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This dissertation draws on the burgeoning field of innovation of low carbon 
technologies. Using the functions of innovation systems, this study explores the process 
of innovation of biofuel ethanol in the U.S. and in Brazil. It uses “process theory” to 
build a narrative of historical events that represent the innovation trajectory of ethanol 
biofuel in the U.S. and in Brazil over a period of thirty years. The data is drawn from 
newspaper articles from the New York Times, Washington Post, and O Estado de Sao 
Paulo   published between 1975 and 2008. Results of this research confirm findings 
published previously that innovation performs better when the main actors in the 
innovation process act under clear and well defined policy targets, and when the 
innovation environment contributes to building positive expectations about the 
technology. The empirical findings build upon the literature and validate early claims that 
the alignment of goals between technology producers and users is an inducer of 
innovation. Moreover, the analysis presented shows that by developing new capabilities, 
technology users in the downstream market broaden the innovation environment and 
facilitate the adoption of the emerging technology by new users and markets. For 
example, the automobile sector has been participating actively in the ethanol 
technological innovation system in Brazil, facilitating the innovation flow between 
upstream and the downstream market. This has not been the case in the U.S., where the 










1.1 Transportation sector: the oil drive 
 Our over-reliance on fossil fuels will lead the world to an unsustainable path of 
energy consumption, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and climate change (IEA, 2009a; 
NAS, 2009; Walter, Rosillo-Calle, Dolzan, Piacente, & da Cunha, 2008). Under business 
as usual, fossil fuels will account for the largest increase in energy use in the next twenty 
years, with the transportation sector claiming 97% of the growth during this period (IEA, 
2009a, 2009b).   
 Developed economies claim large amounts of fuels for transportation, but the 
main factors pushing fuel consumption worldwide are population growth and higher 
vehicle ownership in emerging economies (IEA, 2009a). Demand for fuel will be driven 
not only by American and European automobile markets, but by a growing proportion of 
new consumers buying cars for the first time in China, Russia and India over the next 




Figure 1: From the IEA World Energy Outlook 2009: Passenger light duty vehicle fleet and 
vehicle ownership per capita 
 
 In the United States, transportation accounts for one third of energy related 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (AEO2010), with Americans consuming approximately 
14 million barrels of oil per day, 9 million of which is used to power a fleet of more than 
200 million light duty vehicles (Earley & Mc Keown, 2009; NAS, 2009). The 
transportation sector accounts for 28%1 of the national energy consumption, and supply is 
mostly dependent (98%) on oil  (US DOE, 2009).  There has been a growing sense that 
technological innovations2   alongside with environmental policies are critical to help the 
U.S. reverse this scenario (Alic, Mowery, & Rubin, 2003; Holdren, 2006).  
 The U.S. growing vulnerability on energy security and climate change has 
justified public policies promoting research, development and the adoption of low carbon 
and sustainable3  technologies to replace fossil fuels4 . Biofuels, which are alternative 
                                                 
 
 
1 From which highway vehicle travel accounts for 85%. 
2 http://www.americanenergyinnovation.org/ 
3 Sustainable technologies emit lower levels of GHG, they are economically affordable, and they use 
resources that can be replaced without harming social and environmental systems (NSB 2009). 
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fuels derived from biomass (non-fossil, organic, renewable), are considered one of the 
short term solutions available to replace part of America’s fossil fuel demand for 
transports (EERE/Biomass, 2009; Holdren, 2006). Like other low carbon technologies, 
biofuels face tough competition against fossil fuels. These alternative fuels still struggle 
to develop within a system that does not enable the adoption of routines or rules that are 
conducive to technological progress, or high market penetration of low carbon 
technologies. 
 Given the potential contribution of biofuels to replace part of the growing demand 
of fossil fuels, the study of the innovation of biofuels deserves particular attention. 
Biofuels compete with an incumbent – fossil fuels like gasoline and diesel - that 
dominates the market, and is embedded within an innovation environment that has not yet 
developed the mechanisms to enable the full development and market penetration of 
clean technologies (Timothy Foxon, Kohler, & Neuhoff, 2008a; Marko P. Hekkert & 
Negro, 2009; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009).  In this sense, identifying the barriers and inducers 
of the process of development, diffusion, and adoption of biofuels is an important topic 
for research.  
 Innovation is a process that enables and promotes the creation, diffusion, and 
adoption of new technologies or new processes (Edquist, 2005; Kline & Rosemberg, 
1986; B.A. Lundvall, 2007).  The systemic view of innovation argues that the process of 
innovation is long, complex, and it does not happen in isolation (Edquist, 2005). Drawing 
on theories of innovation, this study explores the process of innovation of biofuels 
examining historical events that represent the innovation trajectory of biofuels in the U.S. 
and Brazil – the two largest producers - over a period of thirty years. The study analyzes 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
4 Energy Secretary Steven Chu emphasized the importance of science and technology and innovation to 
promote renewable energy and efficiency at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009 
(www.energy.gov/news/8394.htm) 
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chronological events around ethanol in the U.S. and Brazil using a set of quantitative and 
qualitative analytical methods. It uses “process theory” (Van de Ven & Poole, 2000) to 
build a sequence of events from newspaper articles published between 1975 and 2008.  
 The dissertation confirms results reported previously that innovation performs 
better when the main actors in the innovation process act under clear and well defined 
policy targets, and when the innovation environment contributes to build positive 
expectations about the technology. This result is consistent with the assumption that: 1) 
actors within the innovation environment operate under uncertainty and bounded 
rationality; and 2) they pursue searching, interacting, and learning activities to innovate – 
that is, to develop, diffuse, and adopt new knowledge and technologies (B. A. Lundvall, 
2007). The empirical findings also validate early claims that the alignment of goals 
between technology producers and users is an inducer of innovation.  
 Building on the literature of innovation systems, this study proposes and tests 
empirically an additional function of innovation – capability building in the downstream 
market. This concept suggests that in some cases, innovation in the downstream market 
creates conditions to accelerate innovation in the upstream market. The case of the 
rebound of the ethanol industry in Brazil following the development of the flex-fuel 
vehicle capable of running on ethanol, gasoline, or any mixture of the two fuels offers 
empirical support for this claim. The study shows that the development of flex fuel 
vehicles in Brazil took advantage of and built upon the knowledge acquired during the 
early years of the National Alcohol Program, when Brazilians drove cars with engines 
tuned and adapted for ethanol.   
1.2 The dynamics of innovation of biofuel ethanol 
 This study focuses on biofuel ethanol, rather than other major biofuel, biodiesel, 
because ethanol has the largest production volume in the world, with U.S. and Brazil 
sharing approximately 85% of global output in 2009 (RFA, 2010). Moreover, ethanol 
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competes with gasoline and is compatible with combustion engines, the technology used 
in most light duty vehicles in the U.S. and Brazil.    
 Both Brazil and the U.S. started industrial production and mass commercialization 
of ethanol during the 1970s, in reaction to the Arab Oil Embargo. As a sugar producer 
since colonial times, Brazil developed ethanol capacity using sugarcane as a feedstock. 
Leader and largest exporter of corn, the U.S. capacity is 99% derived from corn-based 
ethanol. These two feedstocks have different costs and require different conversion 
processes to ethanol. Despite the difference in process, both products serve the market of 
combustion engines for the transportation sector, and compete directly with gasoline. 
Studying the innovation trajectory of ethanol in the United States and Brazil offers the 
opportunity to understand two different processes with different interplay of factors 
leading to different outcomes of innovation in ethanol.  
 In this study, low carbon technologies relate to technologies that have been 
developed with the goal of decreasing carbon related gas emissions into the atmosphere. 
They include, but are not limited to, renewable energy technologies such as wind, solar, 
biomass, geothermal, fuel cell, hydrogen, and others; coal with carbon sequestration; and 
energy efficiency technologies. Throughout this dissertation, the term “low carbon 
technology” may be used interchangeably with “clean energy”, or “green energy” to 
characterize alternatives to fossil fuel or carbon-based technologies. 
 
1.3 The two cases 
 Studying the innovation of ethanol in the U.S. is useful, because it helps 
understand how a decade of strong investments in R&D, and long term mandates and 
financial and fiscal incentives has not delivered a sustained market penetration of ethanol 
in transportation. The U.S. started its ethanol industry after the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo 
by producing gasohol, a 10% blend of corn-based ethanol and gasoline. Strong 
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government commitment towards high targets of ethanol began after 2000. The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 established the goal of using 9 billion gallons of biofuels in 2008. The 
Energy Independency and Security Act of 2007 (EISA 2007) expanded the mandate of 
biofuels and established the goal of consuming 36 billion gallons until the year 2022 
(Yacobucci & Bracmort, 2009). Stimulated by tax breaks and mandates, the U.S. became 
the world’s largest ethanol producer (51% of the world production) in 2006. 
  Americans have also been the leaders in R&D investments in advanced 
technologies that process biomass (from cellulose and non edible) for ethanol production 
((S&T)2ConsultantsInc., 2009; EERE/Biomass, 2009; IEA, 2009a; Kamis & Joshi, 
2008)); American firms, academic, and research institutions have been the world first in 
scientific publications and patent applications in ethanol-related technologies (Kamis & 
Joshi, 2008). And yet, despite American primacy in science and technology in biofuels 
(Berger & Cozzens, 2009), and strong government incentives for large production, there 
is still low penetration of biofuels in the gasoline market (approximately 5%). Around 
99% of ethanol is used as oxygenate or additive, in blends of 10% with gasoline (US 
DOE, 2009). Currently, the U.S. has approximately 8 million flex fuels vehicles (less 
than 4% of its car fleet) capable of using E85, a blend of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline, 
but most of them run on 100% gasoline, because there is not the necessary infrastructure 
to distribute ethanol fuel around the country (GAO, 2009; RFA, 2010). Despite the strong 
technology push and long term government market incentives, ethanol has been a 
complement, and not a substitute for gasoline in the U.S. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has not approved ethanol blends above 10%, and industrial growth has 
been hampered by the blend wall, or the limited size (10% of the gasoline market) of the 
blender market5 .    
                                                 
 
 
5 Ethanol installed capacity is approaching 10% of the gasoline market. 
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 The case of Brazil is useful to explore a process of innovation that culminated into 
a successful and self-reinforcing innovation system. Like the U.S., Brazil began its 
ethanol innovation process in earnest following the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. At that time, 
Brazil’s military government addressed the country’s dependence on oil (80% of oil 
demand was imported) and financial stress, by putting together a national plan to produce 
and distribute ethanol from sugarcane. Like the U.S., Brazil focused its innovation 
process by investing in science and technology in the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
But in contrast with the U.S., the private automobile sector joined the ethanol innovation 
process since the first years of the program.  
 Supported by government incentives, Brazil was the only country to develop 
commercially a program with vehicles capable of running on 100% ethanol during the 
1980s (J. Goldemberg, 2009). Despite strong incentives and opportunities during the 
1970s and 1980s, shortage of ethanol and low international oil prices put the program 
almost to a halt during the 1990s. It was only in 2003 that the flex fuel engine technology 
allowed consumers to regain trust in ethanol, making the case for strong investments in 
research and production, thus higher participation in the market. The case of Brazil 
reveals an innovation trajectory of a technology that took more than three decades to 
build a self-reinforcing system able to compete with gasoline. Contrary to the U.S., 
currently the penetration of ethanol in the Brazilian market is high, accounting for 40% of 
the gasoline demand, thanks in part to the recent success of flex fuel vehicles that today 
account for 90% of sales of light duty cars  (J. Goldemberg, 2009; Jose Goldemberg & 
Guardabassi, 2009). 
1.4 Innovation of low carbon technologies: “carbon lock-in” 
and functions of innovation 
 This research uses theories that draw on the systems of innovation school, which 
treats innovation as a system composed of agents, networks, and institutions that interact 
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to produce, and diffuse new technologies. The systemic view of innovation goes beyond 
the linear model of “technology push” and “market pull”, emphasizing the critical role of 
interaction, collaboration, and reciprocity among firms, suppliers, customers, and other 
agents participating in the innovation process. The innovation systems approach 
considers learning a fundamental mechanism to promote technological change. Learning 
stimulates the generation of new knowledge or new combinations of existing knowledge 
within the system. The innovation process is evolutionary and cumulative; it is influenced 
by political, economic, institutional, and social factors, and has feedback mechanisms 
(Edquist, 2005). Innovation systems can take different dimensions, and have been studied 
at the national (B. A. Lundvall, 1992; B.A. Lundvall, 2007; Nelson, 1993), at the sectoral 
(Malerba, 2002), at the regional (Saxenian, 1994), and at the technological level 
(Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmen, & Rickne, 2002b; Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991).  
In order to understand the socio-institutional environment that surrounds the emergence 
of ethanol over time, this study analyzes ethanol evolving within a technological 
innovation system (TIS). Technological innovation systems refer to the set of institutions, 
agents, and networks that use resources available to produce technological change 
(Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991). Using innovation systems at the technology level and 
not at the national, sectoral, or regional level facilitates the task of understanding the 
dynamics of innovation over a long period of time, because it reduces the scope of the 
analysis to agents, networks and institutions specific to the technology in question. It 
facilitates the close examination of whether the components of TIS are supporting the 
emerging technology and whether the technology is reinforcing the agents, institutions, 
and networks around it (Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009).  Technological innovation 
systems have been useful to explain the process of innovation of emerging technologies 
(B. A. Lundvall, 2007).  
 The concept of technological change is critical to understand the context within 
which low carbon technologies emerge. Technological change is an evolutionary process 
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that results from a combination of new technological capabilities or from new 
institutional or organizational arrangements of old technological competences (Carlsson 
et al., 2002; Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 2002). Technological change is endogenous to 
innovation systems, that is, it is determined by technological, economic, political, and 
social factors embedded in the technology’s innovation environment. Technology change 
is path dependent, that is, without external events it tends to follow a specific path, or a 
technological trajectory consistent with established knowledge and procedures to solve 
specific problems - a “technological paradigm”  (Dosi, 1982).  Technological change 
happens as a result of interactions among economic, social, and institutional factors once 
a technological paradigm has been established; thus, the phenomenon of “path 
dependency” (David, 2000). In this context, past events related to a technology become 
relevant and have important implications for the understanding of the innovation process. 
Over time, stronger linkages between technology and its institutional and regulatory 
environment, along with less uncertainty about technology developments, create 
conditions for self-reinforcing mechanisms, or increasing returns to adoption (T. Foxon 
& Pearson, 2008). In the absence of external forces, increasing returns to adoption lead to 
“lock-ins” of incumbent technologies, creating barriers against potential rivals (David, 
2000; Timothy Foxon, Kohler, & Neuhoff, 2008; T. Foxon & Pearson, 2008).  
 A successful innovation outcome of low carbon technologies can be determined 
by the technology’s ability to displace the incumbent fossil fuel, and penetrate in the 
market. Moreover, a successful innovation process is one that takes the emerging 
technology to a self-reinforcing path of positive feedbacks and market penetration.  In the 
case of ethanol, a successful innovation process is one that displaces gasoline and creates 
conditions for a self-sustained growth in the transportation market. The innovation 
system surrounding ethanol may contribute or hamper its successful innovation 
trajectory.   
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 The innovation of ethanol is one facing “lock-in”, because ethanol needs to 
compete and survive within a system where actors, networks, and institutions still remain 
“locked in” to fossil fuel technologies, in the case, gasoline and oil. Because of the public 
good nature of energy security and climate change mitigation, market forces cannot drive 
innovation without public policy interventions. (Timothy Foxon et al., 2008b). The 
institutional and socio-economic environment reinforces the market consolidation of 
fossil fuels, thus making more difficult the process of innovation of ethanol. The reality 
facing the ethanol industry in the United States illustrates some of the barriers typical of 
the innovation process of “low carbon” technologies. To compete with long time 
established carbon-based (derived from fossil fuels) technologies like gasoline, ethanol 
needs to break the inertia of a system that is designed to run on fossil fuel-based 
technologies. This phenomenon, known as “carbon lock-in” (Brown, Chandler, Lapsa, & 
Sovacool, 2007; G. C. Unruh, 2000; Gregory C. Unruh, 2002; Gregory C. Unruh & 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006), has been a barrier in the process of innovation of low carbon 
technologies. For example, gasoline prices and tax burden in the U.S. are low compared 
to other countries6 , making more difficult the competition of ethanol with gasoline in the 
U.S.; the fuel distribution system (transportation from industrial plants in pipelines) is 
expensive and it has been conceived to transport fossil fuels (sunk costs); only a minority 
of gas stations is equipped with ethanol pumps. Most light duty vehicles sold have 
gasoline only engines that take up to 10% ethanol; flex fuel vehicles (FFVs) are minority 
and most run on gasoline because of lack of distribution infrastructure; automakers don’t 
invest in flex fuel vehicles because there is no infrastructure, and gas stations don’t invest 
in ethanol pumps because there are not enough FFVs. Breaking the barrier of “carbon 
                                                 
 
 
6 As of November of 2008, average retail prices of gasoline in the US was US$ 2.12/gal,  against  4.77 in 
Brazil,  3.60 in Chile, 2.95 in Argentina, 2.80 in Mexico, 5.75 in France, 5.45 in UK, and 5.90 in Germany 
in the same period (GTZ 2009 at http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/30005.htm).  
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lock-in” and displacing the incumbent technology is then a complex process, it warrants 
government programs, and takes a long time to happen. Moreover, because of the public 
good nature of climate change and energy security, the process of innovation of ethanol 
faces market failures. For this reason, public policies to stimulate innovation of ethanol 
are justified to guarantee the optimal provision of those public goods to society (Popp, 
Newell, & Jaffe, 2009; Stern, 2007).  
1.5 Functions of innovation systems 
 Scholars have been studying the innovation process by monitoring the functions 
or activities of innovation around a technology. They argue that the innovation process is 
long, complex, and dynamic. A technological innovation system performs well when 
technological possibilities overcome barriers in the system and generate consumer 
products in the market (Carlsson et al., 2002).  
 Innovation relates to the development, diffusion, and adoption of technology. 
Because most low carbon technologies have to compete with fossil fuels that dominate 
the market, in this case the performance of innovation may be explained by a measure of 
how the clean technology breaks “carbon lock-in”, and displaces the incumbent (fossil) 
technology in the market. This process of innovation is intrinsically dynamic, complex, 
and evolutionary. To facilitate understanding of the dynamics of the innovation process 
of low carbon technologies, some scholars developed a methodology to monitor and 
measure the functions or activities of innovation systems over time.  They claimed that 
the successful performance of innovation systems depends on the intensity of each 
function and relies on the level of interaction among its functions over time, that is, how 
functions interact with each other to form positive (virtuous) or negative (vicious) cycles 
of innovative activity (Anna Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, & Rickne, 2008; M. 
P. Hekkert, Harmsen, & de Jong, 2007; Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009; M. P. Hekkert, 
Suurs, Negro, Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2007; Negro, 2007). Scholars suggest that a number 
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of functions need to be present and fulfilled : 1) entrepreneurial activity to emerge and 
displace the incumbent technology; 2) knowledge creation to stimulate learning by 
experimentation; 3) knowledge diffusion to stimulate learning by interaction; 4) guidance 
of research to guide strategic decision making and stimulate positive expectations around 
the new technology; 5) market formation to create a niche market and stimulate the 
penetration of the new technology; 6) investments in material and human resources; and 
7) legitimation of the new technology to help break the inertia of the incumbent 
technology within the institutional and socio-economic environment (Anna Bergek et al., 
2008; Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009; M. P. Hekkert, Suurs et al., 2007).  
 The functional analysis of innovation is a conceptual framework in formation. 
Different works suggest different lists of functions of innovation. Bergek et al. (2008) 
provides a complete account of different versions, and concludes that over time most 
authors have converged around a common set of functions. Some empirical research has 
confirmed that the seven functions that have been described previously are relevant for 
the study of the process of innovation of some low carbon technologies (Marko P. 
Hekkert & Negro, 2009). But previous research does not confirm whether the set of 
functions explains the overall dynamics of the innovation process. In other words, it is 
possible to affirm that the proposed functions of innovation are necessary to explain 
dynamics of innovation of low carbon technologies, but the literature has not empirically 
tested whether the set of functions is sufficient to explain the dynamics of innovation of 
low carbon technologies.  
 Bergek and colleagues (2004, 2008) propose an additional function of innovation 
named “Development of external economies”. The authors claim that at the onset of the 
innovation process, an emerging TIS enlarges its scope of innovation by building a 
number of linkages with new actors who become active within the TIS. This dynamic 
creates opportunities for the TIS to generate positive externalities within the process of 
innovation, such as pooled labor work, a larger and high quality supply of intermediate 
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goods, and increased flow of knowledge within the system (Anna Bergek et al., 2008; A. 
Bergek, Jacobsson, & Sandén, 2008; Jacobsson, 2008; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004). The 
function “Development of external economies” has not been tested empirically by studies 
mapping the innovation of emerging technologies (Anna Bergek et al., 2008).  
 
The downstream market may contribute to the process of innovation 
 This dissertation contributes to the field by building on the function 
“Development of external economies”, and proposes a function that is specific to the 
downstream market. Downstream market relates to users of the technology or product 
carrying the technology. In the case of ethanol, the downstream market relates to car 
producers, and also to fuel distributors. As it is defined in this study, the downstream 
market applies to products and technologies that are not at the end of the supply chain. In 
other words, downstream market relates to industries or sectors of the economy, and not 
to final consumers. 
 When it develops capabilities to support the upstream market, or the producers of 
the emerging technology, a downstream market that has goals and strategies aligned with 
players of the upstream market co-evolves, converges, and ultimately “embraces” the 
technological innovation system. At some point, it participates and becomes an integral 
component of the innovation process. This study proposes the function “Building of 
capabilities in the downstream market” as an additional function to the set of the seven 
functions previously proposed. This function can be considered a sub-set of the function 
suggested by Bergek and colleagues, because the downstream market is a sub-set of the 
economy external to the technological innovation system (TIS). 
  By developing a capability (technological, industrial, commercial, institutional), 
the downstream market becomes increasingly embedded within the TIS, developing a 
niche market for the new technology to emerge. This concept is consistent with Carlsson 
et al.(2002), who argue that innovation systems perform well when technology 
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possibilities fulfill market demands, and when technologies can match market 
competencies (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 2002), leading towards an alignment of goals 
between producers and users of technology. The potential contribution of the downstream 
market is greater when the technology is emerging and needs to face barriers of the 
incumbent technology.  In the early life of a technology or a product, there are few 
players within the technological innovation system. This stage of the innovation process 
creates opportunities for building linkages between technology producers and technology 
users that can be critical for the future innovation trajectory of the new technology. In this 
context, the downstream market can take the lead in advancing its own products and 
technologies to maximize the advantages of the technology produced by the upstream 
market, therefore maximizing the chances that the emerging technology will displace the 
incumbent in the short term.  The usefulness of building capabilities in the downstream 
market is less evident in non emerging technologies and, as has been mentioned, in 
consumer products. 
 The renewable energy sector can benefit from a downstream market more akin to 
clean energy.  As has been mentioned previously, low carbon technologies cannot always 
take advantage of the low cost infrastructure available to fossil fuel-based energy 
systems. In this sense, low carbon technologies face an additional barrier to displace 
fossil fuel technologies. Facilitating the connection and maximizing potential synergies 
between the downstream and upstream markets can mitigate the intrinsic barriers 
between the production and use of renewable energy systems. For example, building of 
capabilities in the downstream market can be applied to home systems. The innovation 
and institutional environment that regulates energy use in home systems can induce the 
use of clean technologies such as photovoltaic (PV) solar panels and heating pumps by 
engaging the home building sector (civil engineering and architecture) to build capability 
in sustainable systems in coordination with target technologies such as PV panels. The 
same concept can be applied between intermittent sources of energy such as wind and the 
 15
development in smart grid systems that develop an expertise in predicting energy 
generation following climate models. The main goal is to engage the downstream market 
and to maximize coordination between producers and users of clean technologies.  
 Very often, different technological innovation systems compete for the same 
downstream market. This is the case of the TIS ethanol and TIS gasoline competing for 
the automobile sector (combustion engines). By developing a specific capability, the 
downstream industry can attract the emerging technology to the detriment of the 
incumbent. In the case of ethanol, the automobile sector (including fuel distribution) has 
an active role in developing a niche that facilitates the use of ethanol by the final 
consumer. The more the automobile sector fulfils this role or function, the better for the 
performance of the ethanol TIS. This function, however, does not operate in isolation. It 
is part of a set of functions that interact to form positive feedback mechanisms to create 
long term innovation. For example, the development and commercialization of vehicles 
having engines with flex-fuel technology can facilitate the penetration of ethanol in the 
automobile market. The convergence between the ethanol and the downstream market 
(fuel distribution and automotive sectors) is critical to stimulate the penetration of ethanol 
and the displacement of gasoline in the transportation sector, or it is critical for the 
performance of innovation of ethanol over time (fig.2). 
 16
 
Figure 2: TIS 1 (ethanol) competing with TIS 2 (gasoline)  
for the Downstream Market (automobiles - internal combustion) 
Source: Own author  
 
 The performance of the TIS composed of eight functions of innovation is assessed 
quantitatively by measuring the number and the intensity of functions of innovation over 
time. It is assessed qualitatively by identifying interactions among functions that induce 
or block the process of sustained innovation. Because functions interact and reinforce 
each other, all functions need to be present and active. When all functions are 
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individually fulfilled and interact with each other, a TIS can successfully nurture a 
sustained process of innovation (development, diffusion, and adoption of new 
technologies).   
 Using the functions of innovation to map the innovation process of ethanol in the 
U.S. and in Brazil between 1975 and 2008, this study raises the following questions: 
 
1.Q   What are the differences between the functions of innovation of ethanol in the 
U.S. and Brazil? How have those differences evolved over time?  
2.Q   Which are the strongest and weakest functions in each country? How do they 
compare to each other? 
3.Q   What are the causal patterns (blocking and inducing mechanisms) that explain 
the outcomes of ethanol development for each country over time?  
 
 The literature leads us to expect that the function Guidance of Research (F4) is an 
important trigger of innovation within the ethanol system. The renewable energy sector 
requires particular conditions for innovation to happen. In order to overcome “carbon 
lock-in” and penetrate in the fossil fuels market, the system demands incentives that 
generate a positive expectation for technology producers (supply side), and for 
technology users (demand side). The extent to which carbon intensive technologies are 
embedded in the technological, economic, and institutional environment will dictate how 
much incentive renewable technologies will need to penetrate in the market. Some may 
include regulations, procurement, market obligations, pricing, training, R&D 
investments, among others. In this sense, the expectation around the technology plays a 
critical role driving decisions around investments in R&D, production, and over the 
legitimation of the technology among the actors of the ethanol TIS. I expect Guidance of 
research (F4) will have a positive effect in knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion 
(F2), (F3) of ethanol, promoting more investments in resources (F6), boosting 
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entrepreneurial activity (F1). This pattern has been identified by authors exploring cases 
on biomass digestion and biomass co-firing in Germany (Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 
2009; Negro & Hekkert, 2008); biomass gasification and biomass digestion in the 
Netherlands (Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009); biofuels in Sweden and in the 
Netherlands (Hillman, Suurs, Hekkert, & SandÃ©n, 2008; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009); and 
biopower (CHP) in Sweden (Jacobsson, 2008). These cases indicate that there is a 
cumulative pattern where the function Guidance of Research is a precursor of a positive 
cycle of innovation. However, neither of the empirical studies have statistical power, nor 
sufficient qualitative insights to generate persuasive and testable hypotheses. Since the 
‘functions of innovation’ is a concept in formation, most empirical studies concentrate in 
testing the usefulness of the list of functions. They also focus on providing qualitative 
insights that enrich our understanding about the process of innovation of low carbon 
technologies. By answering the research questions, this dissertation will contribute to the 
task of validating the usefulness of the set of functions of innovations proposed by the 
literature. 
1.6 Policy relevance: biofuels innovation is a priority in 
President Obama’s agenda 
 The study of innovation of biofuels is relevant in this moment when the Obama 
administration is proposing steps to boost the production of sustainable biofuels7 . This 
study shows that despite government policy and action towards the development of 
biofuels in the U.S., the industry has not been able to unlock “carbon lock-in” and 
displace gasoline in the market in a sustained way. This analysis contributes to the 
decision making process by clarifying the process of innovation of biofuels. The 






analytical tools used in the study suggest that biofuels occupy a broad innovation 
environment, one that requires a policy coordination and strategic convergence between 
agriculture, industry, and the transportation sector.   
 This research goes beyond an assessment of technological differences.  By 
mapping the functions of innovation over time, it informs how the functions interact to 
induce or block the process of innovation growth. At the methodological level, the 
research offers the possibility to analyze and compare biofuel ethanol as a technological 
innovation system between an industrialized and a developing country over time.  It also 
offers American policy makers a benchmark analysis of three decades of development of 
biofuel ethanol that culminated in a successful program of alternative fuels in Brazil8 (J. 
Goldemberg, 2007; OECD, 2008; Sandalow, 2006). 
 
1.7 Methodology: Process theory, and historical events as unit 
of analysis 
 The functions of innovation perspective is a causal and evolutionary framework 
that cannot be tested by an independent/dependent variable relationship, but rather by a 
mechanism of path-dependency, with multiple causes and outcomes, or a sequence of 
causal relationships with self-reinforcing characteristics (Gerring, 2001, 2007). 
Therefore, explanations of outcomes are based on patterns of temporal and geographical 
variation of functions of innovation, such as positive (virtuous cycles) and negative 
(vicious) feedback (Pierson, 2003). By plotting the evolution of functions over time, I 
expect to identify the patterns of development for each function, and the emergence of 
                                                 
 
 
8 Brazil has the most competitive ethanol process in the world. 90% of Brazilian light duty vehicles can run 
on gasoline, ethanol or any mixture of the two fuels.   
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positive and negative feedback, providing support for a comparative analysis between the 
U.S. and Brazil.  
 The methodology is based on process theory, which claims that the process of 
innovation relates to the chain of events that represent how people interact to develop and 
implement new concepts and ideas over time. The events are assumed to represent 
instances when change is observed within the innovation system. In this research, change 
relates to the longitudinal change in the functions of innovation systems of ethanol, or in 
the context influencing change over time. The research design assumes that each 
newspaper article represents an empirical observation of an event, also the object of 
analysis for the purpose of research.  
 The data consists of newspaper articles from the U.S. and Brazil containing news 
or describing events related to ethanol in the two countries between 1975 and 2008. The 
methodology, described in detail in chapter 4, follows 6 steps: 
 
1. Bibliographic research: search in the international database Lexis Nexis 
Academic9 , limiting to U.S. newspapers New York Times and Washington Post. The 
search was complemented with archival research at the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de 
Sao Paulo. The search generated a dataset of 1750 articles organized as a list of 
chronological events that were individually imported to NVivo, a software specialized in 
qualitative analysis. 
                                                 
 
 
9 Database containing searchable data of legal, news, and business sources worldwide.    
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2. Coding of events:  using NVivo capabilities, each event was coded into categories 
(functions of innovation) defined by the theory, following a codebook previously 
designed through an inductive coding process10 .  
3. Data analysis and plotting: once reported events (represented by newspaper 
articles) were classified according to the codebook, they were plotted against time to 
analyze quantitatively the evolution of each function of innovation for each country over 
time. 
4. Interviews with specialists: This step gathered information obtained from 
unstructured interviews with specialists from the U.S. and from Brazil. The goal of the 
interviews was to complement the data from newspapers and gray literature with insights 
from specialists who have experienced many years of the innovation process of ethanol. 
Because each specialist has a different focus, the interview was geared towards the 
experience of each interviewee.  
5. Process analysis: a narrative story line was developed by using a chronological 
sequence of events. This step took into account the different contexts of each country, 
and the exogenous factors influencing the functions and the development of innovation 
over time.  The goal of this step was to explain how functions interact with each other 
leading to positive and to negative feedback mechanisms. By linking narrative to graphic 
representation of functions, the goal of this step was to identify the causal patterns 
leading to the emergence of positive or negative cycles of change and development. Gray 
literature and interviews with specialists were used to complement and validate the inputs 
obtained from newspaper articles. 
                                                 
 
 
10 I create a sub-level of coding subordinated to the main functions of innovation. I do that for all events or 
articles published by the New York Times. This process helped me create a codebook with detailed 
descriptions for each function of innovation. 
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6. Comparative analysis: the steps described were applied to the two countries, 
providing the necessary data to compare the patterns of development of innovation in 
ethanol over time.  
 The remaining of the dissertation includes the following chapters: 
 Chapter 2 explores the theories of innovation. It starts by introducing the concept 
of innovation systems, and how the concept evolved from the classical theories of 
innovation. The chapter defines technological change, and introduces the concepts of 
path dependence, and increasing returns to adoption as the source of technological lock-
ins. In the case of low carbon technologies, carbon lock-in has been a significant barrier 
against the innovation of clean technologies like ethanol. The innovation system school 
now has a scholarship of its own, with programs and studies dedicated to exploring the 
concept in its different dimensions: at the national, at the sectoral, at the regional, and at 
the technological level. Technological innovation systems relate to the set of actors, 
networks, and institutions that interact to produce innovation. The application of the 
functions of innovation using technology as the unit of analysis has been explored more 
recently by scholars investigating the emergence of low carbon technologies. The chapter 
reviews the literature on the functions of innovation systems, providing more detail on 
previous work developed on the field of biofuels.  
 Chapter 3 presents a general description of the ethanol technology in the U.S., and 
the technology in Brazil. The chapter explores the different dimensions of learning, and 
shows the impact of learning in measures of agricultural and industrial productivity, 
energy consumption, and carbon emissions for corn ethanol in the U.S. and sugarcane 
ethanol in Brazil. It is argued that time and learning is essential for innovation to happen. 
The case of corn ethanol illustrates the impact of different technologies (use of different 
energy sources) on the environmental impact of corn ethanol production. The chapter 
shows that the use of low carbon technologies can improve the environmental impact of 
corn ethanol. In fact, there is a significant gap in energy consumption between a plant 
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powered by coal and a plant powered by biomass. The chapter claims that government 
policies may stimulate the supply and demand of more sustainable corn ethanol in the 
U.S. Brazil has adopted the use of bagasse (fiber residue from sugarcane stalks) to power 
its industrial plants. This technological and industrial decision has been critical for the 
positive energy balance, and competitiveness of Brazilian ethanol.  
 Chapter 4 describes the data, the coding process, and the methodology. The 
chapter starts by providing the basic assumptions for the operationalization of variables. 
It then describes process theory, because it is the theoretical source from which the 
methodology is developed.  In process research, the goal is to create a chronological list 
of events around a specific technology, code the events in categories defined by the 
theory, and identify the processes or the patterns that explain how innovation occurs. The 
chapter describes the procedure that is applied to two case studies of the evolution of 
ethanol during the last thirty years, in the U.S. and in Brazil.  
 Chapter 5 answers in part the second research question, identifying quantitatively 
the strongest and weakest functions in each country. It also compares the evolution of 
events for the U.S. and Brazil over time, showing that the period after 2000 is the 
strongest in innovation activity for the two countries. Chapters 6 and 7 bring the results 
drawn from the qualitative analysis. Chapter 6 develops the process analysis or the 
narrative for the U.S., supported by data and graphs (quantitative analysis). Chapter 7 
presents the same as chapter 6, but for Brazil. Chapter 8 compares the two countries and 
Chapter 9 concludes with discussions and policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INNOVATION AS A SYSTEM 
  
 This chapter reviews the literature of innovation systems, focusing on variations 
using technology as unit of analysis. The chapter presents the structural dimensions of 
technological innovation systems (TIS), and explores in more detail the functions or tasks 
of technological innovation systems in the context of innovation of low carbon 
technologies. 
 Scholars have been developing the field of innovation studies for many decades, 
exploring the intersection between science, technology, and economic growth (Stephan, 
1996).  By opening the “black box” (Rosenberg, 1982) of technological change, and  by 
endogenizing technology into the process of innovation (Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
institutional and evolutionary economics challenged the basic premises of neoclassic 
economics.  The analysis of how institutions shape the evolutionary process by which 
technological progress takes place became the theoretical source of scholars who later 
developed the concept of innovation systems (Freeman, 1987; B. A. Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993). Under the systemic approach of innovation, research and development is 
necessary but not sufficient to transform knowledge into economic growth. A preliminary 
comparative bibliographic analysis between the U.S. and Brazil confirms this premise. 
Assessment of the scientific literature indexed by ISI Web of Science during the last 30 
years, shows that U.S. institutions have published almost four times as much as Brazilian 
institutions in the field of biofuels. And yet, as this research project will show, the 
industry in Brazil performs better in cost competitiveness, energy and land intensity than 
its counterpart in the U.S.   
 Lundvall (1992) underlined the importance of interaction between producers and 
users of technology, and the role of institutions to bridge technology capacity to market 
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needs. By acknowledging that actors make decisions under conditions of “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1997), the innovation systems concept underlines the critical role of 
individual and organizational interaction, defining patterns of behavior that can 
ultimately predict how the process of individual and group learning takes place (Nelson, 
2002). Under the systemic approach, firms are assumed not to operate in isolation, and 
external linkages become critical determinants of innovation. Challenging the neoclassic 
approach, investments in technology take place even under uncertainty. 
 According to the innovation systems framework, knowledge is localized. Firms 
learn from different sources, and in order to survive competition, they adapt their routines 
to the environment that surrounds them. Inherent to the evolutionary tradition is the 
concept of path dependency that characterizes the process of technological change as 
“learning by doing” (Arrow, 1962), “learning by using” (Rosenberg, 1982), and “learning 
by interacting” (B. A. Lundvall, 1992; 2002). Scholars developing the innovation system 
approach assume increasing returns to adoption and learning, thus rejecting the linear 
nature of technological change. Therefore, time and history are relevant, since the 
performance of a new technology depends on past decisions embedded in technologies 
and institutions from the past (T. J. Foxon et al., 2005). 
 The systemic approach of innovation was first introduced by Freeman (1987), 
who developed the concept of National Systems of Innovation to study Japan’s industry 
during the 1980s. Nelson (1993) further developed the concept to compare how different 
national economies evolve over time. Edquist (1997) provides a general definition of 
national systems of innovation as “all important economic, social, political, 
organizational, institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion 
and use of innovations” (Edquist, 2005). 
 The systemic approach proved to be useful to explain innovation in regions 
(Cooke, 2001; Saxenian, 1994), sectors (Malerba, 2002), and around specific 
technologies (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991). Aware of its limitations in the study of 
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developing countries, and in explaining and assessing the dynamics of innovative activity 
overtime, Lundvall (2007; 2002) more recently has broadened the framework to 
incorporate the concepts of social capital, and capacity building. 
 In order to characterize the evolution of ethanol, this dissertation uses the 
technological innovation systems (TIS) approach, a concept developed by Carlsson and 
Stankievicz in 1991 that later converged into the field of study of innovation systems. 
TIS are innovation systems performing around a specific technology, or a product. 
Taking a technology or a product as the boundary of a system facilitates the task of 
understanding the temporal and geographical evolution of innovative activity. In the case 
of emerging technological systems, actors and institutions interact to combine capabilities 
that create innovation. By displacing the incumbent technology, the new technology 
becomes entrenched in the new socio-economic environment (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 
1991; Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000). Bo Carlsson and colleagues have been working on 
the Technological Innovation System approach since 1987, within the scope of a major 
project commissioned by the Swedish National Board for Industrial and Technical 
Development (VINNOVA). This dissertation draws on more recent version of the theory, 
when the authors broadened the framework to analyze the set of technologies in the field 
of biotechnology. 
 Carlsson et al. (1991) argue that TIS are inherently dynamic, and that identifying 
relationships and feedback loops among the system components overtime are the main 
goals of using TIS as an analytical tool. Technologies11 are embedded in networks of 
institutions and actors, which in turn use the resources available to produce innovation. 
Thus, in order to evaluate the performance of a technological innovation system, it is 
critical to understand the relationship between the technology and the innovation system 
                                                 
 
 
11 Here technology embodies products, machines, processes, and softwares, as well as the technical 
knowledge incorporated on them (Bergek et al. 2008).   
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that surrounds it. Very often TIS overlap with parts of different sectoral and national 
innovation systems, and sometimes the boundaries of a technology coincide with 
national, international, or regional borders (M. P. Hekkert, Suurs et al., 2007; Negro, 
2007).  
 Scholars have used the TIS approach to explain and compare the development of 
different technologies over time.  The concept has been used to analyze the economic 
performance of factory automation in Sweden (Carlsson, 1995), to compare 
biotechnology clusters between the U.S. and Sweden (Carlsson & Braunerhjelm, 2002), 
and to assess the evolution of a number of emerging technologies in the energy sector 
(Carlsson, Elg, & Jacobson, 2006)12 . Many studies revealed that technological 
innovation systems can be analyzed at the structural (Carlsson et al. 2002) and at the 
functional level (M. P. Hekkert, Suurs et al., 2007; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004). 
2.1 Technological Innovation Systems – technological, 
institutional, and economic dimensions 
 
 In a more recent version of the concept, Carlsson et al. (2002) argue that taking 
into account the different structural dimensions of the system facilitates understanding 
innovation dynamics over time and across different regions. The authors define TIS as a 
set of “knowledge and competence networks” which, stimulated by innovative activity, 
can be transformed into “development blocs”, or “synergistic clusters of firms and 
technologies within an industry or a group of industries” (Carlsson et al. 2002: 10).  They 
propose three structural dimensions for analysis:  
                                                 
 
 




• Technological or cognitive dimension:  defined as “design spaces formed by 
clusters of complementary technical capabilities”, where technological growth takes 
place through the combination of new and old capabilities and applications. These new 
combinations can result in new technological possibilities.  
• Institutional and organizational dimension: represented by the network of actors 
that form and transform the design space, and which are influenced by policies and 
institutions that regulate how the techno-economic environment evolves. 
• Economic dimension: also called “competence blocs”, which represent “the set of 
actors who convert technological possibilities into business opportunities and exploit 
them in economic activity”. One design space can deliver technologies to several 
competence blocs. 
 Carlsson et al. (2002) argue that successful technological innovation systems are 
brought up by the evolutionary dynamics between the technological, institutional, and 
economic dimensions of TIS. “The confrontation between technological possibilities and 
the market takes place in an environment largely determined by the actors, networks, and 
institutions within the system” (Carlsson et al. 2002). Performance of innovation depends 
on how design spaces (technological dimension) and competence blocs (economic 
dimension) are able to integrate and address tensions within the innovation systems 
dynamics. This concept is critical in the realm of low carbon technologies.  
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2.2 TIS – a functional analytical approach 
 Scholars studying the field of innovation have developed the concept of 
functions13  of technological innovation systems, suggesting a list of functions that 
innovation systems should perform in order to create, deploy and diffuse new 
technologies. Scholars have applied the functions of innovation to map innovation of low 
carbon technologies in biomass digestion and biomass co-firing in Germany (Marko P. 
Hekkert & Negro, 2009; Negro & Hekkert, 2008); biomass gasification and biomass 
digestion in the Netherlands (Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009); cogeneration in the 
Netherlands (M. P. Hekkert, Harmsen et al., 2007), biofuels in Sweden and in the 
Netherlands (Hillman et al., 2008; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009); and biopower (CHP) in 
Sweden (Jacobsson, 2008). 
 The functionalist approach was developed through a collaboration between a 
group of scholars and policy practitioners from the Swedish Agency for Innovation 
Systems (VINNOVA), the Chalmers University in Sweden, and the Utrecht University in 
the Netherlands (Anna Bergek et al., 2008). These scholars and policy analysts searched 
for theoretical and analytical tools that could complement more conventional approaches 
they considered more limited to explain the dynamics of innovations systems over time. 
They proposed to map a longitudinal series of events, and argued that using the functions 
or activities of innovation systems (instead of or in addition to using more structural 
indicators) 1)  help the analyst capture dynamic trends that very often cannot be revealed 
by structural factors or variables; 2) help explain the underlying factors shaping 
innovation system growth; 3)  help to identify the blocking mechanisms, failures, or 
weaknesses hindering or preventing innovation system development;  4) and help the 
                                                 
 
 
13 The concept of functions of innovation is not related to the “functionalist” approach from the social 
sciences, but instead comes from the field of engineering where systems are designed to perform certain 
tasks or functions (Negro 2007). 
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analyst  identify the inducing mechanisms promoting development, diffusion, and 
adoption of new technologies (Anna Bergek et al., 2008; Carlsson et al., 2006). These 
analytical contributions have had a significant impact for understanding the innovation 
process of low carbon technologies. The innovation of clean technologies faces barriers 
or failures, and it deserves government support because of the public good nature of 
knowledge creation for mitigation of climate change, and energy security. Some factors 
justify policy intervention in the innovation process of low carbon technologies: 
1. “Carbon lock-in” - low carbon technologies face an institutional and socio-
economic environment that tends to reinforce the market consolidation of fossil fuels (G. 
C. Unruh, 2000).  For example, because the infrastructure is adapted to fossil fuels, new 
investments in low carbon technology need to take into account sunk costs of investments 
in carbon intensive technologies. Also, most institutions are designed to support and 
benefit fossil fuels.  
2. Climate change – according to Sir Stern, climate change is considered a negative 
externality in economic terms (Stern, 2007). Therefore, social gains from climate change 
mitigation are greater than private gains, justifying government support to provide the 
optimal amount of mitigation benefits to society (Timothy Foxon et al., 2008; T. Foxon 
& Pearson, 2008). This has been the rational for environmental and energy policies. 
3. Science & technology – knowledge is a public good, which without public 
support tends to be undersupplied to society. Therefore, the creation of knowledge for 
low carbon technologies deserves incentives (such as R&D funding and intellectual 
property rights) to promote public and private research 
4. Energy security – if low carbon technologies are produced and supplied from 
reliable places and from sustainable sources, then they contribute towards energy 
security. Policies should promote local entrepreneurship to guarantee energy supply and 
the development of a vibrant energy industry. 
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 A number of authors claim that mapping the functions of TIS is a useful analytical 
tool to identify blocking (market failures) mechanisms and suggest inducing mechanisms 
(policy prescriptions) influencing the performance of innovation systems over time 
(Hillman et al., 2008; Jacobsson, 2008; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004; Jacobsson & 
Johnson, 2000; Negro & Hekkert, 2008; Negro, Hekkert, & Smits, 2007). The functional 
perspective has been proved useful in longitudinal analysis of different institutional 
environments, offering a powerful tool to map the determinants of innovation within the 
field of renewable energy. Hekkert et al. 200714  propose seven functions that explain 
how innovative activity takes place over time: 
• F1: Entrepreneurial activities – entrepreneurs are central to innovation, linking 
knowledge to market opportunities. Entrepreneurship involves risk and “learning by 
experimentation”. 
• F2: Knowledge creation – this function relates to R&D activities, and is directly 
related to “learning by searching” and “learning by doing”. Learning is considered the 
fundamental aspect of the process of innovation. The functionalist approach leaves the 
knowledge creation activity open to more explicit ways of acquiring knowledge – 
through research (learning by searching) – or to less explicit and more implicit ways of 
learning that takes place through experience (learning by doing) and through social 
interaction (learning by interacting).  Some authors merge knowledge creation and 
knowledge diffusion within the same function of innovation (Anna Bergek et al., 2008).  
• F3: Knowledge diffusion – this function takes place through network of actors 
who are constantly exchanging knowledge. It incorporates the concept of “learning by 
interacting” and “learning by using”.  
                                                 
 
 
14 The development of functions is the result of a meta-analysis of the innovation systems literature, a 
collaborative work between research groups from Utrecht University (Innovation Studies), VINNOVA 
(Swedish Innovation Agency), and Chalmers University. 
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• F4: Guidance of research – this function relates to events that influence the 
definition of policy targets, and the establishment of a research agenda that selects the 
best technology among the options available. Therefore, it affects perception and general 
expectation in relation to the technology.  
• F5: Market formation – it relates to the temporary creation of niche markets, 
allowing the new technology to thrive in the new environment. In the case of low carbon 
technologies, the concept of market formation assumes that government intervention is 
justified to address “carbon lock-in”, climate change, and energy security. 
• F6: Resource mobilization – it relates to both, financial and human resources 
allocated to the technology or product over time. In the case of low carbon technologies, 
public investments are justified on the grounds of “carbon lock-in”, climate change, and 
energy security. 
• F7: Creation of legitimacy – this function has the goal to counteract the inertia 
intrinsic of most systems, where there is often a resistance to change. It can be fulfilled 
by advocacy coalitions or commercial associations that lobby for the new technology.  
Very often, politicians and public authorities act to support the agenda of a specific 
technology. Within a context of “carbon lock-in”, low carbon technologies have a deficit 
of legitimacy among investors, policy makers, and the society.  
 The seven functions of innovation described represent processes happening 
simultaneously within a technological innovation system. From a theoretical perspective, 
they are consistent with the process of innovation as described by Lundvall (2007), who 
argues that innovation is about learning processes, where knowledge is the most 
important resource (B. A. Lundvall, 2007). The first three functions of innovation 
describe the different learning processes. F1-Entrepreneurial activity is about learning by 
experimenting; F2-Knowledge creation is about learning by searching and learning by 
doing; and F3-knowledge diffusion is about learning by using and learning by interacting. 
The four additional functions relate to the barriers or failures specific to the process of 
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innovation of low carbon technologies: F4-Guidance of research relates to the “risky” 
nature of innovation of low carbon technologies - carbon lock-in. Clear policy targets and 
positive expectations about the technology facilitate decisions that support innovation in 
clean technologies; F5-Market formation relate to public policies that address market 
barriers, and they are justified on the grounds of carbon lock-in, and climate change; F6-
Resource allocation map investments in R&D, demonstration, and manufacturing. 
Additional government support may be justified on the grounds of carbon lock-in, 
climate change, and energy security; and F7-Legitimation identifies legitimacy issues of 
low carbon technologies, a weakness explained by carbon lock-in.  
 The literature on innovation systems presents a number of studies using functions 
of innovation to assess the performance of innovation processes. Overall, most studies 
use similar sets of functions at the conceptual level, although naming the functions in 
different ways (Anna Bergek et al., 2008). Galli and Teubal (1997) differentiate between 
hard (R&D and supply of scientific and technical services) and soft functions (diffusion 
of knowledge, implementation of certifications and standards, promotion of science and 
technology through museums, and professional coordination through professional 
associations) (Galli & Teubal, 1997). Rickne (2000) suggests functions such as 1) 
creation of human capital; 2) direction of technology, market, and partner search; 3) 
market creation, market regulation; 4) networking; 5) legitimation of technology and 
firms; and 6) financing, creation of labor market, etc. Bergek et al. (2008) proposes seven 
functions: 1) knowledge creation and diffusion; 2) entrepreneurial experimentation; 3) 
influence on the direction of research; 4) market formation; 5) development of positive 
external economies; 6) legitimation; and 7) resource mobilization. See (Anna Bergek et 
al., 2008) for a thorough discussion and comparison among each one of the studies. 
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2.3 Functions of innovation and the performance of innovation 
 So far, it has been argued that the main goal of technological innovation systems 
is to maximize innovation, that is, the development, diffusion, and adoption of new 
knowledge, or technologies (Anna Bergek et al., 2008; Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmen, & 
Rickne, 2002a). Therefore, the ultimate goal of different technological innovation 
systems (TIS) is to support and nurture an environment that facilitates the innovation 
process. Given the growing interdependency between innovation and economic 
prosperity, policy makers make use of different analytical tools to measure and compare 
the performance of technological innovation systems across different countries (Carlsson 
et al., 2002a). To assess TIS performance, one needs to define performance indicators, 
level of analysis, and the importance of each indicator (since the weight of each indicator 
may change with the level of maturity of the technology to be analyzed) (Carlsson & 
Stankiewicz, 2002).  Scholars have suggested different indicators: for example, 1) 
generation of technology can be measured by number of scientific publications, number 
of patents, investments in R&D, number of scientists, etc.; 2) diffusion of technology can 
be measured by number of spinoffs, mobility of professionals, number of licenses, joint 
ventures, etc.; 3) and economic activity can be measured by volume of sales, market 
share, number of new companies, etc. (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 2002; Rickne, 2000). 
Some of these indicators relate to the components of innovation systems, and may not 
reflect the systemic nature of the environment where emerging technologies evolve 
(Carlsson et al., 2002b).  
 As previously argued, to accomplish the final goal of developing, diffusing, and 
adopting technologies, a TIS performs different tasks, or activities, or functions. The 
performance of a TIS can be assessed by the intensity (strength) and/or quality (how 
functions interact) of the tasks/functions fulfilled by the different components of the TIS 
(Anna Bergek et al., 2008). In this way, the measurement of performance is done at the 
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systemic level, and not at the system’s components level. The systemic nature of TIS 
presupposes actors or network of actors performing tasks that contribute to the innovation 
process. Measuring tasks or functions instead of indicators at the system’s component 
level moves the analytical focus from actors and institutions to the process of innovation. 
This additional analytical perspective may add important clues about weaknesses or 
failures in the innovation process, and about which inducement mechanisms (translated 
into policy interventions) may accelerate the process of innovation of a particular 
technology. A TIS performs well if a large number of functions are present and are 
fulfilled by the components of the system. Moreover, since functions interact, functions 
can also be fulfilled by the effects of other functions. Therefore, performance is not 
assessed by a dependent/independent variable relationship, but by a mechanism of path-
dependency, with multiple causes and outcomes, or a sequence of causal relationships 
with self-reinforcing characteristics.    
2.4 Functions of innovation and ethanol 
 While the seven functions of innovation proposed by Hekkert et al. (2007) are 
broad categories that can be applied to a large pool of technologies, they also reveal to be 
a useful theoretical approach to study the evolution of biofuels, as demonstrated by Suurs 
et al. (2007, 2009) and by (Hillman et al., 2008) in the cases of biofuels in the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Those studies show that the functions of innovation are useful 
indicators to compare the performance of innovation of biofuels between Sweden and the 
Netherlands, and to identify the weaknesses and strengths in the innovation process for 
each country over time. 
 In Suurs et al. 2009, the authors use the functions of innovation to map the 
evolution of TIS biofuels in the Netherlands. They assess the performance of two 
processes for the production of biofuels: the 1st generation technology relies mainly on 
edible feedstocks and is the one commercially available; the 2nd generation technology is 
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not available at commercial scale, and uses feedstocks that don’t compete with the food 
and feed markets. Separating the analysis by the two groups of technology is important to 
determine whether programs to promote the 1st generation technology have a positive 
effect on the development of the 2nd generation technology. They apply “historical event 
analysis”, and use publications covering biofuels from 1990 until 2007 as the empirical 
representation of events. They classify reports of events according to the designated 
function of innovation, indicating whether they relate to the 1st, 2nd, or a generic class of 
biofuels. Results reveal that 1) lack of policy definition (-F4) and the debate about the 
environmental benefits of biofuels (-F7) in the 1st generation technology prevented the 
development of ‘entrepreneurial activities’ (-F1) in the industry, thus limiting the 
possibilities for the formation of positive cycles of development during the early stages; 
2) government programs were geared towards R&D of 2nd generation technology (F2), 
but did not include a strong emphasis on market development (-F5) of 1st generation 
technology. Without an established niche market, investors and entrepreneurs did not 
have enough incentives to invest in a risky and capital intensive 2nd generation 
technology. In 2003, the European Union Directive on Biofuels implemented a broad 
innovation policy for biofuels and established incentives for 1st and 2nd generation 
biofuels, determining that the 1st generation would serve as a bridge to the 2nd 
generation technology. This change in policy and priorities was implemented at the 
national level through a tax exemption (F5) towards 1st generation technologies, 
reassuring major stakeholders (F4), promoting further research, diffusion of knowledge 
(F2,F3), triggering entrepreneurship (F1), and raising the expectations about the future of 
biofuels (F4). Therefore, an external event – the European Directive on Biofuels – served 
as a ‘guidance of research’ (F4) at the national level, justifying the implementation of 
policies to help create a market – ‘market formation’ (F5), increasing positive 
expectations (F4), increasing ‘creation of knowledge’ (F2), ‘diffusion of knowledge’ 
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(F3), ‘entrepreneurial activity’ (F1), and closing the loop increasing the expectations in 
relation to biofuels (F4). 
 In Hillman et al. (2008), the authors use the functions of innovation to compare 
the performance of biofuels innovation systems between the Netherlands and Sweden. 
They underline the importance of external events, that is, exogenous factors to the system 
that influence the trajectory of innovation. Some of these factors include oil supply (oil 
chocks price volatility), air quality (greater concern in Europe beginning in the 1980s), 
European agricultural policy, and climate change (signing of Kyoto Treaty by EU 
members in 1998). The authors recognized the difference between 1st and 2nd generation 
technologies of biofuels, and the impact of policy in each of the two generations of 
technology for each country. As has been argued by other authors, despite the debates 
about the sustainability of 1st generation technologies to produce biofuels, the European 
Commission supported the more conventional technologies on the grounds that it would 
serve as a bridge to facilitate access to the 2nd generation technology (Hillman et al., 
2008).  
 The authors used the functions of innovation to explain the different performances 
of biofuels innovation systems for Sweden and the Netherlands. First, the Swedish 
innovation system benefited from a stronger function ‘guidance of research’ (F4), as 
indicated by strong policy guidance and support provided by Swedish policy makers 
throughout the period. Even before the Biofuels European Directive of 2003, the Swedish 
government was already proactive in stimulating ‘knowledge creation’ and ‘market 
formation’ for biofuels. The government support encouraged different ‘entrepreneurial 
experiments’ (F1) in 1st generation technology (wheat ethanol) and 2nd generation 
technology (wood ethanol). At the same time, stimulated by exogenous events such as 
strict environmental standards, Swedish local governments gave incentives for the 
development of buses run on ethanol, and the ‘market formation’(F5) of ethanol for 
public transportation. The successful project was later replicated for cars with the 
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development of the flex-fuel technology for automobiles. The successful application of 
ethanol in the transportation market had the support and ‘legitimation’ from different 
advocates for the technology. It increased expectations about the prospects of biofuels in 
Sweden (F4), closing the loop for a positive cycle of innovation development of biofuels 
in the country. Hillman et al. (2008) point out the importance of the presence and 
fulfillment of all the functions as a pre-requisite for the successful performance of 
innovation in biofuels in Sweden, as compared to the Netherlands. The research also 
reveals the significance and the role of the function ‘guidance of research’ (F4) as a 
trigger of a positive cycle of development, or of a positive self reinforcing path.  
Hillman et al. (2008) and others from the same branch of literature validate the relevance 
of the seven functions of innovation as proposed by Hekkert et al. (2007) to explain the 
process of innovation of low carbon technologies (Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009). 
However, the literature on the functions of innovation does not confirm whether the set of 
functions proposed explains the overall dynamics of the innovation process. The 
empirical literature confirms that the seven functions of innovation are necessary (Marko 
P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009), but they do not confirm whether they are sufficient to explain 
the process of innovation.  
 Bergek and colleagues (2004, 2008) propose an additional function of innovation 
named “Development of external economies”. The authors claim that at the onset of the 
innovation process, an emerging TIS enlarges its scope of innovation by building a 
number of linkages with new actors who become active within the TIS. This dynamics 
creates opportunities for the TIS to generate positive externalities within the process of 
innovation, such as pooled labor work, a larger and high quality supply of intermediate 
goods, and increased flow of knowledge within the system (Anna Bergek et al., 2008; A. 
Bergek et al., 2008; Jacobsson, 2008; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004). Most empirical 
research using the functions of innovation has not considered this function as an element 
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to map the evolution of the dynamics of the innovation process (Anna Bergek et al., 
2008).  
 As explained in the introduction, this dissertation follows the seven functions 
proposed by Hekkert et al. (2007) and, building on the function “Development of external 
economies” proposed by Bergek, it suggests an additional function of innovation, 
“Building of capabilities in the downstream market”. The list of eight functions of 
innovation that follows describes each function, and provides examples to illustrate how 
the concept can be applied to the case of biofuel ethanol (for detailed list of examples of 
functions of innovation applied to ethanol, see appendix A - Codebook):  
1. Entrepreneurship (F1): - Entrepreneurship involves risk and “learning by 
experimentation”. The industrial/manufacturing sector plays the main role in 
entrepreneurial activities. Events that reflect growing industrial capacity, new projects 
and plants are all related to entrepreneurial activities. In the case of ethanol, it includes 
reports of events informing about a new ethanol plant, or expansion of ethanol 
production. Alternatively, the function may relate to events about downsizing of ethanol 
production. In this case, it has a negative sign. 
2. Knowledge creation (F2): - it relates to R&D activities, and experience, and is 
directly linked to “learning by searching” and “learning by doing”. Government, industry, 
and academia all play a critical role in knowledge creation. In the case of ethanol, 
knowledge creation consists of first generation technologies (starch and sugar feedstock) 
that have been available since late nineteen century. For 1st generation technologies, new 
knowledge relates more to experience and learning by doing, since the technology is 
considered mature. The generation of new knowledge is about process improvement, 
gains in cost, energy efficiency, and gains in productivity as well as scaling factors. The 
2nd generation technology, on the other hand, is at the laboratory and pilot scale. 
Therefore, new knowledge relates more to research, development, and demonstration. 
Examples of the function of innovation applied to ethanol may include a new patent, 
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feasibility studies or new projects exploring new processes, R&D activities, 
developments and deployments to pilot and demonstration scale, and tests and feasibility 
studies using alternative fuels vehicles running on ethanol.   
3. Knowledge and information diffusion (F3):  - individual and organization 
interaction are critical to fasten the pace of innovative activities. Collaboration among 
actors and institutions, and the formation of knowledge networks increase creativity and 
promote better use of resources. This function applied to biofuel ethanol may include 
events like conferences, workshops, meetings, or any event involving interaction, 
collaboration for information exchange. 
4. Guidance of research (F4): - this function relates to the research agenda, and 
represents the selection of technology options generated in the function knowledge 
creation (F2). It highlights the fact that technological change depends on choices made 
among different technological possibilities. Guidance of research relates to the notion that 
during the early stages of development, different technology possibilities compete for 
scarce resources within the innovation systems. Entrepreneurs, investors, and policy 
makers make decisions based on incomplete information. A set of inputs, data, and 
knowledge available in the market influence decision markers’ perception and 
expectations about the different technology options available within the TIS (Anna 
Bergek et al., 2008; M. P. Hekkert, Suurs et al., 2007) Examples of reports of events 
relating to this function of innovation include reports of studies generating a positive 
expectation about ethanol, or studies reporting positive results of ethanol, or new 
legislation regulating/promoting the use of biofuel ethanol, or reports of positive results 
from tests with cars running on ethanol or blends of ethanol with gasoline. Alternatively, 
the function may also include negative reports of ethanol. 
5. Market formation and consolidation (F5): - Policies that internalize environmental 
externalities and promote private investments in the supply and demand of renewables. 
Some might include: market reforms, public procurement, market obligations, cap and 
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trade policies, zero-emission vehicles, pricing of CO2, and tax credits for renewables 
(Geller 2003). In the case of ethanol, they include mandates like the Renewable Fuel 
Standards (RFS). 
6. Resource mobilization (F6):  – it relates to financial and human resources 
allocated to the technology or product over time. It also includes financing through loan 
programs, low interest rates, subsidies, and investments to finance ethanol or flex fuel 
vehicles. Players include government, industry, and the financial sector.  
7. Legitimation (F7): - this function has the goal to counteract the inertia intrinsic of 
most systems, where there is often a resistance to change. This function can be fulfilled 
by advocacy coalitions that lobby for the new technology, trying to influence the R&D 
agenda (F4), and funding activity (F6). It can be a lobby activity from politicians 
advocating for ethanol during a public speech, or the automobile sector asking 
government for additional investments in infrastructure for the distribution of high blend 
ethanol, or lobbying activities against biofuels, like the many taking place during the high 
profile debate about fuel versus food. 
8. Building of capabilities in the downstream market (F8): - in the case of ethanol, 
this function reflects the development of competences in the distribution and automobile 
sectors, without which biofuels cannot win space in the downstream market. This 
function will map the development and commercialization of ethanol and flex fuel 
vehicles, and the infra-structure for distribution of biofuels. All technological and R&D 
activities are classified under knowledge creation (F2).  
 A Technological Innovation System is successful if all system functions are 
present and are fulfilled by the main components of the innovation system. It is important 
to notice that the eight functions presented are complementary to each other and are 
highly interdependent. Functions interact in a number of different and complex ways. For 
example, while knowledge creation is affected by guidance of research and resource 
allocation, market formation can be determined by legitimation, while influencing 
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entrepreneurship. The ways the functions interact over time create dynamics of path 
dependence, generating virtuous cycles in the case of positive feed-back loops, or a 
vicious cycle when negative feed-backs are prevalent (Anna Bergek et al., 2008; M. P. 
Hekkert, Suurs et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 2008). Sometimes, the sequence of events 
describing the development of innovation leads to a self-reinforcing pattern of cumulative 
causation. The innovation systems develop from a formative to a market diffusion phase 
when this pattern becomes self-sustained and repetitive (Hillman et al., 2008).  
TIS are not impervious to the external environment (ex. oil prices), and remain 
susceptible to external factors and events that can create opportunities to trigger 
mechanisms that will turn into virtuous or vicious cycles (Hillman et al., 2008). For 
example, both ethanol programs in the U.S. and Brazil were initiated at commercial scale 
in response to the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. Likewise, the recent boom in R&D and 
production of ethanol has been stimulated by the steep increase in oil prices. Therefore, 
the analysis must contemplate those external factors and be able to identify how the 
system is affected by them over time.  
 The functions of innovation is a framework in development. The set of functions 
presented has been tested empirically, and the literature reviewed shows that although 
relevant and necessary, the list of function may not explain the complete dynamics of 
innovation processes. Some critics argue against the functionalist approach based on 
early versions of the framework (B. A. Lundvall, 2007). The functions of innovation 
systems should be assessed in light of the recent literature that places innovation within 
the context of sustainainable and low carbon technologies. The framework preserves the 
core concept/assumption of the more traditional strand of the literature on innovation 
systems: 1) a TIS has different tasks or functions; 2) its most important task is learning 
(by experimenting, by doing, by searching, by interacting, by using); and 3) its ultimate 
goal is to promote the development, diffusion, and the adoption of new knowledge.  
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  CHAPTER 3 
LEARNING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
This chapter explores the different mechanisms of learning, and how they relate to 
technological change. By using the cases of ethanol in the U.S. and in Brazil, it shows 
that learning (research, development, demonstration, experience, interaction with the 
group, adoption of routines, feedback from downstream and upstream) has a positive 
impact on production cost, energy use, and carbon footprint of ethanol production 
processes. The chapter’s main goal is to show that technology is dynamic over time, and 
that appropriate policies may induce the adoption of technologies that not only contribute 
with knowledge, but also with environmental gains to society.  
3.1 The case of biofuel ethanol in the U.S. 
 Interest in renewable fuels in the U.S. began during the 1970s, in reaction to the 
Arab Oil Embargo, and the fall of the shah of Iran (Bettelheim, 2006). The phasing out of 
lead as an octane enhancer by the late 1970s sparked some interest on the use of ethanol 
as a fuel additive. In 1978, the National Energy Act gave federal tax exemption to 
gasoline containing 10% ethanol (US DOE, 2000).  
 Ethanol production has been increasing steadily, growing from 3 billion gallons in 
2003 to 10.5 billion gallons in 2009 (fig. 3). Government mandates15  and tax incentives 
are the main reason for high volume output (RFA, 2009; US DOE, 2009). Corn-based 
ethanol accounts for the largest share of renewable fuels production and consumption in 
                                                 
 
 
15 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA 2007) renews the renewable fuels standard 
(RFS) established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and mandates the consumption of 36 billion gallons of 
biofuels in 2022. It requires that 21 billion gallons be “advanced biofuels” -  biofuels that don’t use corn as 
a feedstock and reduce GHG emissions in 50% when compared to gasoline (Capehart, Schnepf, & 
Yacobucci, 2008; RFA, 2009; Sissine, 2007). 
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the United States, where it serves mostly as oxygenate16  blended into gasoline at 10% by 
volume, marketed as E10 or “gasohol”. According to the Renewable Fuels Association17 , 
ethanol installed capacity as of January 2010 was at 12.0 billion gallons per year. 
 
 
Figure 3: U.S. Ethanol production and capacity. (National Academies of Sciences, 2010 – 
based from workshop presentation by Tiffany, University of Minnesota, June 24, 2009) 




                                                 
 
 
16 Replacing methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), an oxygenate that started to be phased out in 1999, 
following recommendations from the EPA. 
17 http://www.ethanolrfa.org/ 
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3.1.1 Technology, production/supply 
 The main feedstock for ethanol production in the United States is corn (>95%). 
Other sources include grain sorghum, barley, wheat, and cheese whey (RFA, 2009). 
During the last three decades, corn productivity almost doubled in bushels per acre 
(USDA ERS, 2007), as a result of innovation in fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, agricultural 
management, and mechanization (fig.4). 
 
 
Figure 4: U.S. corn acreage and yield (USDA-Economic Research Service - 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Corn/background.htm) 
 
 The U.S. is the world largest producer of ethanol for the transportation sector, but 
the overreliance on corn has raised questions over the long term impact of growing corn 
crops to agriculture and environment in the U.S. (Malcolm, Aillery, & Weinberg, 2009). 
In 2007/2008, fuel ethanol plants used around 25% of U.S corn as a feedstock, a 
significant increase compared to previous years (fig.5). The growing demand of corn for 
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fuel has sparked debate over the use of edible crops to serve the industry of fuels for 
transportation in detriment of world demand of food (Earley & Mc Keown, 2009; RFA, 
2009). The fuel versus food debate evolved between 2006 and 2008, when the world 
grain market experienced an increasing demand, with commodity food prices reaching 
unprecedented levels. The food grain and commodity boom of 2007 – 2008 coincided 
with a spike in energy prices, when oil prices jumped to US$133 a barrel. The food grain 
and commodity boom also coincided with high biofuels production and growing corn use 
for ethanol production in the United States. During the time, corn ethanol was blamed for 
the high price levels and food security problem. However, a recent World Bank report 
reveals that biofuels had a minor impact in the boom in commodity prices. The most 
important factors leading to more expensive food grains were higher energy prices, 
adverse weather conditions, the weak dollar, export bans established for some 





Figure 5: Use of corn grain in the U.S. (USDA – Economic Research Service - 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Corn/background.htm) 
     
 
 Corn grain-based ethanol uses a conventional technology that first converts the 
corn (starch) to sugar, and then ferments the sugar into ethanol. The process grinds the 
corn kernel following a dry or wet milling process. Currently, most plants in the U.S. use 
the dry milling process. This process produces a by-product called dried distillers grains 
(DDG) that is consumed by the animal feed industry.  In the corn grain-based ethanol 
process, only the starchy part of the corn is used in the conversion to sugar, representing 







Figure 6:  Corn ethanol production – dry milling process (VeraSun Energy) 
 
 
 Since a large portion of ethanol producers is not verticalized, ethanol plants tend 
to be located near corn cooperatives to minimize the transportation cost of feedstocks 
(Hettinga, 2007; Hettinga et al., 2009). For this reason, most corn ethanol plants are 
located in the Midwest.  
 The conventional process to produce ethanol uses only the starchy part of the 
corn, leaving the corncob and straw on the crop field. More advanced processes, those 
not using feedstocks that compete with food, use cellulosic materials. The process to 
convert cellulose materials to sugar is more difficult, and research is ongoing to make the 
cellulosic ethanol technology competitive. The Farm Bill 2008 confers a tax credit of 
$1.01/gal to blenders consuming ethanol using cellulose-based feedstocks. It also funds 
R&D, provides loans and grants for production of cellulosic ethanol.  Many 
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demonstration plants of cellulosic ethanol are already in operation in the U.S. (Royal 
Society, 2008; WorldWatch_Institute, 2006).  Twenty eight projects of 
advanced/cellulosic ethanol are in development, using a diversified number of biomass 
materials (RFA, 2010). Since these processes use feedstock other than corn, industrial 
plants don’t need to be geographically close to corn production. The use of a diversified 
source of biomass feedstocks allows for planning and construction of plants close to 
biomass production and big consuming centers of fuels  (EERE/Biomass, 2009; RFA, 
2010). 
3.1.2 Technological change contributes to low production costs 
 The use of crop-based fuels to power automobiles in the U.S. dates from the 
beginning of the twenty century when Henry Ford developed the Model-T using ethanol 
as a fuel (Bernton, Kovarik, & Sklar, 2010). Since then, corn-based ethanol has made 
significant progress. Table 1 and Table 2 below show that production costs have 
improved over the last decades thanks to gains in corn and ethanol yield, scale, lower 
enzyme costs, fermentation technology, and better utilization of energy throughout the 
process (see Hettinga 2007 and Hettinga et al. 2009 for a complete and more technical 
review).  Feedstock (corn) and energy (fossil fuels and electricity) represent the largest 
portion in the industrial cost structure of an ethanol plant today18.  
Table 1: Corn production 1980 - 2005. From Hettinga et al. 2009 
Corn 1980-1985 2000-2005 % Change 
Yield  
(ton/ha year) 
6.5 8.9 + 37% 
Production  
(million ton/year) 
185 260 +40% 
Average farm size 
(hectares/farm) 
40 80 +100% 
                                                 
 
 
18 Excluding capital recovery costs, taxes, insurance, and land rent. 
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3.1.3 Technological change contributes to less energy consumption 
 It has been argued in Chapter 2 that the process of technological change is 
endogenous, that is, it is not only influenced by time and market prices, but by historic 
factors internal to the innovation process (Popp et al., 2009). Innovation in energy 
systems is also influenced by policy and business decisions on research and development, 
and by firms’ strategic decisions to take advantage of market opportunities. Learning and 
knowledge production and diffusion are critical in the process of technological change 
and innovation. Knowledge can be acquired in different ways and in different forms: 1) 
codified knowledge, the one that is explicit in documents, publications, and patents, is 
normally acquired through activities of research, development, and demonstration; and 2) 
tacit knowledge, the one that is often implicit in routines, it is normally acquired by 
cumulative experience, by using the technology, and by receiving feedback from 
technology users (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz, & Lundvall, 2007). Research and 
development activities contribute to learning by searching; time, experience, and 
implementation of better manufacturing routines characterize learning by doing; and 
feedback from external markets/users of technology are specific to the processes of 
learning by using and interacting (IEA, 2000; Kohler, Grubb, Popp, & Edenhofer, 2006).  
 Improvements in corn ethanol technology can be explained by learning by 
searching (applied R&D and deployment of efficient processes), learning by doing 
(experience over time, improved manufacturing routines), and exchange of information 
with technology users (learning by using and interacting) (Hettinga, 2007). The pressure 
in energy costs (especially during the late 1990s and early 2000s, when oil prices became 
more volatile) helped justify investments in energy efficiency for ethanol production. The 
average consumption of energy has been cut in half in the last twenty five years, going 
from approximately 22 MegaJoule (MJ) per liter of ethanol produced in the 1980s to 
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around 10 MJ per liter in an average ethanol plant today. Still, energy accounts for more 
than half of the industrial costs in the plant. 








140 70 -50% 
Labor costs 
 
55 16 -71% 
Enzyme costs 40 10 -75% 
 
3.1.4 Technology and the environmental impact of ethanol 
 The evidence shows that cumulative experience and R&D have had a positive 
effect on the environmental impact of ethanol. Energy use is one component of the 
environmental impact of corn ethanol. Energy use in ethanol plants vary with the process 
(dry or wet mills), with the scale of production, and with the technology used to heat and 
power plant operation.  Most ethanol plants built after 2004 include investments in 
technologies that optimize utilization and recovery of heat. The implementation of 
fractionation as a feedstock pre-treatment before fermentation is another technology that 
is already bringing cost and energy efficiency advantages in the production of co-
products ((S&T)2ConsultantsInc., 2009). Finally, site locations close to animal feedstock 
operations may reduce the need to dry distiller grains with solubles (DGS)19, bringing 
greater returns on investment in energy savings and operational costs (Bevill, 2008; 
Kram, 2007; Morey, Tiffany, & Hatfield, 2006).   
                                                 
 
 
19 Distillers dried grains with soluble (DDGS) are co-products of biorefineries that use the dry process for 
ethanol production. With high protein content, they have a market for livestock feed. With increased 
volumes of production of ethanol, there is a growing supply of DDGS. 
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 Growing production of corn-derived ethanol has generated a market for the co-
product distiller grains with solubles. Distiller grains (DGS) became a biomass fuel with 
potential to replace natural gas. Large volumes and consequent lower prices have helped 
DGS compete with volatile prices of natural gas during the last years, leading some 
producers to recycle DGS and burn it to generate electricity and process heat  (Morey et 
al., 2006).  
 Wang et al. (2007) estimate energy use for different technology scenarios of 
ethanol plants. Results of the study show that the implementation of Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP), reduction in drying operation of distiller grains and  solubles (DGS), and 
use of biomass for heat generation bring greater energy efficiency, and therefore 
significant environmental contribution in terms of GHG emissions, compared to plants 
fueled by coal or natural gas (Wang, Hong, & Huo, 2007). Figure 5 shows the impact of 
different technologies in the total consumption of fossil fuels in corn ethanol plants. The 
use of biomass to generate steam for the process provides the highest contribution. The 
new technology using natural gas without drying DGS consumes a little over half the 
energy consumed by a plant powered by coal. Results illustrate that low carbon 
innovation applied to a conventional process of corn-based ethanol can still bring 





Figure 7: Corn Ethanol – Energy Consumption for different technologies (Wang et al. 2007) 
 
 Most recent biofuels policies recognize the positive impact of innovation on the 
environmental impact of corn ethanol. They also recognize the long term limitations of 
using edible feedstocks to produce biofuels. The Energy Independence and Security Act 
2007 (EISA 2007) establishes a cap of 15 million gallons a year for corn ethanol use and 
requires the increasing production and consumption of advanced or cellulosic ethanol, 
using biomass materials that don’t compete with food (fig.6). The policy’s main goal is to 
direct technological change towards more sustainable forms of production of biofuels 
(Koshel & McAllister, 2010). EISA 2007 requires greenhouse gas emissions thresholds, 
demanding an improvement in relation to the baseline measures of gasoline and diesel 
emissions. New (after enactment of the law) production of corn ethanol (beyond 15 
billion gallons/year) must reduce GHG emissions in 20%; cellulosic biofuels have a 
threshold of 60% GHG emissions; advanced biofuels (any biofuel other than corn 
ethanol) must meet a threshold of 50%; and advanced biodiesel must reduce GHG 








 Under EISA 2007, the EPA must perform a lifecycle analysis20  to determine 
whether the different biofuels meet the GHG thresholds required by law. The 
calculations21  take into account the different technologies used to produce corn ethanol, 
as illustrated in the figure below.  
 Consistent with (Wang et al., 2007), the EPA calculations (Fig. 9) recognize that 
under a period of 30 years, the conventional technology to produce corn ethanol (using 
natural gas and dry mill process) decrease GHG emissions by 17% compared to the 
                                                 
 
 
20 A measure of total emissions of greenhouse gas emissions related to the total cycle of production of the 
fuel, including those related to feedstock production and respective inputs. 
21 The calculations take into account direct and indirect land use change resulting from additional crop 
planting, and assume GHG emissions impact over 100 years, discounting future emissions at a rate of  2% 
per year.  
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baseline of gasoline; the worst case scenario (using coal to power ethanol dry mill 
process) increases GHG emissions in 12%, and the best case scenario (using biomass, 
wet DGS, and combined heat and power), decreases GHG emission by 48% on average 
(including direct and indirect land use change) (EPA, 2009). Although there is still debate 
on the science that calculates life cycle analysis including direct and indirect land use 
change, it is certain that targeting ethanol technological progress towards less energy 
intensive technologies has a positive impact in the carbon foot print of ethanol 
production. The positive environmental impact represents a positive externality with 
positive social benefits greater than private benefits. Thus, these efficient technologies 
tend to be undersupplied by the market. In these cases, government intervention is 
justified to make sure the private sector supplies the optimal amount of efficient 
technologies for ethanol, therefore maximizing the benefits for society (Popp et al., 2009; 
Stern, 2007). 
 
Figure 9: Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions (30 years, 0% discount rate). Calculated by EPA. 
Source: Env.Protection Ag., Office of Transp. Air Quality, Feb.2010, EPA-420-F09-024. 
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3.2 The Case of Biofuel Ethanol in Brazil 
 Ethanol in Brazil is produced from sugarcane, a crop very well adapted to the 
country’s abundant land and tropical climate. Brazil is the pioneer and the most 
competitive producer of sugarcane ethanol worldwide, mainly due to its natural 
endowments, its long tradition in the sugar industry, and the technological progress made 
in the agricultural and industrial conversion processes, allowing significant increase in 
production over time (J. Goldemberg, Coelho, & Lucon, 2004). Between 1975 and 2004, 
sugarcane productivity grew 2.3% annually, while ethanol productivity (from sugarcane) 
jumped at a rate of 1.17% per year (Martines-Filho, Burnquist, & Vian, 2006). From 
1975 to 2000, ethanol yield per hectare of sugarcane increased from 535 to 1585 gallons 
(Arraes, 2006).  
 According to the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA)22 , 
production reached 6 billion gallons (in approximately 400 industrial plants) of ethanol in 
2008, against 0.9 billion gallons in 1980. Back in 1980, the cost to produce ethanol was 
approximately three times as high as the international cost of gasoline, justifying strong 
government subsidies. By 2004, ethanol prices were able to compete with gasoline 
without government intervention (J. Goldemberg, 2007, 2009). Today, many sugarcane 
mills also generate electricity from bagasse, an industrial by-product, improving the 
energy balance, and reducing even further the cost of production (IAEA, 2006).  Higher 
gasoline prices and larger industrial scale gave the Brazilian ethanol enough leverage to 
compete with gasoline at international prices (J. Goldemberg, 2007).  






 Sugarcane cultivation and ethanol production concentrate in the Center-South 
region of Brazil (85%), especially in the state of Sao Paulo (60%), benefiting from high 
labor skills and strong infrastructure (BNDES & CGEE, 2008; J. Goldemberg, 2009; R. 
C. Leite, 1990). Most research is concentrated geographically in the Southeast, with 
important initiatives led by government, private, academic, and hybrid forms of 
institutional arrangements. 
 Sugarcane is a semi-perennial tall grass that grows well in tropical zones. Brazil is 
the largest and most productive sugarcane grower, accounting for more than 40% of the 
world production (BNDES & CGEE, 2008). In Brazil, sugarcane has on average a six-
year production cycle, after which a new crop is replanted. Brazil’s average productivity 
is around 70 and 80 ton per hectare, but productivity in the Center-South can reach up to 
90 ton/ha of sugarcane in some farms depending on the season (BNDES & CGEE, 2008). 
Sugarcane consumes low rates of fertilizer, because most industrial plants recycle vinasse 
(sugarcane industrial waste rich in nitrogen) to the field. Sugarcane cannot be stored, and 
needs to be crushed immediately after the harvest. Brazil has 340 million hectares of total 
agricultural land, from which 77 million are still available as cropland. Sugarcane 
occupies 7 million hectares, from which 4 million for ethanol production (J. Goldemberg, 
2009; R. C. D. Leite, Leal, Cortez, Griffin, & Scandiffio, 2009).  
 In Brazil, ethanol is produced as anhydrous (dehydrated) ethanol to be blended 
with gasoline (E20 – E25), and as hydrated ethanol – 6% of water in weight - (E100) to 
be used in dedicated engines or in flex fuel vehicles (FFV). Because it requires one less 
operation (dehydration), dehydrated ethanol tends to be less expensive than anhydrous 
ethanol (BNDES & CGEE, 2008). A simplified industrial process to convert sugarcane to 










 Brazil’s ethanol program dates from 1975, when the military government initiated 
a mandatory use of the biofuel in response to the international oil crisis (Moreira & 
Goldemberg, 1999). The launch of the National Alcohol Program – Proalcool - was a 
component of a large Energy Strategy Plan under the import substitution model seeking 
to decrease the country’s dependence on external sources of energy (R. C. Leite, 1990). 
Proalcool also served the interests of sugar producers, who had been threatened by strong 
decline in international sugar prices at that time23 (Geller, 2003; IEA, 2006; Sandalow, 
2006). 
 During the first period of the alcohol program, government, universities, and the 
sugar industry focused efforts in scale of production and productivity. More recent 
investments in R&D – public and private – led to the sequencing of the genetic code of 
sugarcane. With more than 500 different crop varieties, farmers were able to adapt their 
crops to different climate and terrain conditions24.  Brazil also is an international player in 
the R&D of second generation ethanol production25. The Center for Sugarcane 
Technology, a private research institute supported by Brazilian ethanol producers, has 
played an important role in promoting R&D throughout much of the history of ethanol 
development. The practice of residue recycling to the sugarcane field (filter cake and 
vinasse), as well as continuing research on different varieties of sugarcane contributes to 
decreasing rates of fertilizer and water use. 
                                                 
 
 
23 Ethanol was first produced as a co-product in the process of sugar production from sugarcane. 
24The genetic coding of sugarcane was developed by CTC, Agronomic Institute of Campinas, and RIDESA 
(Rede Interuniversitaria para o Desenvolvimento do Setor Sucroalcooleiro), a network of 8 federal 
universities.  
25 A network of 15 universities and research institutes participate in the development of cellulosic ethanol 
from sugarcane bagasse, among them University of Sao Paulo, University of Campinas, Federal University 
of Rio de Janeiro, Federal University of Brasilia, Federal University of Pernambuco, IPT /SP, and 
University of Lund in Sweden (Ereno, 2007). 
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 During the last three decades, ethanol productivity grew at an average annual rate 
of 1.4% in agriculture (sugarcane production) and 1.6% in the industry (ethanol 
production), providing an overall average annual productivity growth of 3.1%.  Figure 9 
illustrates this long term trend (BNDES & CGEE, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 11: Ethanol and Sugarcane productivity. Source: Ethanol and Biopower (2009). Available at 
UNICA (www.unica.com) 
 
 Sugarcane and ethanol have gained competitiveness with improvements made by 
R&D, engineering, and experience. Research was critical to develop new varieties of 
sugarcane; new agriculture technologies helped to improved sugarcane harvests; and 
progress in engineering brought considerable gains in industrial operations such as juice 
extraction, fermentation and distillation (Bake, Junginger, Faaij, Poot, & Walter, 2009; 
Moreira & Goldemberg, 1999).  Scale was an important factor helping to reduce cost of 
production of ethanol in Brazil. The total cost to produce ethanol reduced significantly 
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during the last thirty years, from US$ 0.98 per liter of hydrated in 1975 to US$ 0.26 – 
US$ 0.305 in 2004 (Bake et al., 2009).  Cost reductions of ethanol in Brazil can be 
understood by breaking the process in two main steps: agricultural and industrial. 
 
Agriculture – sugarcane production 
 Sugarcane is a large component of the ethanol cost structure, accounting for 
approximately 60% of the total cost of production.  Increasing the competitiveness of 
sugarcane has always been a constant goal of the ethanol industry in Brazil. This 
motivation attracted investments to improve the quality and decrease the cost of the 
feedstock over the years. In addition to investments in R&D to create new sugarcane 
varieties, the industry invested in agricultural management, logistics, and transportation 
to improve overall efficiency (Bake, 2006; Bake et al., 2009; Rosillo-Calle & Cortez, 
1998).  
 Maximizing the rate of sugars in the sugarcane juice before it goes into 
fermentation has been one of the main technological and economic goals in the process to 
convert sugarcane to ethanol. The higher the total reducible sugar (TRS) contained in the 
sugarcane, the better the rate of fermentation in the industrial process. Therefore, the 
industry made efforts towards improving the amount of sugarcane harvested per hectare, 
and towards maximizing the TRS for a given quantity of sugarcane.  The amount of sugar 
in sugarcane depends on the climate and soil conditions, but investments in new varieties 
of sugarcane were critical to improve the TRS over time. Another factor contributing to 
higher levels of sugarcane productivity was the length of the ratoon system. The increase 
in the number of years before a new planting cycling would begin (longer ratoon system) 
reduced the cost of soil preparation, and crop maintenance. Increasing sugarcane yields 
(normally measured in tons of cane per hectare per year) also reduced the cost of harvest, 
and the cost of the land. For a detailed analysis of sugarcane cost structure, and its 
evolution over the years, see Bake (2006). 
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Table 3: Sugarcane productivity. Source: Bake et al. 2009 
Sugarcane 
(Brazil) 
1975 - 1980 2000 - 
Ratoon system 
(years) 
3 - 4 5 - 7 
Agricultural yield 
(TC/ha/year) 
65 - 72 75 - 82 
Agricultural yield 
(kg TRS/TC) 
124 - 128 144 - 148 
 
Industrial – conversion of sugarcane to ethanol 
 Scale was a critical contributing factor to reduce industrial costs. Scale affects 
industrial yield, reduce investment and operational costs. Larger plants lead to higher 
load factors, more automation, less stops, and more process optimization. The scale also 
required more efficient and continuous operations throughout the process. The industrial 
process benefited from gains in fermentation time, purity of juice, and R&D to find new 
yeasts to increase the efficiency of the continuous fermentation process. Between 1977 
and 2000, the fermentation time has been cut by 40%; the percentage of ethanol after 
fermentation has doubled, and the overall fermentation efficiency increased from 83 to 
91.4 (Bake 2006, based on data from CTC). Overall, during the last thirty years, the 
amount of ethanol produced in liters per hectares of sugarcane harvested doubled from 
approximately 3,000 to 6,000 liters of ethanol per hectare (J. Goldemberg, 2009). 
 
Ethanol and Bioelectricity 
 In energy terms, sugarcane is made of one third sugarcane juice (for the 
production of ethanol), one third bagasse (from sugarcane crushing), and one third straw 
(left in the field). Sugar and ethanol producers generate 98% of their energy needs from 
sugarcane bagasse. The use of bagasse as energy source replaces expensive fossil fuel, 
and contributes to the carbon footprint of the sugarcane ethanol production process 
(Wang, Wu, Huo, & Liu, 2008). Currently, it is becoming a growing revenue source for 
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ethanol producers. The Brazilian regulatory framework during the 1990s didn’t give 
enough incentives for producers to invest in more efficient and high pressure boilers. The 
current policy scenario offers more incentives for production and sale of electricity as a 
co-product in the process of sugarcane conversion (J. Goldemberg, Coelho, & 
Guardabassi, 2008). The eradication of the practice of pre-harvesting burning in 
sugarcane fields - in compliance with the “Green Protocole” of 2014 – will increase the 
supply of sugarcane straws26  for biopower production27 . In the short and medium term, 
biopower will become a strategic commercial product for ethanol and sugar producers, 
and a potential source of alternative energy in the populated Center-South region of 
Brazil (Castro, Brandao, & Dantas, 2009). 
3.2.2 The Environmental impact of sugarcane ethanol 
 In February 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency announced the final 
regulation of the Renewable Fuels Standards (named RFS2), considering sugarcane 
ethanol an advanced biofuel, or a biofuel reducing greenhouse gas emissions in at least 
50% compared to the baseline emissions of gasoline (EPA, 2009). According to EPA, 
sugarcane ethanol reduces GHG emissions by 61%28 compared to baseline gasoline 
emissions, considering 30 years for calculations of the effects of indirect land use effect.  
 
                                                 
 
 
26 When mechanical harvesting is not possible, sugarcane fields need to be burned before harvest, and the 
straws are wasted in the fields. 
27 Today, around 50% of sugarcane harvest is mechanized in the state of Sao Paulo.  
28 The numbers published in February 2010 were revised after the EPA took into consideration several 




 This chapter argues that technology is endogenous to the innovation system, and 
changes with R&D and learning over time. The cases show that over time, technological 
change has had a positive effect on the environmental impact of ethanol. It shows that 
learning activities (learning by searching, by doing, by using, and by interacting) have 
contributed to technological progress and environmental sustainability of corn and 
sugarcane ethanol. More recently, higher energy prices and biofuels policies induced 
more sustainable technological change. While the basic corn ethanol technology provides 
GHG emissions benefits of 21% on average, the adoption of more advanced technologies 
in ethanol plants improves the benefits to 48% in relation to gasoline, on average. This 
environmental benefit gap in corn ethanol shows that given appropriate policies and 
technologies, the U.S. can decrease the carbon footprint of corn-based ethanol. The Brazil 
case shows that the use of bagasse to power sugarcane ethanol plants brings 
environmental benefits that can still be improved when ethanol plants start selling the 
surplus power from burning ethanol straw to the grid. The next chapters will explore in 
more detail the dynamic features of technological change, using the functions of 
innovation to assess the innovation trajectories of ethanol in the U.S. and in Brazil.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA, CODING, AND METHODOLOGY 
  
 This study assumes that the functions of innovation perspective is a causal and 
evolutionary framework that cannot be tested by an independent/dependent variable 
relationship, but rather by a mechanism of path-dependency, with multiple causes and 
outcomes, or a sequence of causal relationships with self-reinforcing characteristics 
(Gerring, 2001). Therefore, explanations of outcomes are based on patterns of temporal 
and geographical variation of functions of innovation, such as positive (virtuous cycles) 
and negative (vicious) feedback (Pierson, 2003). By plotting the evolution of functions 
over time, I expect to identify the patterns of development for each function, and the 
emergence of positive and negative feedback, providing support for a comparative 
analysis between the U.S. and Brazil.  
 
4.1 Definitions and assumptions 
 To map the innovation process, one needs tools to measure and to understand how 
innovation takes place. Van de Ven et al. (2000) and Poole et al. (2000) use “process 
theory” in contrast to “variance theory” to suggest methods to study how phenomena 
evolve over time. According to the authors, “a theory of innovation is fundamentally a 
theory of change in a social system” (Poole et al., 2000; Van de Ven & Poole, 2000). 
While innovation may be related to the introduction of a new concept or idea, the process 
of innovation relates to the chain of events that represent how people interact to develop 
and implement new concepts and ideas over time. Therefore, events are assumed to 
represent instances when change is observed within the innovation system. In this 
research, change relates to the longitudinal change in the functions of innovation systems 
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of biofuels, or in the context influencing change over time. For example, the completion 
of a research project that leads to a technical conclusion in relation to biofuels is an event 
where change in knowledge creation occurs. There are different methods for observing 
change over time.  
 This research uses published information that brings historical data from which it 
is possible to form a sequence of events related to the development of ethanol as a biofuel 
in the U.S. and in Brazil. Since past events cannot be observed in real time, the analyst 
may use bibliographic databases as a data source to identify events in the innovation of 
ethanol over time (Van de Ven & Poole, 2000).  
 
4.2 Data 
 As explained in the introduction, since ethanol represents most of biofuels 
produced in the U.S. and in Brazil, this study focuses on the development of ethanol, and 
will exclude biodiesel and other fuels derived from biological sources. The years 
considered span from 1975 (just after the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo) to 2008. The research 
builds on multiple public sources that report on the set of historic events that helped 
determine the development paths of biofuels industry over time in each country. Because 
Brazil has limited coverage in international databases, especially during the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990, the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo is used as the main source 
reporting on Brazilian events around the ethanol industry. An exploratory visit to the 
newspaper archives in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in July 2008 confirmed the availability and 
access to the newspaper’s articles published since 1975. The material is indexed by 
subject. Electronic access is available from 1997. Therefore, the data ranging from 1975 
through 1996 was performed through a manual search in the archives of the Brazilian 
newspaper.  
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 Once the data for Brazil was limited to newspaper articles, U.S. sources were also 
limited to newspaper articles for consistency and to avoid sample bias. The database 
Lexis-Nexis Academic was used to search the New York Times and Washington Post, 
the two American newspapers covering most news on biofuels since early 1970s. The 
search was limited to the period between 1975 and 2008. The Brazilian source O Estado 
de Sao Paulo was not available in the database LexisNexis. The search into the 
newspaper was done in the archives, at the newspaper’s headquarters in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil, during the summer of 2009. The search was manual between the years 1975 and 
1996. I used an internal database to search the period between 1997 and 2008. Both 
manual and database searches followed the same keyword pattern used for the American 
sources. The keyword strategy is described in the methodology. 
 All articles gathered from the Lexis-Nexis database were downloaded into text 
compatible software. Each individual article was saved as an individual file. The same 
process was done for the electronic articles downloaded from the Brazilian newspaper. 
Articles from the physical archive were individually scanned and saved into individual 
files. Overall, the complete dataset is composed of 1,750 references or newspaper 
articles: 431 from the New York Times, 331 from the Washington Post, and 988 from the 
O Estado de Sao Paulo.  
 Newspaper articles are not a perfect representation of past events, since they are 
influenced by interpretation and relevance of the topic at the time of the publication. An 
important weakness of the data relates to the paucity of scientific or technical information 
about the technology. Since it covers only events reported by the media, the data does not 
take into account scientific sources of information, only newspaper articles that may 
underreport research taking place in a technology field. The data underestimates events 
related to knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion in the two countries. 
Notwithstanding, the mixed aspect of the methodology addresses part of this problem by 
having qualitative and quantitative methods complementing each other. In this study, the 
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narrative tries to complement some of the information left out by the quantitative 
analysis, providing a clear picture of the innovation trajectory of ethanol in the U.S. and 
in Brazil since 1975.  
4.3 Coding 
 The research design is based on the assumption that each newspaper article 
represents an empirical observation of an event, also the object of analysis for the 
purpose of research. Events reported in multiple stories are treated as “double”, and were 
not counted in the quantitative analysis. Each newspaper article was imported into a 
master NVivo file. Each newspaper article or source was coded using the tools of NVivo 
software according to the year it was published (1975 through 2008), country it is 
reporting about (U.S. or Brazil), and functions of innovation they were assigned to. The 
coding process followed a codebook that was designed based on previous research, and 
enhanced to maximize intercoder reliability. All references from the New York Times 
were coded into more detailed categories subordinated to the main codes, or the 8 
function of innovation. More than 100 sub-categories were freely created, some of them 
more general, others more specific. At the end of the process, these sub-categories were 
analyzed, and many of them were merged to eliminate redundancy. NVivo offers many 
advantages for inductive coding, because it allows the analyst to go back and forth to the 
coding and to the original source that originated it. NVivo also allows the migration of 
subcategories from one main coding or function to the other. This flexibility maximizes 
reliability. The codebook (Appendix A) was shared with a second coder who was trained 
to code a small sample (34) of the dataset. The 34 references were drawn from the 
newspaper Washington Post, chosen numerically and distributed from early to late years. 
Both coders converged on 25 out of 34 articles. From the 9 references on which they 
diverged, they were able to agree on 6 after some clarification. The coding of the 
remaining 3 references diverged because of subjectivity. The subjectivity was addressed 
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by clarifying assumptions and better describing the functions of innovation in the 
codebook.  
 
4.4 The Methodology 
 The methodology is based on process analysis29 (Poole et al., 2000) of 
chronological events observed in two case studies – the development of ethanol in the 
U.S. and in Brazil.  The methodology has been applied and tested in a previous 
dissertation thesis investigating innovation systems of biomass energy in Germany and in 
the Netherlands (Negro, 2007). Taking historical events as unit of analysis emphasizes 
temporal development, and facilitates determining how the process of innovation, 
development and change unfolds over time. One critical assumption is path dependence, 
or the mechanism under which an event can be explained based on the history of 
preceding events (Poole et al., 2000).   
 In process research, the goal is to create a chronological list of events around a 
specific technology, code the events in categories defined by the theory, and identify the 
processes or the patterns that explain how innovation occurs. The following procedure 
was applied into two case studies looking at the evolution of ethanol as biofuel during the 
last thirty years, in the U.S. and in Brazil. 
 
1) Bibliographic research: a search was performed in the database LexisNexis 
Academic looking for references reporting events related to developments of ethanol and 
its application as a biofuel. As has been explained earlier in this chapter, the search was 
                                                 
 
 
29 This specific method was developed by a group of scholars within the scope of the Minnesota Innovation 
Research Program (Poole et al. 2000 Eds; Poole et al. 2000 in Van de Ven et al. Eds.). 
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limited to the American newspapers the New York Times and the Washington Post. The 
following search strategy was used: 
(ethanol OR bioethanol OR gasohol OR sugarcane) AND 
INDEX-CODE((ALTERNATIVE FUEL PROGRAMS OR BIOFUELS AND AUTOMOTIVE)  
AND (BRAZIL OR UNITED STATES))30 AND DATE(>=1975-01-01 and <=2008-12-31) 
 
For the physical archives in Brazil, I followed instructions given by the director of 
archives, after briefing him about my research focus. Following the archives’ indexation 
criteria, I searched in the files named “Proalcool” (the Alcohol Plan of 1975),  “alcool 
para motor” (alcohol for engines), and “carro a alcool” (car running on alcohol). The 
articles that covered accidents, criminal investigations, were not included. I was 
authorized to make copies of all articles of interest.  
 
2) Coding of events:   The coding process is qualitative in nature. Independently of 
what they represent, events are always coded with weight 1, either positive or negative.  
For example, an event relating to investments in R&D results in one positive unit (+1) 
allocated to the function knowledge creation in the specific year. Conversely, events can 
also allocate negative unit values (-1) to the functions they represent. For example, an 
event relating to a plant that shuts down leads to the allocation of a negative unit value   
(-1) into the function entrepreneurship. Events that relate to events that are external to the 
system, or exogenous, such as price changes in oil, gasoline, economic policies that relate 
to ethanol, but are not endogenous to the innovation process are classified as context. As 
previously mentioned, the codebook (Appendix I) was generated by using NVivo 
software. Once the coding of all sources was done, the results were transferred to an 
Excel worksheet for quantitative analysis. 
                                                 
 
 
30 INDEX-CODE refers to vocabulary controlled by the database.   
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3) Data analysis and plotting: events were plotted by category of function and by 
country against time.  
4) Interviews with specialists: This step gathered information obtained from 
unstructured interviews with specialists from the U.S. and from Brazil. The goal of the 
interviews was to complement the data from newspapers and gray literature with insights 
from specialists who have experienced many years of the innovation process of ethanol. 
Because each specialist had a different focus, the interviews were geared towards the 
experience of each interviewee.  
5) Process analysis: this step used the chronological sequence of events (coded by 
functions of innovation) to develop a narrative storyline. The goal was to identify positive 
(virtuous cycles) and negative (vicious cycles) paths that may have promoted or 
hampered the innovation process of ethanol. This step took into account the different 
contexts of each country, and the exogenous factors influencing the development of 
innovation over time.  The goal was to explain how functions interact to each other 
leading to positive and to negative feedback mechanisms. By linking narrative to graphic 
representation of functions, this step identified the causal patterns that lead to the 
emergence of positive or negative cycles of change and development. This step also 
added information not included in the previous steps. It took into account grey literature, 
books, and interviews with specialists. The functions were plotted all together by periods 
of time to illustrate how the unfolding of events contributed or not to the building up of 
functions of innovation over time.  
6) Comparative analysis: the steps described were applied to both countries, 
providing the necessary data to compare the patterns of development of innovation in 





5.1 The functions 
 Approximately one fourth of newspaper articles (470) were coded as contextual 
or reported events considered exogenous to the process of innovation, and not fulfilling 
the eight functions of innovation. Some examples included articles reporting change in 
price of ethanol or corn price, or international trade issues, China or India’s food 
consumption, political issues over the Farm Bill, or the presidential campaign and the 
Iowa Caucus.  Table 4 shows the list of functions, with the number of events assigned to 
each function, differentiating by whether it contributes to the process of innovation 
(positive sign), or is detrimental to it (negative sign). For the codebook, please see 
Appendix I. 
Table 4: Ethanol in the U.S. and in Brazil: coding of events (functions of innovation) 
Functions of Innovation + - Total 
F1 Entrepreneurship 92 17 109 
F2 Knowledge Creation 124  124 
F3 Knowledge Diffusion 35  35 
F4 Guidance of Research 192 165 357 
F5 Market Formation 101 9 110 
F6 Resource Mobilization 93 7 100 
F7 Legitimation 113 43 156 
F8 Building of Capabilities in 
the Downstream Market 
190 71 261  
Context    470 
Double    30 
Total    1750 
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 The data shows that among the articles which events were endogenous or were 
embedded within the process of innovation, most of them were coded as Guidance of 
Research (F4) and Capability Building in the Downstream Market (F8). 
Table 5: Ethanol in the U.S. and in Brazil: coding of events (functions of innovation) 








F1 Entrepreneurship 43 11 49 6 
F2 Knowledge Creation 42  82  
F3 Knowledge Diffusion 3  32  
F4 Guidance of Research 58 80 134 83 
F5 Market Formation 52 8 49 1 
F6 Resource Mobilization 31 5 62 2 
F7 Legitimation 73 27 41 16 
F8 Building of Capabilities in 
the Downstream Market 
34 21 156 50 
Context  254  217  
 
 There are only 35 articles reporting events coded as knowledge diffusion for both 
countries together during the whole period. This function of innovation was 
operationalized as events related to conferences, meetings, workshops around the theme 
of ethanol. Since this research used mostly newspaper articles to code functions of 
innovation, it is expected that events such as meetings and conferences happening around 
the technology may have been underreported.   
 When analyzing by country (table 5), results show that the most relevant function 
in the U.S. was Legitimation (F7), while the most prevalent function in Brazil was 
Building of capabilities in the Downstream Market (F8). Conversely, the function 
holding the most negative effort, or most counteracting the process of innovation in the 
U.S. was Guidance of Research (-F4). During the last years, many reports were published 
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alerting about the harming effects of growing production of corn ethanol. Reports 
presented models suggesting that the production and use of corn ethanol generated more 
GHG emissions than gasoline (OECD, 2008), and that the growing use of corn for fuels 
could cause long term impact to food commodity prices (Baffes & Haniotis, 2010). These 
negative reports changed some policy targets, and generated a negative expectation about 
the future of corn ethanol as a biofuel. The same was true for Brazil, but the negative 
effects into sugarcane ethanol were less intense because the product was already 
consolidated in the Brazilian domestic market. These results in isolation are limited 
without a thorough analysis of how the functions of innovation evolved over time. This 
analysis is presented in the following chapters of this dissertation. 
 
5.2 Number of events over time 
 Making a comparison by country over time, Brazil emerges as a player earlier 
than the U.S. Because of the national impact of the Brazilian ethanol in the 1970s, the 
number of events in Brazil was higher than the number of events in the U.S. during that 
time. The first ethanol activities in the U.S. were more concentrated in the Corn Belt 
region, and did not have the national impact of the Brazilian events with the 
announcement of a government-led national plan for the production of ethanol to replace 




Figure12: Brazil and U.S. - number of events reporting on ethanol (including context) 
 
 Ethanol became a more prominent issue after the year 2000. The number of 
events reported between 2000 and 2008 (9 years) is approximately twice as many as the 
number of events reported between 1975 and 1990 (16 years). And despite Brazil’s 
dominance in the early period, the issue of ethanol in the U.S. becomes also evident 




Figure13: Brazil and U.S. - number of events reporting on ethanol (1975 - 1990) 
 
 
Figure 14: Brazil and U.S. - number of events reporting on ethanol (2000 - 2008) 
 
 
 As mentioned in the methodology, the coding process is qualitative. Events are 
coded with the same value - positive 1 or negative 1. In other words, events are coded 
with the same weight regardless of their importance or relevance for the innovation 
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process. Therefore, the quantitative data here presented in tables and graphs cannot be 
considered in isolation without a thorough understanding of how the sequence of events 
unfolds. The narratives for each country describe the events and highlight the 
significance of time and history to explain how the dynamics of innovation of ethanol 
unfolds for each country. The next chapters explore those in detail.   
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CHAPTER 6 
NARRATIVE ETHANOL UNITED STATES 
 
 This chapter reveals how the dynamics of innovation of ethanol unfolds during 
the innovation process. It uses a narrative approach to describe the trajectory of the 
innovation of ethanol in the U.S. between 1975 and 2008. The narrative is built from the 
chronological compilation of articles from the New York Times and the Washington Post 
that compose the dataset of this research. Articles from the Brazilian newspaper O Estado 
de Sao Paulo reporting events specific to ethanol in the U.S. are also included in the 
narrative. The articles were often complemented by gray literature.  The unfolding of 
reports of events is divided in the chapter in four different segments of time:  
1) The Arab Oil Embargo and the gasohol boom (1975-1980) 
2) The Reagan era and cheap oil – the end of gasohol boom (1981-1990) 
3) The Clean Air Act: an opportunity for ethanol as oxygenate (1991-2000) 
4) The new millennium: energy security, climate change. Reaching to advanced 
ethanol (2000-2008) 
 Each session starts with a brief summary, and ends with a brief analysis of how 
the unfolding of events relate to the functions of innovation (in bold). The analysis is 
complemented by a graph that illustrates the cumulative evolution of each function 
during the period. 
 
 Henry Ford’s aspiration for vehicles to be operated with agricultural-based fuel 
did have a strong beginning in the US where ethanol was commonly produced and used 
into the 1920s and 1930s.  During that time, several of the biofuel concepts that are being 
pursued today, were also promoted.  Ford’s Model T was considered the first flex-fuel 
vehicle and could be modified to operate on either gasoline or pure alcohol.  A variation 
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of today’s ethanol, except with a 25% alcohol blended gasoline, was marketed by 
Standard Oil in the Baltimore area during the 1920s.  Ethanol plants also existed in the 
Midwest.  In 1938, an ethanol plant located in Atchison, Kansas, produced 18 million 
gallons of ethanol a year and supplied more than 2000 service stations in the Midwest.    
Unfortunately, all of this progress came to a sudden halt in the 1940s when large volumes 
of inexpensive petroleum and natural gas became available.  (US DOE, 2000).  
 Although WWII spurred some increase in the consumption of ethanol, most 
demand was still for non fuel use. The interest for renewable fuels was revitalized in the 
1970s as a result of the Arab Oil Embargo, and the fall of the shah of Iran (Bettelheim, 
2006). The phasing out of lead as an octane enhancer by the late 1970s sparked some 
interest on the use of ethanol as a fuel additive. 
 
6.1 Arab Oil Embargo and the gasohol boom (1975-1980) 
 The first period of the ethanol innovation history marks the beginning of the 
industrial commercialization of ethanol (entrepreneurial activity-F1, and resource 
mobilization-F6)), which was accelerated by three exogenous factors: 1) the oil crisis of 
1973 and 1979; 2) the oil price volatility; and 3) the oversupply of grains in the market. 
The National Energy Act of 1978 benefits gasohol producers with tax credits, helping 
gasohol to compete with gasoline 100% (market formation -F5) in the Midwest. The 
regional boom of gasohol in the Midwest has the support of local farmers and politicians, 
who advocate for national policy that benefits the burgeoning local gasohol industry 
(legitimation-F7). The gasohol industry also takes advantage of renewable energy 
programs funded by the Carter administration (knowledge creation-F2; resource 
mobilization-F6).   
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 Entrepreneurship (F1) in the ethanol industry addressed the anxiety of farmers 
looking for additional markets for large production of corn. The commercial boom of the 
ethanol fuel industry during the 1970s came as a relief for farmers during a period of crop 
surplus and low grain prices. To create an additional application for corn, struggling 
American farmers began to install small distilleries to produce ethanol. They used their 
corn processing plants to process surplus grains, developing a small market for biofuel 
ethanol. The Arab Oil Embargo gave a significant incentive to the burgeoning industry, 
in a moment when America realized the vulnerability of its energy supply for the 
transportation sector.  
 The Arab Oil Embargo helped justify national policy promoting the production of 
renewable energy, and increasing expectations about the future of ethanol as a 
replacement or complement of gasoline (guidance of research F4). The images of long 
lines in gas stations symbolized the U.S. reliance on foreign oil, and the serious 
implications of another oil embargo to the American economy. The Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975 was a response of Congress and President Fords’ 
administration to the oil embargo, and set the tone for a set of policies for energy 
conservation at the national level. One important item included the doubling of efficiency 
standards for new vehicles by 1985 (Hakes, 2008).  
 Higher oil prices (fig.15) helped the economics of the ethanol business. Between 
1970 and 1981, oil prices increased from $3 dollars a barrel to $35 dollars a barrel (EIA, 
2002). Ethanol sprawled in the Midwestern states, where developed the core of the corn 




Figure 15: Oil prices and GDP growth – 1970 – 2009. Transportation Energy Data Book. Edition 29, 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory  - cta.ornl.gov/data 
 
 The emergence of ethanol during the 1970s did not come without controversies 
and resistance from the oil industry. In the mid 1970s, tests had shown that gasohol 
decreased tail pipe emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide, but increased 
emissions of nitrogen oxide, one of the precursors of greenhouse emissions. A Clean Air 
Act amendment in 1977 had banned the use of gasohol, because tests did not prove its 
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environmental safety. In 197831  the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decided to 
allow production and commercialization of gasohol in the Midwest of the country, 
because the region represented a very small portion of the gasoline market. The American 
Petroleum Institute condemned the development of the gasohol market, and issued a 
report containing a negative evaluation of alcohol for automobiles.  
 Considering ethanol a renewable energy and a source of rural development in the 
Midwest, many politicians advocated for ethanol publicly (legitimation F7).  Ethanol 
produced in the U.S. was promoted by politicians in the Midwest as one of the 
alternatives to decrease the U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The U.S. Congress soon after 
approved legislation to fund ethanol research, finance loans to ethanol producers, and 
reduce federal tax on the production and commercialization of ethanol fuel. In 1978, 
Congress passed the National Energy Act, giving a tax credit of 4 cents for each gallon of 
gasohol, a mixture of 10% ethanol and 90% gasoline. The incentive was equivalent to 40 
cents of tax benefits for every gallon of ethanol mixed into gasoline. Ethanol fuel offered 
an economic opportunity for corn growers in the Middle West, in special in Iowa, 
Nebraska, Illinois, Minnesota, and South Dakota. Ethanol became a profitable market in 
the region.  
 The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, and the second energy crisis in America gave 
voice to an already influential ethanol lobby in Washington DC, speeding up the pace of 
development on the business. In the Midwest, there were almost 500 gas stations selling 
the alternative fuel as gasohol. Archer Daniels Midland Inc, known as ADM was the 
largest producer of ethanol in the U.S. The company began production of ethanol in 
1977, after transforming and adapting its vodka and gin manufacturing plants for ethanol 
                                                 
 
 
31 "Motor vehicles are a major source of urban smog," EPA Deputy Administrator Barbara Blum pointed 
out. "We must improve the use of cars, trucks and buses, and plan and manage our urban transportation 
systems more efficiently in order to reduce air pollution." From 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/trans/02.htm.  
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production. In 1979, it accounted for 80% of ethanol production nationwide (Bernton et 
al., 2010). Over time, ADM became the largest corporate donor to politicians and law 
makers, and was considered by many an example of corporate welfare in the ethanol 
business for many years.  
 Ethanol enjoyed large investments from the federal government (resource 
mobilization  F6). Despite strong support from Midwestern state politicians and financial 
help from federal government incentives, gasohol had only 2% of the gasoline market in 
1980. Notwithstanding, players in the industry kept investing in technology. Some 
examples included the National Distillers and the Chemical Corporation announcing 
plans for a new ethanol plant, using a continuous fermentation process, which reduced 
significantly the production cost associated with the conventional process. Investments in 
technology and research were not limited to the private sector. The federal government 
was also committed to investing in alternative fuels.  The Department of Energy created 
the Office of Alcohol Fuels to accelerate research and development of ethanol and 
methanol. Although there was R&D capability and knowledge acquired on cellulosic 
ethanol, the sense of urgency on the energy independency problem led the administration 
to focus research efforts on short term promising technologies, such as corn ethanol 
(Wyman, 2001). In 1980, the US government established the US Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation, a public-private partnership for the development of synthetic fuels from 
coal, ethanol, and power production from biomass.  
 Gasohol was becoming popular in the country. With prices slightly higher than 
unleaded gasoline, gasohol attracted consumers for its positive appeal associated with 
energy security and driving performance (guidance of research F4). Gasohol accounted 
for 13% of Texaco sales in the Washington region. Texaco had 1,400 stations offering 
gasohol around the country. Other oil companies, such as Amoco offered gasohol mainly 
in the grain producer states of the Midwest. Exxon did not market gasohol, because it 
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believed the production of ethanol used more energy than the energy contained in the 
fuel.  
 For President Carter, the energy dependency problem was considered the “moral 
equivalent to war”. Carrying a sense of urgency, his administration main goal was to 
replace oil imports with synthetic fuels produced in the U.S. Under the Carter 
administration there were programs and investments promoting renewable fuels 
(guidance of research F4; knowledge creation  F2; resource mobilization F6). The most 
important programs of the Carter administration focused on the production of synfuel32  
from coal, and alcohols such as methanol and ethanol. The Energy Security Act funded 
$1.27 billion in federal loans for biomass fuels and loan guarantees for coal and shale-
based synthetic fuels. During the 1980s, some oil companies, especially those having 
stakes in the coal business, began investing in plants producing methanol using the coal 
liquefaction process. However, ethanol became the fuel of choice for the market of 
oxygenates for gasoline. Methanol was considered very toxic and less suitable for the 
production of gasohol than ethanol (Bernton et al., 2010).  
Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
Exogenous factors increased positive expectations for gasohol (research guidance-
F4), leading policy makers to regulate and provide tax incentives (National Energy 
Act 1978) for the production of gasohol in the Midwest (entrepreneurship-F1; 
market formation-F5). Moreover, farmers and ethanol producers formed a group 
with common interests, who very early became powerful advocates for ethanol and 
gasohol production (legitimation-F7). These initiatives reinforced entrepreneurial 
activity (F1), knowledge development (F2), additional investments (resource 
mobilization-F6), and the optimism in relation to the future of the industry 
                                                 
 
 
32 Synfuel or synthetic fuel can be obtained from coal liquefaction or natural gas reform.  
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(guidance of research-F4). The Carter Administration reinforced the positive 
climate for renewable energy, providing additional funding for research on ethanol 
(F6, F2). However, the emergence of gasohol and ethanol would soon slow down 
with the new Regan administration and cheap and abundant oil during the 1980s. 
The graph below illustrates the evolution of the functions of innovation during the 
first period of innovation of ethanol in the U.S. Most functions of innovations have a 
positive start during the period. Entrepreneurial activity (F1) was reinforced by the 
positive expectations of the industry (guidance of research-F4) and by tax incentives 




Figure 16: Gasohol Boom - Map of functions of innovation 1975-1980. Source: New York 
Times and Washington Post 
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6.2 The Reagan Era and Cheap Oil - the end of the gasohol 
boom (1980-1990) 
 
 The 1980s marked the end of strong government incentives for renewable energy, 
and the stabilization of international oil prices. Ethanol programs lost government 
funding (resource mobilization  -F6), and gasohol lost market and production to unleaded 
gasoline (entrepreneurial activity  -F1). However, ethanol was already valued by its anti-
knocking properties and as a potential replacement for lead in gasoline, creating a 
positive expectation about the potential market of ethanol as an additive (guidance of 
research F4). Some local initiatives in California began testing cars with engines running 
on 100% methanol (downstream market F8; knowledge creation), but those initiatives did 
not have a significant impact. 
  In 1981, funding for research decreased significantly (resource mobilization   -
F6), and shifted to more long term and high risk projects, those that would not have been 
pursued by the private sector. R&D efforts were limited to ethanol produced from 
biomass, using the enzymatic process (Wyman, 2001). 
 The Reagan Administration planned to end the large loan program to the ethanol 
industry created by the Carter administration. To counter this movement, a coalition of 
gasohol interests created the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA). The RFA transformed 
itself in a powerful lobbying organization, and continually advocated for ethanol interests 
in the Congress. These actions strengthened the legitimation of ethanol at that time 
(legitimation  F7).  But the Reagan administration’s large federal support program in the 
form of loan guarantees went to the production of synthetic fuels from coal, shale, and tar 
sands (Bernton et al., 2010).  
 By 1981, oil supply had normalized, and prices were stable. The consumer did not 
see much advantage in using gasohol.  Following low interest from consumers, Texaco 
decided to stop sales of gasohol in many of its gas stations. The company stopped sales in 
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the Northeast states, and replaced gasohol with premium grade unleaded gasoline. ADM, 
the largest producer of ethanol decided to delay one of its large investment plans in 
ethanol.  
 During the early 1980s, the Reagan administration ended the Carter’s era of 
strong funding for alternative fuels. Investments to promote ethanol innovation decreased 
(resource mobilization   -F6). Funding for ethanol was cut drastically, along with electric 
vehicles and methanol. However, amidst the economic recession and financial hurdles for 
farmers and land owners, some strong voices called for the support of fuels from 
agricultural crops, arguing that those programs could bring relief for economically 
distressed American farmers. Some environmentalist groups claimed that programs like 
those supporting ethanol from corn were in fact contributing to price increase in grains, 
inflating prices in the food market. But a report commissioned by Ford Motor Company 
and the Energy Department used computer models to show that the production of fuels 
from feedstock would not harm the production of food.  
 The state of California was promoting alcohol as a renewable fuel (research 
guidance  F4). The state of California and Ford Motor Company supported the use of 
methanol as an alcohol fuel. In 1981, Ford had delivered 40 methanol cars to California, 
LA County. The county installed several methanol pumps, and in 1983 Ford began 
market tests with its new car using methanol33 . More than 500 cars were delivered to 
local fleets and to state officials. The test was followed by the California Energy 
Commission. The methanol was blended with 10% gasoline to help start the engine at 
low temperatures. Despite the small number of cars being tested, users reported minor 
problems, with an overall positive performance. Although methanol has energy content 
50% lower than gasoline, methanol provides a better performance, as long as engines are 
                                                 
 
 
33 Methanol was produced from indirect liquefaction of coal, or from natural gas. Methanol may also be 
produced from biomass sources. As ethanol, methanol is compatible with flex fuel vehicles.  
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adapted to maximize performance with the alternative fuel. Methanol and ethanol had 
long been used in motor race because both fuels have a higher energy density than 
gasoline, deliver more power, more torque, as a result of their anti-knocking properties.   
 The phasing out of lead from gasoline since the Clean Air Act of 1970 opened a 
potential market for ethanol, thanks to its anti-knocking properties. This increased the 
expectations of a potential market for ethanol as a replacement for lead in gasoline 
(guidance of research  F4). The Environmental Protection Agency determined that the 
level of lead in gasoline should be reduced to 0.1 gram until January 1st 198634 . The 
amount of lead in gasoline in 1975 was between 2 and 3 percent. The complete banning 
of leaded gasoline did not come until 1996. Companies like American Fuels Technology, 
Inc., found a market opportunity with the new EPA ruling, because ethanol was 
considered not only a fuel extender, but also a fuel enhancer because of its anti-knocking 
properties.  
 In 1987, California decided to go forward with its plans to use methanol as a fuel 
to reduce its pollution problems. The state had made an agreement with Arco (Atlantic 
Richfield Corporation) for the commercialization of methanol in the state in 70 gas 
stations. At the same time, the system made the first efforts to develop capabilities in the 
downstream market (F8). On the transportation side, Ford had developed cars capable of 
running with methanol or gasoline. California officials hoped to replace 30% of the 
state’s gasoline consumption with methanol by the year 2000. Methanol was also making 
strides in other states. New York was experimenting buses running on methanol. The 
Reagan administration also supported the development of ethanol and methanol programs 
to replace part of the gasoline in the U.S. The government planned to recommend these 
alternative fuels with economic incentives, because of their potential to curb emissions in 





the transportation sector. The EPA would provide guidance to the states in how to use the 
alternative fuels to comply with the Clean Air Act requirements.  
 By the end of the 1980s, the environmental appeal of alcohol fuels revived the 
interest for alternative fuels, after a decade of low oil prices ended the growing cycle of 
ethanol and methanol during the 1970s. The competition with oil prices forced many 
industries to shut their ethanol and methanol plants. A government report estimated that 
approximately half of the 165 alcohol plants operating during the early 1980s were still 
operating in 1987. The strong entrepreneurial activity of the previous period was 
counteracted by low oil prices (-F1) and lack of incentives from the government (-F4). 
However, the environmental appeal of ethanol as a renewable source helped to revive the 
interest for ethanol in the late 1980s, increasing positive expectations about the 
technology (guidance of research F4). The prospects of a new market for alcohol fuels, 
and the support of politicians revived the interest for the programs. The government 
announced that the sales of gasohol in 1986 had reached approximately 8% of gasoline 
sales, against 2% during the early 1980s. 
 In April of 1988, the Senate approved legislation that gave incentives for the 
production of alternative fuels vehicles (guidance of research F4). The measure would 
help automakers meet the efficiency requirements for corporate average fuel economy 
(CAFE standards) for cars and light trucks. The bill was approved by the House and 
became law.  Automakers were entitled to produce cars with engines designed to run on 
ethanol, methanol, or natural gas. The main process to produce methanol used natural 
gas, raising questions about methanol’s benefits for energy independence in the long 
term. Oil companies were not supportive of methanol as an alternative fuel. Addressing 
the criticism, the EPA issued a report highlighting methanol’s environmental benefits, 
and arguing that the alternative fuel would be competitive with gasoline at the pump.   
 In 1989, President H.W. Bush announced a plan to curb pollution in large cities 
by increasing the use of ethanol, methanol, and natural gas. The plan required annual 
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sales of one million alternative vehicles in the most polluted cities until 1997. The plan, 
however, did not have the support of automakers, who claimed that alternative fuel 
vehicles were an expensive option for consumers. Pressured by tough environmental 
regulations, automakers and oil companies announced a joint research program to 
develop vehicle and fuel technologies to decrease levels of pollution and to decrease the 
emission of greenhouse gas emissions. The research plan contemplated research on 
reformulated gasoline, and alcohols. The Bush plan of a “National Energy Strategy” 
focused on energy conservation, and renewable energy such as ethanol and solar energy 
(guidance of research  F4). In addition, there was a stronger legitimation towards ethanol 
at that time.   
 The ethanol lobby was very strong. Ethanol enjoyed a federal tax credit of 60 
cents a gallon, helping to cover the wholesale price difference between ethanol and 
gasoline. Since 1980, gasohol producers had received $4.6 billion in federal and state tax 
exemptions. Critics to subsidies argued that the tax incentives were nothing but corporate 
welfare, because the largest beneficiary of the tax credit had been ADM, which 
accounted for 75 percent of the production of ethanol in the country. The federal tax 
credit would expire in 1992, but a powerful lobby in Washington DC was fighting for the 
survival of the tax incentives for the ethanol industry. Besides large corporations like 
ADM, professional associations such as the National Corn Growers Association, the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, and the American Agriculture Movement all 
supported the ethanol industry in Congress. 
Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
 During the 1980s, cheap oil prices reduced investments in R&D (resource 
mobilization- -F6) in ethanol and entrepreneurial activity slowed down (-F1). But 
with the banning of lead by the EPA in the 1970s, ethanol was already recognized by 
its anti-knocking properties (guidance of research-F4). The Renewable Fuels 
Association became the strong lobbying organization for ethanol in Washington DC 
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(legitimation F7). California adopted anti-pollution standards (market formation 
F5), and began tests with methanol and cars running on 100% methanol (knowledge 
creation F2) and (building capabilities in the downstream market F8). Some cities 
began tests with methanol to curb pollution problems (knowledge creation F2). The 
graph below shows that there is some building in the function guidance of research 
(F4), because of the expectation that ethanol could serve the market of oxygenates. 
There is some building of function legitimation (F7) with stronger lobbying for 
ethanol. Funding for methanol drove some activity of knowledge creation for testing 
cars running on alcohol (F2). However, none of those activities were strong enough 
to spur entrepreneurial activity. The graph does not show a sustained building of 
functions of innovation in the positive direction, suggesting the TIS ethanol was 
emerging but still lacking important activity to take off. 
 
 
Figure 17: The end of the gasohol boom. Map of the functions of innovation. 1981-1990  
Sources: NYT and Washinton Post 
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6.3 The Clean Air Act: an opportunity for ethanol as oxygenate 
(1990-2000) 
 
 The end of the last period was marked by a focus on methanol from coal. 
California and Ford tested some cars running on 100% methanol, and some states 
adopted blends of gasoline and methanol. Many ethanol plants shut down for lack of 
government support and market demand (entrepreneurial activity –F1). Although ethanol 
was considered a nice oxygenate for gasoline in more polluted areas (guidance of 
research F4), the product was deemed to increase smog levels during the warmer months 
in the most polluted cities (guidance of research  -F4). The banning of MTBE in the late 
1990s generated the necessary market demand to spur production of ethanol in the new 
millennium.  Despite automakers’ efforts to launch flex fuel vehicles (downstream 
market F8), most of them ran on 100% gasoline (downstream market  -F8).  
 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 required the nine most polluted areas in 
the country to sell reformulated gasoline mixed with additives like ethanol or MTBE 
(Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether) beginning in 1994. The oil industry opposed the measure. 
However, oil companies and car makers made efforts to reduce the levels of emissions of 
gasoline. Major oil companies and automakers decided to collaborate in a project to 
investigate emissions coming out of tail pipes from the combustion of gasoline. The goal 
was to identify which components contributed the most to smog formation, and to change 
the formulation of gasoline to eliminate the most toxic emissions. Local governments in 
large cities were proactive in adopting measures to improve levels of emissions from 
transportation. Following environmental concerns, some large cities mandated the use of 
alternative fuels vhehicles, creating a potential market niche for ethanol (market 
formation  F5). New York City and Los Angeles adopted alternative fuels vehicles in 
government fleets, using methanol, ethanol, and natural gas as alternative fuels.  
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 In 1991, Volvo North America began testing flex fuel vehicles capable of running 
on methanol in California, strengthening capabilities in the downstream market of ethanol 
(F8). The technology included electrically heated catalytic converters so that cars would 
emit less toxic gases during cold months. In an effort to comply with the recently 
approved Clean Air Act amendment, Exxon planned to build three plants to produce 
MTBE, an  oxygenate competing with ethanol. MTBE was cheaper than ethanol and 
easier to transport. Arco was a large MTBE supplier, and other oil companies had plans 
to increase consumption of MTBE.  
 At the local level, some states passed legislation promoting the use of alternative 
fuels vehicles, increasing the prospects for the use of ethanol as an alternative fuel 
(guidance of research  F4). In California, the Air Resource Board adopted legislation to 
restrict emissions beginning in 1994. California and Texas laws pushed forward the use 
of automobiles compatible with alternative fuels like propane, natural gas, and alcohols 
like methanol and ethanol. In the meantime, the automobile and energy sectors joined 
forces to collaborate in research of alternative fuel vehicles (knowledge creation  F2; 
knowledge diffusion  F3). Detroit “Big Three” and Southern California Edison agreed to 
collaborate in research of alternative fuel vehicles. Electric vehicles were also included. 
Texas law required schools and government agencies to buy only alternative fuels 
vehicles beginning in 1991. The state also required the conversion of existing fleets to 
compatible alternative fuels vehicles until 1996. Despite incentives put forward by the 
state, the sales of alternative fuels in service stations were low, leading Chevron to stop 
installing methanol pumps throughout the state. 
 And more automakers joined forces building the capability of the downstream 
market of ethanol (F8). Following other American automakers, Chrysler also announced 
sales of flex fuel vehicles. The additional cost of the alternative fuel vehicles would be 
between $200 and $500 dollars. The production of these cars would give Chrysler a 
credit in corporate average fuel efficiency as determined by law. Different from other 
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states, California offered buyers of AFV a subsidy of $2,000, pushing forward the 
commercialization of bi-fuel vehicles. However, those incentives did not guarantee that 
consumers would fuel their vehicles with alternative fuels, since the number of pumps 
offering alternative fuels was still very low.  
 In November 1992, the EPA began the Oxygenated Fuels Program as it was 
determined by the Clean Air Act of 1990. The new program required gas stations in 39 
metropolitan areas of the country to sell gasoline blended with oxygenates like ethanol or 
MTBE. The goal was to reduce urban pollution, by decreasing the emission of carbon 
monoxide (CO) from tail pipes35 . However, the EPA banned the use of ethanol in nine 
major cities (non-attainment areas) during the summer months, because the higher 
volatility levels of ethanol could make the smog worse. This came as bad news for the 
ethanol industry, bringing concerns that it would have negative impact for the 
development of the industry (guidance of research  -F4). But advocates for the industry 
reacted immediately, trying to legitimize ethanol as an oxygenate appropriate to be 
consumed widely (legitimation  F7). The corn lobby asked the EPA to waive the 
restriction, demanding that ethanol be sold year round nationwide. They were faced with 
tough criticism from the oil industry and environmental groups who argued that waiving 
the restriction would go against the Clean Air Act of 1990, which required a decrease in 
smog by 15% in nine major cities during the summer months, beginning in 1995. It was 
1993, and time of reelection approached. Despite calls from the oil industry and 
environmental groups, President Bush answered the request from the corn industry, 
exempting ethanol from restrictions established by the Clean Air Act. The move 
increased sales of ethanol throughout the year. 
                                                 
 
 
35 http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/caa90/09.htm (07.06.2010) 
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 In 1994, the Clinton Administration implemented policy mandating the use of 
ethanol as an alternative fuel (market formation  F5). The federal government promoted 
the use of ethanol as oxygenate by mandating that 30% of additives to gasoline be 
produced from renewable sources. Corn ethanol was the only additive produced 
commercially that was considered a renewable fuel. The mandate was good news for corn 
and farm lobbies, but made oil companies angry with the prospects of ethanol taking a 
market share of their own gasoline oxygenate, MTBE, produced from methanol. 
Methanol was produced from natural gas or coal, two non-renewable sources of energy. 
The oil industry challenged the government order by going to the US Court of Appeals in 
the District of Columbia. Some months later, the Court recognized the legitimacy of oil 
companies’ request, blocking the Clinton Administration from mandating the use of 
ethanol with gasoline.  
 In 1995, the reformulated gasoline (RFG) requirements were implemented in nine 
cities (the nine worst ozone nonattainment areas in the country). EPA estimates that until 
2000, RFG would account for one third of the gasoline sold in the country. One of the 
RFG requirements was the use of oxygenates, one of those being MTBE. There was 
concern at that time about the potential health hazards effects of this chemical compound. 
The reports of health complaints included headaches, dizziness, nausea, and flu-like 
symptoms (Mayer, 1995). In the meantime, automakers worried about strict air regulation 
in large metropolitan areas recently approved by the Clinton Administration. The auto 
industry feared that the regulations would prevent them from complying with tougher 
efficiency standards. 
 By 1996, ethanol was using about 7 percent of the national corn production, and 
was blended to approximately 12 percent of the gasoline in the country. Complying with 
legislation mandating government fleets to buy alternative fuel vehicles, the Postal 
Service announced that it would buy 10,000 new delivery trucks, all of them flex fuel 
vehicles capable of running on E85 (market formation  F5). However, according to postal 
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service workers, most of the vehicles would run on gasoline, because of the small 
numbers of ethanol pumps throughout the country. Even where ethanol was available, the 
price was on average 10 to 15 cents a gallon higher than gasoline. This reveals a 
weakness of the downstream market, which despite developing some capability, proved 
to be unable to make use of the renewable fuel, or ethanol (-F8) . A Government 
Accounting Office report published in 1997 reported that the cost of the ethanol program 
since its inception in the 1970s was $7.1 billion, with no or minor benefit for energy 
independence and environmental quality. The report was considered a bad evaluation of 
the innovation of ethanol, lowering expectations about the future of ethanol as an 
alternative fuel (guidance of research  -F4). 
 In 1997, a loophole legislation led automakers to launch flex fuel vehicles, but 
without much concern if the vehicles would really take on ethanol as a fuel. In other 
words, automakers invested to build capability in the downstream market without having 
much incentives about the availability of ethanol. Ford Motor Company announced that it 
would start selling flex fuel vehicles capable of running on ethanol or gasoline. Ford’s 
effort was followed by Chrysler and GM. The initiative was criticized by 
environmentalists, because automakers were taking advantage of a loophole in the 
Federal Law, which offset CAFE36 standards requirements. The credits for average 
efficiency, gave automakers license to sell more gas guzzling SUVs and vans, the most 
profitable line of vehicles at that time. At the same time, the sale of FFVs did not 
guarantee that consumers would fuel cars with ethanol instead of gasoline, 
environmentalists argued. 
 In Congress, the policy was favoring ethanol producers and the protection of the 
emerging ethanol market (guidance of research  F4).  The ethanol tax credit survived one 
                                                 
 
 
36 http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/caa90/09.htm (07.06.2010) 
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more challenge in Congress. The industry’s powerful lobby (Archer Daniels, the largest 
manufacturer and the National Corn Growers Association) gained support from 
lawmakers to keep the subsidies for ten more years. Congress extended the tax credit 
until 2007, despite the criticism that it cost US$ 600 million a year for American tax 
payers. Despite the favorable policy environment, the weak downstream market 
(capabilities in the downstream market  -F8) hindered ethanol penetration in the market. 
Even with generous tax incentives, sales of ethanol were dismal, because of the lack of 
gas stations and pumps selling ethanol throughout the country. According to a DOE 
study, the United States had 385,900 alternative fuel vehicles, against 4 million in Brazil, 
1.7 million in Japan, and 560,800 in the Netherlands. Alternative fuels in the DOE study 
included ethanol, methanol, compressed natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas (derived 
from propane).   
 In 1999, ethanol saw new market prospects with the banning of MTBE in 
California. Considered an additive deemed to pose “a significant risk” to the 
environment, the state of California announced it would start phasing out the chemical 
compound, with total removal until 2002. In Massachusetts, the Department of 
Environmental Protection had detected problems with the use of MTBE, which when 
leaked was a potential source of water contamination (MTBE dissolves in water). An 
EPA panel suggested that the chemical should be phased out nationwide. At that time, 
MTBE was used in 85% of the gasoline sold in the US, while ethanol had the remaining 
of the market.  
Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
 
 During the 1990s, positive expectations for ethanol increased because of the 
fuel’s positive properties as oxygenate (research guidance F4). However, studies 
considered ethanol to increase smog levels during summer months (research 
guidance -F4). The Clean Air Act Amendment of 1992 required the mixture of 
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oxygenates into gasoline in 39 metropolitan areas. Toxicity problems with MTBE 
increased the potential market for ethanol in the late 1990s. Automakers put the 
first flex fuel vehicles (FFV) in the market (building of capabilities in the 
downstream market-F8), and governments required their fleets to run on FFVs 
(market formation F5). But these initiatives were not sufficient to spread ethanol 
growth outside the Corn Belt, because of the low number of service stations offering 
ethanol (-F8). The graph shows an increasing trend in the function market 
formation (F5) (government programs requiring ethanol use, government fleets 
using FFVs, and legislation renewing ethanol tax credits), and a steady negative 
trend on the function guidance of research (-F4) (ethanol’s higher levels of volatility 
considered to worsen smog, and prevented ethanol from reaching the market year 
round). Despite some activity of the function building of capabilities in the 
downstream market (F8) resulting from the sales of FFV’s, the lack of pumps in 
service stations selling ethanol drove the function down (-F8). Almost all FFVs used 





Figure18: Clean Air Act: the opportunity for ethanol. Map of the functions of innovation. 1990-2000. 
Source: NYT and Washington Post 
 
 
6.4 The New Millennium: energy security, climate change. 
Reaching advanced ethanol (2000-2008) 
 
 During the late 1990s and 2000s, biofuels was recognized as a short term solution 
to address rising concerns of energy security and climate change. The positive 
expectations about ethanol (guidance of research  F4) triggered a positive trend of 
activities in government research funding for advanced ethanol (knowledge creation F2; 
resource mobilization F6), market formation through the Renewable Fuel Standard (F5); 
and growing production of corn ethanol (entrepreneurial activity F1). However, the 
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positive cycle of innovation was interrupted by lack of infrastructure for distribution and 
low sales of high blends of ethanol E85 (downstream market –F8), and by a general 
perception that growing ethanol production was responsible for increasing commodity 
food prices around the world (guidance of research –F4). 
 In the last period, environmental legislation required the use of oxygenates like 
MTBE or ethanol in major cities in the country. Ethanol became the only oxygenate in 
the market when MTBE was banned by the EPA. This requirement represented a 
mandate securing minimum market volumes for ethanol (market formation  F5). The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT 1992) established E85 as an alternative fuels and 
required all government agencies to have flex fuel vehicles in their fleets. This 
government mandate (market formation, F5) was counteracted by a weak downstream 
market for ethanol (capabilities in the downstream market  -F8). Most vehicles  ran on 
gasoline, because of limited infrastructure for ethanol distribution at the pump outside the 
Midwest Corn Belt 
 In 2000, the policy framework reinforced the focus on advanced technologies to 
produce ethanol (guidance of research  F4). The Biomass Research and Development Act 
created the biomass R&D initiative, a multi-agency program led by the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Agriculture to coordinate federally funded research of 
biomass, looking at the transportation, power, and chemical sectors (guidance of research 
F4; knowledge creation). One of the main thrusts of the program went towards R&D of 
ethanol from cellulose raw materials. One of the advantages of producing cellulosic 
ethanol instead of corn ethanol is that it prevents the farmers to divert the use of land 
from food to the fuel market37.  One example of financing from this program was the 
partial funding of BC International, which announced the construction of the first 





commercial plant to transform waste into ethanol. The new patented process used natural 
bacteria to transform wasted wooded material into alcohol. The new plant needed an 
investment of 90 million dollars, and took 18 months to be built.  
 The 2000 presidential campaign revealed once more the political significance of 
ethanol during the early stages of the campaign. Given the importance of the state of 
Iowa during the primaries, most candidates came to the corn state to provide legitimation 
to the technology (legitimation F7), and show their support to its most important 
business: ethanol.   
 In 2001, President W. Bush and his administration called for the use of biomass 
material from human, animal, and agricultural waste to increase the production of energy. 
The initiative expanded the research program to produce ethanol from sources different 
from feedstock like corn. The Bush administration energy plan called also for improved 
energy efficiency in a time when the Transportation department reported lower average 
economy for cars and trucks sold in the 2001 model year, a reflection of higher sales of 
sport utility vehicles. The Transportation department report predicted an average fuel 
economy of 24.5 miles a gallon, below the 24.7 miles a gallon reported for 2000. Because 
of the small number of service stations selling ethanol in the country (101 in a total of 
176,000), most flex fuel vehicles (large part being SUVs) ran on gasoline, increasing the 
gasoline consumption in the country. These results did not reflect the efforts in tax 
incentives and environmental regulation the administration had been consecrating 
towards promoting the market for corn ethanol The efforts in market formation and 
research guidance could not have the expected positive effects on the innovation process 
of ethanol, because the weak capability of the downstream market prevented the 
alternative fuel to displace gasoline.  
 But the environmental policy framework was having a positive impact in the 
innovation of ethanol in California. To comply with Clean Air Act regulations, the 
federal administration required the state of California to blend all its gasoline with 
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ethanol (market formation  F5). The requirement came in the wake of the MTBE ban, an 
additive oxygenate used in most of California gasoline. California officials argued that 
ethanol would increase the price of gasoline in the state, affirming that refineries were 
developing technology that would produce less polluting gasoline without the need to use 
ethanol. They asked EPA for a waiver of the ethanol requirement. The California 
mandate preceded legislation that was being worked in the congress to broaden ethanol 
use as oxygenate nationwide. The bill had the support of the farmers lobby, and large 
ethanol producers who were also important political financial donors. The legislation 
increased expectations of market growth for ethanol (market formation F4), and would 
spur a wave of investments in the ethanol industry, in special in the Northeastern states 
(entrepreneurship F1; resource mobilization  F6). 
 In 2002, Congress enacted legislation mandating the use of ethanol (market 
formation) the Senate passed an energy bill that expanded the amount of ethanol blended 
into gasoline nationwide. The Senate package also funded energy conservation and 
research towards clean sources of energy.  
 In 2003, New York City, the largest municipal fleet in the country, joined the 
Department of Energy’s Clean City, a national program designed to promote the use of 
alternative fuels vehicles nationwide by mandating governments to replace their fleets 
with vehicles capable of running on alternative energy like ethanol, natural gas, or 
electricity. Meanwhile, the Energy bill remained stalled in Congress, as House and 
Senate were not able to compromise on some differences. One point of disagreement was 
related to the amount of tax credits given to corn ethanol. Those against the tax credits 
were concerned that lower tax on ethanol would jeopardize the tax funds going to the 
Highway Trust Fund.  
 In 2004, the Department of Transportation announced that it would extend the 
corporate average fuel economy credit to cars running on ethanol planned to expire on 
models 2004 through models 2005 – 2008. The agency claimed that the measure was set 
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to promote the use of fuel ethanol and to decrease the US’s dependency on imported oil. 
The measure was advanced, despite a congressional report, which had informed that only 
one percent of flex fuel vehicles used ethanol, and that the extension of fuel efficiency 
credit would increase gasoline consumption in 9 to 14 billion gallons over four years.  
In 2005, the U.S. had higher energy prices and was more dependent on imported oil. 
After almost ten years without major energy legislation, President Bush signed the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, which included significant provisions for ethanol. 
EPACT2005 established the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS), requiring that gasoline in 
the U.S. has an increasing amount of biofuels – ethanol or biodiesel. The RFS established 
the use of 4 billion gallons of biofuels in 2006, increasing incrementally to reach 7.5 
billion gallons in 2012. The RFS replaced the Clean Air Act requirement to use 
oxygenates in reformulated gasoline, eliminating the incentive to use MTBE (Holt & 
Glover, 2006).  
 The enactment of EPACT2005 increased positive expectations about the ethanol 
market in the country (guidance of research F4). The state of New Jersey announced the 
construction of its first ethanol plant (entrepreneurship F1). The federal government 
contributed with US$ 1 million in grant money (resource mobilization  F6). In New York 
City, the Environmental Protection Committee sponsored the clean car technology 
legislation that expanded the city’s alternative fuel vehicle fleet. The legislation signed by 
Mayor Bloomberg required that 95% of cars, light trucks and vans bought by the city 
follow environmental standards as strict as the ones required in California. Connecticut 
promoted renewable energy by purchasing 575 alternative fuels vehicles for the state 
fleet, from which 528 were flex fuel and compatible to run on ethanol. The state planned 
to replace the remaining fleet vehicles by 2008.  
 The support towards corn ethanol received much criticism, as a solution that was 
risky and not sustainable in the long term. (guidance of research  -F4) Critics claimed that 
most FFVs ran on gasoline because there were not enough ethanol pumps in service 
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stations around the country (capabilities in the downstream market  -F8). Trying to 
address this problem, Ford announced that it would finance the installation of ethanol 
pumps in the Midwest region of the country. The automaker said it would also increase 
the production of FFVs. With higher gasoline prices, and more tension in the middle-east, 
President Bush urged Congress to push for legislation that would stimulate the production 
of ethanol and other renewables (guidance of research).  
 In 2006, the debate about the benefits and costs of corn ethanol was heating up, 
triggering reactions from society, and from specialists in the field. The corn ethanol 
industry was blamed for hunger around the world   (legitimation  -F7). The combination 
of high oil prices, growing production of ethanol, and the jump in corn prices led to a 
strong criticism towards the ethanol industry, which became the main culprit for hunger 
around the world. Amidst strong criticism against biofuels, President Bush in his State of 
the Union made clear his support for renewable energy, and called for more R&D of 
advanced biofuels, those not using edible feedstocks (legitimation   F7). Bush claimed 
that the U.S. had to decrease consumption of oil, saying that the United States was 
“addicted to oil”.  
 Research and engineering was ongoing to make the process to produce ethanol 
more efficient and less energy intensive (knowledge creation  F2). By placing ethanol 
plants close to cattle farms, corn residues called distiller grains were sent directly to cow 
feeding operations without requiring additional energy for drying operations. Moreover, 
the manure from cows were sent back to the plant and served as an additional source of 
energy. These engineering solutions brought significant gains in natural gas consumption, 
increasing the energy balance of ethanol production. The positive results brought raised 
positive expectations about the sustainability of ethanol as an alternative fuel. 
 Entrepreneurship was diversified in the industry (F1). Vinod Khosla, the founder 
of Microsystem, decided to enter the ethanol business by investing tens of millions of 
dollars in firms developing processes to produce ethanol using non edible biomass 
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sources. Producers of enzymes like Novozymes and Danisco had made significant 
progress in reducing costs of enzymes for the production of cellulosic ethanol.  
 The industry was also investing in expansion. The largest one, ADM, having 25% 
of the ethanol market announced that it planned an expansion of 50%, which would place 
it with an installed capacity of 1.5 billion gallons throughout the following two years 
(entrepreneurship F1). Investments were increasing towards more advanced technologies 
to produce ethanol (resource mobilization). Goldman Sachs invested $27 million dollars 
in Iogen, the Canadian ethanol producer that was pursuing development of cellulosic 
ethanol. Investments in ethanol production sprung across the United States, mostly driven 
by generous tax breaks, increased demand of ethanol stimulated by the mandates, and 
expectations of large profits in the industry. Oil companies decided to invest in research 
of advanced ethanol. BP had announced investments of $500 million dollars in a research 
center that would develop technology and new processes to produce advanced biofuels 
(knowledge creation  F2). 
   As the level of investment increased in the industry, so did the structure of the 
industry. While in 2003 half of the ethanol refineries were controlled by farmers, by 2006 
80% of new ethanol production came from plants whose owners were not locals. New 
plants were large investments that were not necessarily linked to farming operations 
(resource mobilization  F6). Many in Congress claimed that agriculture policy became 
independent from biofuels policy, therefore undermining the need for the tax credit.   
 Automakers continued to invest in the production of flex fuel vehicles, but the 
effort to build capabilities in the downstream market was undermined by the small 
number of ethanol pumps that could dispense the alternative fuel to those vehicles. Ford 
pledged that it would increase the production volume of flex fuel vehicles capable of 
running on ethanol or gasoline. General Motors was also a supporter of ethanol fuel, 
having used the Super Bowl in 2006 to kick off its campaign “Live Green, Go Yellow” to 
promote the use of ethanol and the use of FFV’s. DaimlerChrysler pledged to build 
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500,000 vehicles capable of running on ethanol until 2008. The big three at that time had 
around 4.5 million FFVs on the streets, but very few were running on E85. The 
automakers met with Congress and the President to ask for help to increase the number of 
ethanol pumps in service stations. From a total of 180,000 service stations nationwide, 
only 600 had pumps delivering E85. Oil companies were not encouraged to make the 
necessary investments to sell E85 as a fuel. At the market level, E85 received a negative 
assessment from Underwriters Laboratories, an independent product safety certification 
organization. UL stated that E85 was damaging pumps installed at service stations. UL 
and the Department of Energy held two days of hearings with the collaboration of oil 
companies, automakers and researchers to address the issue and develop a standard for 
pumps delivering E85. The certification problem delayed the proliferation of pumps 
across the country.  
 Increased production of ethanol, and better farm incentives changed the structure 
of grains production in the United States, with corn replacing much of the wheat fields. 
While in the 1970s American farmers accounted for half of wheat exports in the world, 
by 2006 its participation became less than a quarter. Technology, such the development 
of seeds for corn, soybeans, and cotton, also shifted production from wheat to these other 
crops. 
 By 2007, the rapid increase in the production of corn ethanol began to raise 
concerns about the potential impact of growing corn use for fuel production. Those issues 
created a negative expectation for the long term sustainability and development of the 
corn ethanol industry (guidance of research  -F4). In fact, a study issued by the Earth 
Policy Institute predicted that in a few years ethanol would be using half of the American 
corn crop. According to estimates, the 79 ethanol plants under construction would double 
the ethanol capacity to 11 billion gallons by 2008. The estimate spread fears about the 
long term consequences for food supplies.  
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 Counteracting the negative wave against corn ethanol, the Bush administration 
prepared a set of public discourses to strengthen the legitimation of ethanol and other 
biofuels (legitimation F7). Consistent with his rhetoric from 2006, President Bush used 
the State of the Union Address of 2007 to call for an increase in the mandate of biofuels. 
He also called for measures to increase the efficiency of cars and light trucks. President 
Bush made clear that his main goal was to decrease the country’s gasoline consumption 
by 20% over the decade, and he believed that biofuels and efficient cars would help the 
US achieve this goal. More specifically, he established the target of using 35 billion 
gallons of biofuels by 2017, which would mean replacing 15% of the gasoline 
consumption for that year.  
 The wave of optimism about the future of ethanol market (guidance of research 
F4)  spurred more investments in the industry (resource mobilization F6; 
entrepreneurship F1). Estimates indicated production of 6 billion gallons of ethanol for 
2007, this volume coming only from corn. The industry was becoming less centralized in 
a large producer like ADM. At that time, the number of plants increased exponentially, 
pushing ADM’s market share down to 25%.  The new push for new biorefineries and 
new plants was good news for small cities in rural America needing to add to their 
employment figures.  
 At this time, the ethanol TIS enjoyed an increasing amount of resource 
mobilization (F6) and investments in research, development, and deployment (knowledge 
development F2; knowledge diffusion F3). The federal government showed commitment 
to support the scaling up, demonstration, and commercialization of advanced biofuels, by 
funding six demonstration plants developing processes to produce cellulosic ethanol. The 
goal was to reduce the production cost of cellulosic ethanol. According to the 
administration, the country would not reach the goal of producing 35 billion gallons of 
ethanol, using only corn. It was necessary to develop alternative processes using 
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alternative feedstocks. The six companies winning funding were Broin, Abengoa 
Bioenergy, Alico Inc., BlueFire Ethanol, Iogen Corp, and Range Fuels. 
 Ethanol was being promoted in car racing for its superior power and torque when 
compared to gasoline. The IndyCar series would run for the first time the whole 2007 
season cars fueled with 100% ethanol. GM decided to participate in the biofuels business, 
buying stakes in Coskata, a start-up company developing cellulosic ethanol at the 
demonstration stage. In the United States, it was the first time a car maker would enter 
the business of fuels.  
 In March of 2007, President Bush visited Brazil and talked to President Lula. The 
goal of the visit was to promote collaboration in biofuels and to develop joint programs to 
reduce demand for oil in the Western Hemisphere. The two countries signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding, which included R&D collaboration in biofuels, 
technology transfer to countries in the Caribbean, and development of international 
standards and certification of biofuels.  
 By the end of 2007, The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 reserved 
an important market niche for producers of ethanol (market formation F5). The Act, also 
known as EISA2007, expanded the Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS2), and established a 
volume of 36 billion gallons of biofuels in 2022. RFS2 also determined a ceiling for the 
use of corn ethanol, mandating the use of cellulosic biomass, or non-edible feedstock for 
the production of biofuels. In other words, RFS2 determined that 21 billion gallons of 
biofuels should come from advanced biofuels processes that would reduce the emissions 
of GHG by a pre-determined level (Yacobucci & Capehart, 2008). EISA2007 also 
established a new CAFE standard for cars and light trucks, setting an average mileage of 
35 miles per gallon for models year 2020.  
  Following the government commitment towards the development of advanced 
ethanol technologies, the Department of Energy determined the creation of three 
Bioenergy Research Centers (BRCs) to develop research on biofuels produced from non-
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edible biomass (resource mobilization F6; knowledge creation F2). Each center would 
develop a specific capability in research. The DOE Bioenergy Science Center (BESC) 
would be led by the DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Oakridge, Tennessee, and 
would focus on the study of resistance of plants, the cellulosic material breakdown into 
sugar, and the study of poplar and switchgrass. The DOE Great Lakes Bioenergy 
Research Center (GLBRC) would be led by the University of Wisconsin, in Madison, 
Wisconsin, and would focus on the study of plant conversion to sugars, and on the 
socioeconomic and environmental issues related to a biofuels economy. The third center, 
the DOE Joint Bioenergy Institute (JBEI) would be led by the DOE’s Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, and would concentrate on less resistant crops, or model crops. The 
goal was to increase efforts and accelerate research into advanced biofuels to comply 
with the volumes required by RFS2. 
 In 2008, more incentives were given to promote the commercialization of 
advanced ethanol (guidance of research F4). The Farm Bill 2008 reduced the blender tax 
of corn ethanol from 0.54 to 0.45 cents per gallon, and established a new production tax 
credit for cellulosic ethanol of $1.00 per gallon. It also determined the provision of grants 
for the retrofitting and construction of biorefineries for the production of advanced 
biofuels. It required the US Department of Agriculture to support research to promote 
more sustainable farming and to promote the use of renewable energy in farms. The Farm 
Bill also determined joint work between DOE, USDA, and EPA to improve the necessary 
infrastructure for the production of biofuels, and provided ample funding for the research 
and development of bioenergy, including biofuels and bio-based chemicals (Capehart, 
Schnepf, & Yacobucci, 2008).   
 In 2008, gasoline was approaching $4.00 a gallon, and oil price surpassed $100 a 
barrel. Ethanol received much of the blame for the rise in food prices around the world, 
which played a negative role for the future prospects of innovation of ethanol in the short 
term (guidance of research  -F4). Corn prices increased around 50% in one year, and 
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soybean prices were projected to go up 30% as well. There were reports that bad weather 
and increased consumption in China were also contributing to high levels of grain prices. 
Food demand continued to grow worldwide, and the Department of Agriculture reported 
that based on interviews, some corn growers in the US decided to cut corn acreage for 
soybean crops.   
 Some scholars in the scientific community provided evidence against the long 
term sustainability of biofuels (guidance of research  -F4). Still in 2008, the journal 
Science had published two articles arguing that over time, ethanol produced from corn 
would emit more greenhouse gases than gasoline. The first article authored by two 
researchers from Princeton University claimed that, over 30 years, corn ethanol would 
produce twice as much GHG emissions than gasoline. The second article, written by 
scientists from the Nature Conservancy and University of Minnesota claimed that the 
production of biofuels feedstocks triggered land use change in Asia, and in South 
America. The conversion of rainforests and savannahs in those places would be 
detrimental to the efforts to reduce climate change. Although many challenged the 
assumptions used by the researchers, these articles raised even more controversy about 
the sustainability of corn ethanol in the USA.  
 The downstream market was not capable of taking in the growing volumes of 
ethanol produced (building of capabilities in the downstream market  -F8). Investments in 
distribution of ethanol did not keep pace with the overexpansion in the industry. The 
market was not able to absorb the additional supply of ethanol. The price of ethanol 
decreased 30% bringing an end to the era of ethanol boom. Verasun Energy, one of the 
largest ethanol producers and investors filed for bankruptcy (entrepreneurship -F1).  
Iowa, the core of corn ethanol business was also the center for the debut of candidate 
Barack Obama for the presidency of the United States. He campaigned in that state 
supporting the corn ethanol business in the region. He won the Iowa caucuses as a 
Democrat, marking his first victory for the presidential race.  
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Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
 Climate change and energy security became priority issues in the new 
millennium. Increasing volumes of ethanol production (entrepreneurial activity F1) 
and the launch of flex fuel vehicles (building of capabilities in the downstream 
market F8) raised expectations about the potential benefits of biofuels for the 
American energy problem (guidance of research F4). The positive expectation and 
the support of the administration led to additional research funding (resource 
mobilization F6) and the creation of a government program to manage research of 
advanced biofuels in the long term (knowledge creation F2), the Biomass R&D 
program. These initiatives, along with mandates for increasing volumes of biofuels 
in the long term (RFS2 mandated increasing volumes of advanced biofuels) (market 
formation F5), gave incentives for the construction of many new plants 
(entrepreneurial activity F1; resource mobilization F6)). Eventually, the bubble of 
investments was not matched with enough infrastructure for distribution (-F8). 
Despite sales of FFVs, most of them ran on gasoline (-F8). Ethanol was blamed for 
the rise in the price of commodity grains around the world, and the scientific 
community was not convinced about the environmental benefits of corn ethanol in 
the long run (-F4). The financial and economic downturn would take the innovation 
trajectory of ethanol to a difficult path beginning in the late 2008. The graph below 
translates the summary of events into the functions of innovation. There is a 
building up of all the functions of innovation in the positive side of the graph. 
However, some of the functions collapse on the negative side of the graph: 1) 
guidance of research (-F4), because of negative reports of ethanol: environmental 
sustainability and negative effect on food price; 2) building of capabilities in the 
downstream market (-F8): despite the increasing number of FFVs in the market, 
service stations did not have enough incentives to invest in ethanol pumps. 99% of 
ethanol sells as 10% blend with gasoline. Once sales of gasoline reach 10% of 
 112
gasoline market, they reach the “blend wall”. Without the prospects of having a 
large market for E85, investors do not have enough incentives to take further risk in 
the business. Therefore, the collapse of the functions F4 and F8 (low expectation 
about the sustainability of corn ethanol and low penetration in the market of E85) 
may be preventing the building up of a virtuous cycle of innovation for the TIS 
ethanol. Without enough investments, cellulosic ethanol plants producing at the 
demonstration scale do not have the necessary resources to scale up to commercial 
scale, making more difficult the commercialization of advanced ethanol in 




Figure19: The New Millennium: energy, security, climate change. Map of the functions of innovation. 




NARRATIVE ETHANOL BRAZIL 
 
 This chapter describes the trajectory of the ethanol innovation system in Brazil. It 
uses a narrative approach, based on the articles from the newspaper O Estado de Sao 
Paulo. The articles were compiled in chronological order, and complemented by gray 
literature. The unfolding of reports of events is presented in narrative form, and divided 
in the chapter in three different segments of time:  
1) Proalcool under the military government 
a. Proalcool I – ethanol as a blend (anhydrous ethanol) and the development 
of ethanol engines (1975-1980) 
b. Proalcool II – hydrated ethanol and ethanol compatible vehicles (1980-
1990) 
2) The new Proalcool under the new democratic government – the process of 
liberalization, and the lost decade (1990-1999) 
3) The flex fuel vehicle and the rebirth of the ethanol program (2000 – 2008) 
 Each session starts with a brief summary of main events, and ends with a brief 
analysis (in bold) relating the unfolding of events to the functions of innovation. The 
analysis is complemented by a graph showing the cumulative building or collapse of 
functions of innovations during the period. 
 
 A traditional producer of sugarcane and sugar since colonial times, Brazil started 
exploration of sugar-based ethanol in 1903, following a program created by the First 
National Congress on Industrial Applications of Alcohol (Moreira & Goldemberg, 1999). 
At first, alcohol was mainly used for the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, and for 
the production of the Brazilian rum popularly known as “cachaça”. By 1931, Brazil 
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started to use ethanol with gasoline for the small transportation market in blends of 5% 
ethanol. In early 1970s, Brazil strong industrial growth was heavily dependent on 
imported oil. Around 80% of the gasoline consumed in Brazil was imported, representing 
$600 million in annual payments, a heavy financial and political burden for the Brazilian 
military government ruling the country at that time. With the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, 
Brazilian annual payments for oil imports rose to US$ 4 billion, putting the country on an 
unsustainable financial path. In November of 1975, the military government launched the 
Alcohol National Program, or Proalcool (PNA). The program came as a relief for 
Brazilian sugar growers who were struggling to sell in an international depressed market 
(Azanha Ferraz Dias de Moraes & Rodrigues, 2006; J. Goldemberg, 2009). 
 
 Brazilians started doing research on engines running on ethanol and testing 
alcohol cars since the 1920s, but it was in 1975 that engineers from the government run 
research center Aerospace Technological Center (CTA) in Sao Jose dos Campos, state of 
Sao Paulo, unveiled a first prototype of the ethanol engine. CTA was developing a 
combustion engine designed to run on 100% ethanol.   
 Because sugar prices followed the international market, government had to fix 
ethanol prices to avoid that sugar mills would abandon ethanol production to sell sugar in 
more attractive markets. The government had to guarantee a minimum opportunity cost 
for ethanol production. The whole distribution would be centralized at the state owned oil 
company Petrobras at a price competitive to the gasoline, assuring a market for the 





7.1 Proalcool I:  anhydrous ethanol as a blend and 
development of ethanol engines (1975-1980) 
 
 In Proalcool I, the military government assumed the role of entrepreneur (F1) and 
largest investor (resource mobilization F6). In addition to financing, major incentives for 
growing production came from a procurement policy, and the mandatory blending of 
gasoline with 20% ethanol (market formation F5). The funding for the development of 
the engine running on 100% ethanol (knowledge creation F2) began the process that 
would later lead multinational automakers to manufacture cars running on 100% ethanol 
(downstream market F8). 
 The National Alcool Plan mobilized a large amount of resources to the industry 
and the market, mandated the blending of gasoline with ethanol (market formation F5), 
and invested in the research to develop the engine running on 100% ethanol (resource 
mobilization F6; knowledge creation  F2). Proalcool established the following mandatory 
policies: 1) procurement policy through Petrobras to guarantee the market and 
distribution for ethanol production; 2) loans and low interest rates to promote investments 
in ethanol; 3) the development of the engine running on 100% ethanol by CTA 
(Aerospace Technological Center). At its onset, the Brazilian Proalcool would allow the 
progressive blending of ethanol into gasoline up to 20%. The mixture did not require any 
change in the design of cars that ran on gasoline.  
 Brazil was active in developing knowledge in the automobile sector (knowledge 
creation  F2). In 1976, first tests were made in buses (to replace diesel) and cars (to 
replace gasoline). Cars ran with hydrous ethanol (96% ethanol, 4% water). Ethanol also 
gained legitimacy in the racing car sector with the Brazilian Association of Pilots and 
Racing Cars claiming the use of cars running on ethanol in some of their competitions. 
Despite the positive prospects of the plan, many challenges remained, one of them being 
the standardization of the gasoline-alcohol blend throughout the country. According to 
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automakers, standardization was important and critical in the design of an efficient 
engine. By September 1976, Volkswagen of Brazil, the largest multinational Brazilian 
automaker made the first demonstration of a car running on 100% ethanol to Brazilian 
authorities. CTA officially approved the car running on ethanol after a test of 4,000 
kilometers that was considered successful.  
 The Brazilian centralized government used its financial power to finance the 
sugarcane and ethanol industries (resource mobilization F6). The Brazilian government 
through the state owned Banco do Brasil financed projects for Proalcool to increase 
sugarcane and ethanol capacity. However, the program was criticized in many fronts: 
many were skeptical that the whole substitution of gasoline by ethanol was feasible and 
realistic. There were already signs that projects were slow to be implemented and 
undersupply of ethanol was imminent. Sugarcane was considered the best feedstock to be 
used as an energy source. However, the government considered the potential use of 
manioc, because of the potential social and economic benefits of using this feedstock in 
rural communities.  
 By 1977, the blending of 20% ethanol into gasoline became mandatory in the 
metropolitan area of Sao Paulo. The new regulation represented an economy of 20 
thousand barrels of oil per day for the country. Increasing demand was not matched by 
ethanol supply. The shortage of sugarcane and financial pressures led the government to 
prioritize the production of sugar in detriment to ethanol. Brazil still imported 80% of its 
oil consumption, and it had to maximize sugar exports to balance the country’s 
international trade. Despite the change in course, automakers remained committed to 




7.2 Proalcool II:  hydrous ethanol and ethanol vehicles (1980-
1990) 
 
 During Proalcool II, automakers joined the ethanol innovation system and 
launched the first cars running on 100% ethanol (downstream market F8). The demand 
for ethanol grew fast (guidance of research F4), leading the government to accelerate the 
production and investments on sugarcane and ethanol (resource mobilization F6; 
entrepreneurial activity F1). However, supply would not fulfill demand (-F4), leading the 
government to order automakers to reduce production of ethanol cars (downstream 
market –F8).    
 The knowledge generated  to build engines running on 100% ethanol helped to 
reinforce the downstream market for ethanol. By 1978, the technology to produce engines 
running on 100% ethanol had been developed and approved by CTA, but government 
officials raised questions on how to transfer the technology to the multinational 
companies without undermining the nationalistic character of the alcohol program. 
During the second phase of Proalcool, the government focused on the industrialization of 
cars running on 100% ethanol. Government and Anfavea, the national association of car 
manufacturers, fully collaborated on that task.  A technical national commission was 
created involving the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the National Council of 
Metrology, Standardization, and Industrial Quality, the Brazilian Association of 
Technical Standards, and the automakers. The commission guaranteed the proper 
planning and industrialization of cars running on 100% ethanol. The goal was to increase 
the exchange of information between research developed by CTA and the automakers.  
The commission decided that automakers would lead research on light-duty vehicles, 
while government through CTA would focus research on ethanol engines for public/mass 
transportation.  
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 There were a number of incentives promoting the production levels of ethanol in 
Brazil (guidance of research F4).The federal government implemented tax incentives to 
stimulate the production of cars running on 100% ethanol. By early 1979, the Italian 
automaker Fiat announced that it had the technology ready to produce cars running on 
100% ethanol, but needed government authorization to start production at industrial 
scale. CTA certified the product, since it fulfilled the basic requirements defined by the 
government R&D center: ethanol cars could not consume more than 15% than similar 
gasoline cars, and ethanol engines would have to deliver 20% more power than similar 
gasoline-run engines. In March 1979, Fiat started production of its model Fiat 147. 
Commercialization targeted at first government fleets, at the state and federal level. 
Brazil was consolidating its efforts and successfully building capabilities to promote the 
downstream market of ethanol (F8). 
 The government expected that the global demand of oil would exceed production 
by 1985. The National Commission of Alcohol had already approved more than 200 
projects for additional production of ethanol through the construction of autonomous 
distilleries or distilleries annexed to sugar production plants. At this time, Brazilian 
sugarcane productivity was low by international standards, and most sugarcane 
production was dedicated to sugar production. The country had to create an infrastructure 
for the production of ethanol that would not compete with sugar.    
 The Brazilian president during the dictatorship accelerated the market formation 
of ethanol (market formation  F5). The new president Joao Batista Figueiredo determined 
that all government fleets were required to run on 100% ethanol in the cities where there 
was distribution for the new fuel. The Italian automaker Fiat received the green light 
from CTA to produce and commercialize the Fiat 147 /alcohol car, which would be 
produced in mass scale in its plant in Betim, in the state of Minas Gerais. In the 
meantime, Sao Paulo, Brazil’s largest city, prepared to implement a program to transform 
its public transportation fleet (buses) to alcohol. The initial phase of the program tested 
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four buses that were transformed to operate on ethanol. Tests were accompanied by CTA, 
as part of the Proalcool-motor program.  
 The government increased the ethanol blend to gasoline from 20 to 25%, the 
blend was previously approved by CTA to run on gasoline vehicles. This move reflected 
the government commitment towards proteting a niche market for the emerging ehtnaol 
system (market formation F5). With increased demand for ethanol, the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce was already studying a plan to increase ethanol production by 
almost 10 billion liters by 1985 to replace diesel and heating oil. The government planned 
to produce 20.5 billion liters of ethanol, or the equivalent of 35% of oil imports.  
 In July 1979, the Brazilian government announced the norms governing the 
implementation of the second phase of Proalcool, assuring the private sector that ethanol 
production would be procured by the government, according to volumes and technical 
specifications defined by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (guidance of research 
F4).  Government prioritized investments following three main criteria: 1) lowest 
investment/installed capacity ratio; 2) best technological and economic utilization of 
feedstock, effluents, machinery, material that would optimize agricultural and industrial 
processes; 3) lowest cost in terms of adaptation of infrastructure necessary for the 
production and use of ethanol.  
 The multinational automakers Fiat and Volkswagen were certified by the 
Brazilian government and announced they were ready to produce alcohol vehicles at 
industrial scale. The government jointly with the national association of automakers, 
Anfavea, established a protocol that defined the quantity of ethanol-run vehicles to be 
produced, and the necessary volumes of ethanol required to be supplied to the market. 
Other multinational carmakers came onboard. General Motors do Brasil offered 22 cars 
running on ethanol to the state of Sao Paulo government for testing purposes. After two 
year testing, Ford do Brazil presented to consumers two of its models ready to be 
produced using ethanol as a fuel. The National Commission of Energy had approved the 
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plan for the annual production of ethanol cars by automakers, beginning in 1980 with 
250,000 cars, increasing incrementally to reach 350,000 vehicles by 1982. This had an 
important effect in the ethanol, raising positive expectations about the development of the 
ethanol industry in the short and medium term (guidance of research  F4).  
 Knowledge creation was an important goal of policy makers in the Brazilian 
government (knowledge creation  F2). Camillo Penna, Minister of Industry and 
Commerce, called for additional efforts to increase productivity and promote the 
technological progress of sugarcane and ethanol production. Government had also goals 
that went beyond volumes of production for automakers producing cars running on 
ethanol. Government and automakers signed an agreement by which car producers would 
work on R&D towards reducing the consumption of fuel by 20% until 1985. By the plan, 
the government would regulate the “retificas”, or small auto-shops that were certified by 
the government to convert cars running on gasoline to ethanol. The Secretary of 
Industrial Technology would inspect and certify the shops.  
 From those early years of Proalcool, Brazil was already doing research on the 
production of ethanol using wood from sustainable forest cultures. The process to 
produce ethanol from wood was a research program led by the National Institute of 
Technology. The Agronomic Institute in Campinas, Sao Paulo, developed research using 
bamboo as a feedstock for the production of ethanol, showing promising results. CTA 
focused research efforts in developing ethanol engines to replace those running on diesel. 
One project in progress was the development of engines for commercial vehicles and 
farm machinery.  
 By 1980, Proalcool received criticism about its lack of social goals (guidance of 
research  -F4).   Proalcool was also criticized for being slow, with conflicting priorities, 
and lacking social focus. According to critics, the program concentrated wealth into few 
large sugar producers, and benefited the elite, which was already privileged by the sugar 
industry. Moreover, many large producers did not believe that the sector could achieve 
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the production goals established by the government. The private sector demanded more 
action from the government to approve more projects to increase the installed capacity of 
ethanol production and sugarcane crops.  
 The process of building of capabilities in the downstream market has taken some 
difficult steps in Brazil. Trying to bypass excessive government regulation, many taxi 
drivers converted cars in unauthorized body shops and bought ethanol fuel directly from 
producers. Complaining against the high cost of engine conversion in shops certified by 
the government, taxi drivers started to adopt cheaper conversions that didn’t change the 
engine’s compression rate, therefore not taking advantage of the technology available to 
optimize the engine to run on ethanol. The adoption of these “backyard” conversions 
created a black market of engine conversions and ethanol sales, especially in the region 
of Sao Paulo. It also compromised the building of the appropriate capability so the 
downstream market was ready to take in the new and emerging technology (-F8). The 
government acknowledged that this was a reaction against the low speed of the program, 
but could not certify the informal technology because it increased the consumption of 
fuel by more than 40-50% in relation to gasoline. To make ethanol more available for 
consumers, the government authorized sales of ethanol in gas stations on Saturdays (as a 
result of rationing measures, gas stations remained closed for gasoline and diesel sale 
during the weekends). Despite the problems in vehicle conversion and fuel distribution, 
automakers reached agreement with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to increase 
production of ethanol cars to 500,000 by 1981, signalizing the optimism of car producers 
over the future of the ethanol program.  
 The state of Sao Paulo was in steady economic development as a result of the 
ethanol and sugarcane expansion production. Entrepreneurial activity (F1) in ethanol was 
central to the economic development of the state of Sao Paulo. Over five years, ethanol 
production had increased more than 500%, from 362 million liters to 2.4 billion liters, 
bringing a significant economic and social impact to rural communities across the state. 
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The funding of this expansion was paid by the difference between the price of the 
gasoline paid by the consumer and the real price of anhydrous ethanol that was blended 
into gasoline. The price of ethanol was fixed at 65% of the price of gasoline. Automakers 
were also successful. By September of 1980, Fiat announced that for the first time sales 
of ethanol cars were higher than sales of gasoline vehicles. But Brazilians were aware of 
a broader debate around crop-based biofuels. Speakers at a conference alerted about the 
risks of intense use of feedstocks for energy purposes amidst the growing demand of food 
at the global level. The food versus fuel debate was a reality since the 1980s.  
 The heavy market control imposed by the military government had a negative 
impact in the process of innovation of ethanol.   Consumers had to wait on average 
between 30 to 40 days to receive a model running on ethanol.  This compromised the 
building process of the downstream market (-F8), Automakers announced that in 1981 
they would be ready to produce between 600 and 700 thousands vehicles, representing 
70% of the total production for the domestic market. Customers preferred ethanol cars 
because of tax advantage, better financing options, and good cost per kilometer ratio 
compared to gasoline. To assure enough fuel for ethanol cars, the government authorized 
the installation of ethanol pumps in all but one Brazilian state. To overcome the shortage 
of ethanol cars, many owners of gasoline cars began blending ethanol to gasoline in a 
50/50 proportion, increasing the consumption of ethanol beyond what had been agreed 
between the government and the auto industry.    
 The use of ethanol was not only limited to the car sector. Experience with ethanol 
as a fuel was expanded to the rural market and to public transportation, expanding the 
range of knowledge creation to other applications in the transportation sector (knowledge 
creation F2; knowledge diffusion F3). In 1981, Chrysler of Brazil came out with the first 
truck running on ethanol. The company announced that it had invested more than 2.5 
US$ millions in tests and equipments in the new technology. In the short term, the 
company planned to sell the new truck for distilleries, for the transport of sugarcane from 
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the field to the mills.  At the same time, the city of Sao Paulo initiated the tests with the 
first buses running exclusively on 100% ethanol.  
 With the OPEC decision to freeze oil prices, and the announcement that the 
government had already spent the resources allocated for the Proalcool, consumers 
became insecure about the availability of ethanol in the long run. Sales of ethanol cars 
decreased from 42,000 in January to 9,600 in May of 1981. The increase in the price of 
alcohol in relation to gasoline (the maximum relationship should be 65%38  led 
consumers to prefer gasoline to ethanol. Other factors considered negative for ethanol 
cars included some technical problems that dealers had not been able to address at this 
point. Those events inhibited sales of alcohol cars in the short term, and compromised the 
building of capabilities in the downstream market (-F8).  
 To stimulate the sales of ethanol vehicles, representatives of auto industries met 
with government authorities to suggest a change in price that would reflect an advantage 
for ethanol in relation to gasoline for consumers. Authorities did not decide anything 
about price, but made clear that Proalcool would focus only on light duty vehicles and 
would not include large vehicles such as buses, and trucks. The government explained 
that the technology was not ready for this kind of transportation mode. The government 
decided to increase the price difference between gasoline and ethanol for consumers, and 
to provide more tax incentives to stimulate sales of ethanol cars. At the same time, 
authorities decided to eliminate the certification seal requirement, a bureaucracy that 
represented an additional step for the consumer. The elimination of the seal, however, 
would facilitate the illegal use of ethanol in gasoline cars. Despite the new government 
incentives, some specialists argued that those measures had not addressed technological 
problems. Most consumers who had their cars converted from gasoline to ethanol in body 
                                                 
 
 
38 Because of the lower energy content of ethanol, the government established the ethanol should not be 
beyond 65% of the price of gasoline.  
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shops were having numerous technical problems. These problems were affecting overall 
consumer’s perception and were undermining the public confidence in the ethanol 
technology, therefore compromising the whole legitimacy of the program.  
 Automakers and government made efforts to regain confidence. Their strategy 
was to increase the incentives for the ethanol car and regain consumer’s confidence 
(guidance of research F4; building of capability in the downstream market F8). But sales 
of ethanol cars improved when the price gap between gasoline and ethanol had increased 
at the pump. A market research revealed a correlation between technical complaints of 
ethanol cars and the price gap between the fuels. The larger the price gap, the smaller the 
number of complaints. Following the positive results, the government decided to increase 
tax benefits to taxi drivers, reducing in 28% the price of vehicles for these consumers. It 
also decreased interest rates for taxi drivers. The National Commission also established 
that all distilleries financed by Proalcool would be required to have all their vehicles 
adapted to run on ethanol. As a result, industry announced increased sales of alcohol cars. 
The advantages provided to taxi drivers took them to the dealers instead of making them 
transform their engines in small shops or “retificas”. At this point, it was the end of the 
line for the business of “retificas”. Thanks to increased sales to taxi drivers, the market 
share of ethanol cars in the total sales of cars raised to 40%, a substantial jump from 10% 
registered in the previous year.   
 These actions described in the last paragraph had a positive effect in the 
innovation system of ethanol in Brazil (research guidance F4; building of capability in 
the downstream market F8). The participation of ethanol vehicles in the total car sales 
reached almost 80%. The government announced that since its beginning, the production 
of sugarcane increased from 75 million tons to 212 million tons, supplying the production 
of 7 billion liters of alcohol. This amount replaced the equivalent of US$ 2 billion in 
imported oil. The consumption of oil derivatives decreased 6.3% in the first quarter of 
1983 compared to the same period of 1982, while the consumption of ethanol increased 
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by almost 55%. This allowed a reduction in oil imports of 17.5%, according to the 
government. Technical problems were being addressed. Collaboration between the 
Institute of Sugar and Alcohol and the giant Usiminas developed a new technology 
capable of neutralizing the corrosion caused by ethanol in industrial equipments The new 
technology, subject of a patent, should replace the use of additives in plants and 
tubulation, reducing as a result the production cost of ethanol. Later, Ford would test the 
technology in its cars. The non corrosive alcohol, as it was called, decreased the 
production cost of cars and the production cost of ethanol, since it did not require the use 
of special equipment to avoid the effects of corrosion caused by alcohol. 
 By 1985, 96% of cars produced in Brazil were designed to run on 100% ethanol, 
and reports confirmed that consumers were getting increasingly confident about the 
technology and performance of the alternative fuel vehicle. The government then 
designated a working group to formally evaluate the performance of Proalcool, including 
members of the National Commission of Alcohol, The Institute of Sugar and Alcohol, 
The National Oil Council, Petrobras, Secretary of State Owned Companies, and the 
Ministry of Finance. The group would set the stage to promote a better coordination 
among the leaders of the program, and to improve the dialogue among the many agencies 
and actors involved in the decision making process.  
 Even facing lower oil prices in the international market, the Brazilian government 
remained committed to investing in ethanol (resource mobilization F6). From 555 
thousand liters in 1976, the production jumped to 11.4 billion liters in 1985 
(entrepreneurship F1). A large sum of investments went to research for sugarcane and 
industrial processes (knowledge production F2). R&D results brought new cane varieties, 
and new and more efficient industrial processes and production systems. The use of the 
distillation waste, or “vinhoto” as a fertilizer in the field or in the production of methane 
gas was also a notable progress in the ethanol mill (guidance of research  F4).   
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 In 1986, Brazil consumed more ethanol than gasoline. Petrobras was critic of 
government subsidies to ethanol. The state owned company pressured the government to 
decrease the difference between the price of gasoline and the price of ethanol, since the 
company was responsible for subsidizing the price difference, which paid for the 
Proalcool deficit. The government assured the population, especially ethanol car owners, 
that ethanol would remain 35% cheaper than gasoline, and announced an increase in the 
production of the alternative fuel. By mid-1987, the mill Santa Elisa in the city of 
Sertaozinho, in the region of Ribeirao Preto, state of Sao Paulo began producing newly 
developed hydrous non corrosive ethanol at industrial scale. After being tested by 
automakers, the new product was available for consumers at gas stations. But the next 
paragraphs will show that the days of the ethanol car would be counted because very 
soon the supply of ethanol would not be able to fulfill the high demand. This whole 
process compromised future prospects of ethanol development (guidance of research  -
F4). 
 In 1989, the consumption of ethanol surpassed production, and supply became a 
problem. Despite the installed capacity of 16 billion liters, sugarcane was prioritized for 
the production of sugar. Even if government and ethanol producers had an agreement to 
produce 12.3 billion liters of ethanol, it was clear that the industrial sector was 
disrespecting the agreement and was directing a larger part of sugarcane for the 
production of sugar attracted by increasing international prices. To make matters worse, 
the low supply of ethanol fuel decreased the price difference between gasoline and 
ethanol to 21%. In ten years, the difference between gasoline and ethanol decreased from 
41% to 21%. Lines to fill up the tanks with ethanol were already a common scene in 
some large cities in Brazil. With this scenario, the government announced that it would 
limit production of ethanol cars, leading consumers to look for solutions to convert their 
cars from ethanol to gasoline. Ethanol began to be rationed in many Brazilian cities, and 
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the production of ethanol cars became 45% of the total car production, a large slump 
from 80% registered recently. 
  To compensate the undersupply of ethanol, Brazil began importing methanol from 
the United States, and ethanol from the European Union. Other measures to limit the 
domestic consumption of ethanol included the reduction of gasoline-ethanol blends from 
22 to 12%. The government also decided to pay 11% more to producers to stimulate them 
to produce higher volumes of alcohol. The supply was already critical in the states of Rio 
de Janeiro, and other states in the Center South region.  To deal with the ethanol shortage, 
some gas stations had to sell ethanol blended with imported methanol. Sales of ethanol 
cars went down 20% in only two weeks, even if cars were sold at a large discount price. 
Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
 In the first phase of Proalcool, the federal government gave all the incentives 
to spur entrepreneurial activity (F1) through procurement policy (market formation 
F5), loans and low interest rates (resource mobilization F6), and the development of 
the ethanol engine (knowledge creation F2), (downstream market F8). There was 
skepticism that the government plan would be successful (guidance of research-F4). 
But government counteracted pessimism with strong regulation, and investment 
(resource mobilization F6). The market for ethanol was secured with a mandate to 
blend all gasoline with 20% ethanol (market formation F5).  
 The second phase of Proalcool began with the successful launch of the 
ethanol car ( downstream market F8), leading to increasing demand of ethanol, thus 
increasing investments (resource mobilization F6) for increased production 
(entrepreneurial activity F1). The government also approved higher blending to 
gasoline (from 20 to 25%) (market formation F5), increasing demand for anhydrous 
ethanol (guidance of research F4), leading the government to invest more in 
production (resource mobilization F6, entrepreneurial activity F1). The government 
focused on increased efficiency (knowledge creation F2), and better infrastructure 
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for distribution and use of ethanol (downstream market F8). All multinational 
automakers joined the Proalcool and launched ethanol cars ( downstream market 
F8). But Proalcool was criticized for being slow. Supply of ethanol cars and fuel did 
not match high demand (-F4). The program was expensive, because the government 
had to subsidize the price difference between ethanol and gasoline for the consumer 
(-F4).  With the lack of ethanol in service stations, the government-led program lost 
credibility among drivers of ethanol cars and automakers (-F4). The graph below 
shows the building up of almost all functions of innovation. There is a strong build 
up of capabilities in the downstream market (F8) – ethanol car; of research 
guidance (F4) – positive results and good expectations, government setting policy 
targets; and market formation (F5) – procurement policy, blending mandates; of 
knowledge creation (F2) – development of engine running on 100% ethanol, tests of 
cars running on ethanol, improvement of ethanol.  However, with the lack of ethanol 
to fulfill demand, the government ordered freezing of ethanol cars production. 
Functions F8 and F4 collapse to the negative side of the graph. The ethanol program 





Figure20: Proalcool I and II. Map of the functions of innovation. 1975-1990. 




Between 1985 and July of 1990, the participation of ethanol cars in the domestic sales of automobiles 
went down from 84.8% to 4.87%. The picture from the newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo depicts 





7.3 The New Proalcool and the new democratic government  
(1990-2000) 
  
 During the 1990s, ethanol cars almost disappeared from the Brazilian market 
(downstream market –F8). Following the shortage of ethanol in the market, automakers 
shifted production to gasoline cars. Automakers joined the new ethanol plan (in process 
of deregulation) when the government mandated federal fleets to switch from gasoline to 
ethanol cars (market formation F5). Taxi fleets followed suit, attracted by generous tax 
incentives (downstream market F8). Despite government efforts, volumes of production 
of hydrated ethanol for dedicated engines remained small.  The largest part of ethanol 
production went to the market of anhydrous ethanol, used as a blend at 20 to 25%. 
 The 1990 Iraq invasion to Kuwait and the onset of the Gulf crises exacerbated 
tensions in the oil market, bringing new hopes to the ethanol program. Government and 
ethanol producers reached an agreement to guarantee volumes of ethanol necessary to 
satisfy demand. The worsening of the Gulf crises and the prospects of an imminent oil 
crisis (with consequent higher gasoline prices) had an immediate psychological effect, 
pushing consumer’s preference back to ethanol. 
 The recently elected president Fernando Collor de Melo announced a new energy 
plan, supporting the creation of a new Ethanol Plan, or a new Proalcool, but this time 
without any government protection (guidance of research  F4). The president promised to 
promote the competitiveness of ethanol through more investments in R&D. At the same 
time, the president also announced an increase in the production of oil in the country. 
Ethanol producers put together a media campaign to regain consumer’s confidence and 
promote the legitimacy of the technology (legitimation F7).  
 The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development took 
place in Rio de Janeiro. It became the perfect event to showcase the Proalcool program to 
the rest of the world. The event helped to highlight the environmental advantages of 
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ethanol as a potential replacement for gasoline. In 1993, the Brazilian congress approved 
a bill that would allow the Brazilian government to start regulating emissions from 
automobiles. In addition to all the measures to control pollution, the law secured the 
market for ethanol (market formation  F5), by mandating that all the gasoline in the 
country  be blended with 22% ethanol.  
 By 1994, only 10% of vehicles produced in Brazil were ethanol compatible, down 
from 26% in 1993 and 91% in 1985. Automakers lost confidence in the government, 
questioning the reliability of ethanol supply to the market. In addition, ethanol producers 
had no interest in producing alcohol because of high prices of sugar in the international 
market caused by a supply cut by India and Cuba.  
 The 20th anniversary of Proalcool in 1995 was celebrated with many questions 
about the long term future of the program. Despite the technological advancements, 
ethanol production costs were still high to compete with gasoline. Moreover the program 
was criticized for lack of transparency and no accountability for practices of corruption. 
In the automobile sector, the industry focused on popular models. The low confidence in 
the supply of ethanol fuel led automakers to produce the popular models, the “populares”, 
only with gasoline compatible engines. By the end of 1995, ethanol cars made 2% of the 
total fleet produced for the domestic market. In 1996, the percentage went down to 1%. 
Despite the low production, automakers kept investing in engineering and development 
of ethanol engines (knowledge creation F2). The project of engines running on ethanol 
for the popular models was ready, and improvements in technology showed that by using 
higher compression rates, ethanol engines were able to yield more power compared to 
similar gasoline engines (guidance of research F4). 
 The end of the 1990s saw the deregulation of Proalcool, and the implementation 
of policies to promote the market of ethanol (market formation F5). By 1997, the 
government announced the beginning of the deregulation of the Proalcool. The 
government stopped regulating prices. Petrobras stopped centralizing the distribution of 
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ethanol to gas stations, and would soon stop to subsidize the program (average of US$ 
1.2 billion per year). Ethanol producers would negotiate prices directly with distributors. 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso announced measures to stimulate the consumption 
of ethanol by creating incentives to convert taxis and the government fleet from gasoline 
to ethanol compatible engines. The program would be financed by consumers through the 
enactment of a “green tax” on gasoline cars.  
 An American Coalition of Governors led by Wisconsin Governor Tommy 
Thompson visited Brazil to know in more detail the Brazilian experience after 22 years of 
Proalcool and forge an international collaboration between the two countries. Americans 
were interested in the production of flex fuel vehicles stimulated by law, and to increase 
the production of E85 to address the oversupply of corn in the Corn Belt region.  
The rebirth of the Proalcool came in a moment when there was an oversupply of 
sugarcane in Brazil especially during the harvest of 1997/1998. The positive perspective 
of the ethanol industry (guidance of research F4) led to more collaboration between 
industry and university to improve the efficiency in the production of ethanol (knowledge 
creation F2; knowledge diffusion F3). The University of Campinas developed a process 
that increased the productivity of plants by using new materials and eliminating steps in 
the process. Sugarcane and ethanol producers increased adoption of residues and 
sugarcane bagasse to reduce energy consumption and production costs. Research 
collaboration was taking place at the international level as well. The University of Sao 
Paulo and University of Florida started a collaboration to use genetic engineering to 
convert residues and sugarcane bagasse to ethanol.  
  Despite R&D efforts, ethanol was not yet competitive with gasoline without 
subsidies. Since gasoline and diesel consumers paid the price difference, it was urgent to 
find a solution to increase the competitiveness of ethanol. With higher sugarcane 
productivity and a good season, the production of sugarcane was expected to increase 
significantly in the coming years. But the government did not have a long term plan for 
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the sector. Brazil had limitations in the sugar export market because of the protectionist 
policy of developed countries. There were many in the government who believed that 
ethanol should serve only as an additive to be blended to gasoline up to 25% and to diesel 
up to 15%, the limits considered environmentally safe by CETESB, the environmental 
regulatory agency of the state of Sao Paulo. The private sector demanded definitions from 
the government.  
 Despite the lack of definitions (guidance of research –F4), long term research 
remained active. Researchers at the University of Campinas were able to improve the 
process of production of ethanol from molasses, setting up a continuous process for the 
fermentation stage of ethanol production.  
 By 1998, with the oversupply of ethanol and lack of a growing market, the 
government decided that Petrobras would buy the excess production of ethanol and start 
building a strategic stock of the fuel. The government insisted in the problem of 
competitiveness of ethanol in relation to gasoline, and reiterated the government support 
of the plan without subsidies to ethanol. Without subsidies, ethanol was still more 
expensive than gasoline, and the prospects of relaxing the oil monopoly in the country 
would open the possibility of cheaper gasoline in the domestic market, putting more 
pressure in the competitiveness of ethanol.  
 To stimulate the market of ethanol, the government increased the gasoline-ethanol 
blend from 22% to 24%. The Brazilian Ambassador in the US discussed the possibility to 
start ethanol imports to the state of California in the US, following the banning of MTBE, 
considered a toxic additive to gasoline. Brazil tried to negotiate the reduction of import 
duties of 60 cents a gallon imposed on Brazilian ethanol. The potential market of ethanol 
in California would solve the oversupply problem of ethanol produced in Brazil.   
 The government implemented the law promoting the use of ethanol in 
government fleets and taxis (market formation F5).The incentive to ethanol cars became 
law. The Senate Commission approved a plan that mandated the conversion of the federal 
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government fleet from gasoline to ethanol. The plan financed loans and tax incentives to 
consumers buying ethanol cars. GM announced that it would resume production of 
ethanol cars, taking advantage of government incentives to consumers. This time, there 
was an oversupply of ethanol in the market. Moreover, GM would produce ethanol cars 
using the direct injection system that the company’s engineers were able to adapt to 
ethanol cars. In the following months, automakers would increase sales of ethanol cars to 
fleet owners, and to consumers in the ethanol and sugar business. The downstream 
market became stronger again (F8). 
 The transition to a deregulated market brought uncertainty to the sugar and 
ethanol sectors. The competitive producers who had invested to modernize their 
industrial plants were eager to compete in a liberalized market economy. Those who were 
less productive preferred to take advantage of government subsidies and price protection. 
In December of 1998, the government announced a decrease of 72% in the subsidy paid 
to ethanol producers. The government would instead buy the ethanol surplus available 
and build a stock to help balance ethanol prices in the market. 
 By 1999, Brazil produced 15 billion liters of ethanol, most of it was anhydrous 
ethanol to be blended with gasoline at 24%. A small part was sold as hydrous ethanol for 
a fleet of 3.5 million cars running exclusively on ethanol. The change in the mix from 
hydrous to anhydrous ethanol resulted from the fall in the sales of ethanol cars during the 
previous ten years. The change in the ethanol mix led service stations to return to 
gasoline pumps, reducing the number of ethanol pumps in approximately 50%. This 
move was detrimental to the process of building of capabilities in the downstream market 
(-F8). To increase the demand of ethanol, the government decided to increase the 
percentage of ethanol in gasoline from 24% to 26%.  
 Twenty years after the first ethanol car was sold in the Brazilian market, it was 
clear for the government and industry that the success of the program resulted from the 
price advantage of ethanol in relation to gasoline, and from the technological progress 
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that solved most of the technical problems of the first ethanol vehicles. The technological 
progress was possible because tax incentives and subsidies throughout the whole supply 
chain (agriculture, industrial and automotive) allowed the whole sector to learn and 
improve the technology. The crisis in the sector was triggered by undersupply of ethanol 
(producers lost interest because the international sugar market became more attractive 
than ethanol). Consumers became insecure about the supply of ethanol in the gas stations. 
They stopped buying ethanol cars, putting the whole program into a halt. At the same 
time, low gasoline prices led automakers to produce gasoline cars. However, ethanol still 
remained in the market as 22-26% mixed with gasoline in its anhydrous form, and in a 
smaller amount to fuel the fleet of the remaining ethanol cars still circulating in the 
market. Automakers had made important technological progress with gasoline cars, 
which became more efficient and economic.  
 By the year 2000, the international price of oil went up, and ethanol became more 
attractive for consumers. In 2001, 131 ethanol industrial plants in the state of Sao Paulo 
produced their own power from bagasse. From those, 12 produced a surplus that was sold 
to the grid. The surplus was estimated to be equivalent to the energy sufficient to power 
270 thousand homes in a monthly basis during the sugarcane harvest. This became a win-
win outcome for government and industry, since consumers would be able to buy this 
additional power during the months of drought when supply of energy from hydropower 
was less reliable. Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
 During the 1990s, the participation of ethanol cars in total production went 
down to 1% of the entire Brazilian fleet (downstream market -F8). Automakers 
shifted production to gasoline cars, which had become more efficient. The 
government started the deregulation process of ethanol, but without long term 
policy goals (guidance of search -F4). The production of ethanol remained stable; 
volumes of hydrated were replaced by sales of anhydrous ethanol for blending with 
gasoline in 24-25% (market formation F5). The market size was limited by the size 
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of the gasoline market. A generous crop of sugarcane in 1998 resulted in oversupply 
of ethanol, making the government to create new outlets for ethanol. The 
government implemented programs to promote the market such as converting 
government and taxi fleets to ethanol compatible cars (market formation F5). 
Industrial plants became more efficient, and research focused on improving the 
competitiveness of ethanol (knowledge creation F2). However, the ethanol plan still 
lacked a long term policy target (guidance of research -F4). The graph depicts the 
low activity of functions of innovation during the 1990s. There is a slight building in 
knowledge creation (F2); market formation (F5) – government program converting 
government and taxi fleets to ethanol; capability in the downstream market (F8) – 
automakers resuming production and sales to government and taxi fleets. However, 
during the lost decade, ethanol cars’ participation in the market fell to 1%, 
explaining the collapse of F8 (downstream market).    
 
Figure21: The lost decade. The map of the functions of innovation. 1990-1999.  
Source: O Estado de Sao Paulo. 
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7.4 The flex fuel vehicle and the rebirth of the ethanol program 
(2000-2008) 
 
 During the 1990s, the ethanol industry went through a long process of price 
liberalization. Despite technological progress, ethanol still could not compete with 
gasoline without subsidies. With the production of higher volumes of sugarcane 
(entrepreneurial activity F1), there was an oversupply of ethanol in the market, leading 
automakers to resume production and sales of ethanol cars to government and taxi fleets, 
which switched to ethanol cars following government mandates and fiscal incentives 
(market formation F5; downstream market F8). But it was only in 2003, when the 
automobile industry launched the flex fuel vehicles (knowledge creation F2; downstream 
market F8), that the ethanol innovation system was able to rebound and take a sustained 
development path. Higher gasoline prices and a more competitive ethanol industry helped 
consumers regain credibility in ethanol as an alternative to gasoline (guidance of research 
F4). Positive expectations led the government to further invest in research (knowledge 
creation F2) and promote collaboration (knowledge diffusion F3), attracting private 
investments in the industry (resource mobilization F6; entrepreneurial activity F1), 
setting the stage for a positive cycle of innovative activity. 
 In the year 2000, the Brazilian ethanol TIS resumed building the capabilities of 
the downstream market (F8). Ford presented the prototype of the flex fuel vehicle (FFV), 
with technology developed in its headquarters in the US, and adapted to Brazilian needs. 
The prototype could run with any percentage of ethanol or gasoline. The company also 
demonstrated an engine capable of running with ethanol or compressed natural gas. The 
government provided support for the new technology, by giving FFVs the same tax 
incentives received by ethanol cars. The National Association of Vehicle Producers 
(Anfavea) announced that flex fuel vehicles would be ready for commercial sale in one 
year. The cars would cost a little higher than ethanol cars, but would benefit from the 
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same tax benefits (3% advantage in relation to gasoline cars). The technology was based 
on software that identified the fuel and calibrated the engine according to properties of 
the fuel being used. Two firms competed with the technology: Magnetti Marelli, and 
Bosch, both international firms. The technology, however, was developed entirely in 
Brazil, based on the concept developed in the US39. Both firms wanted to sell the 
software to automakers VW, Fiat, and GM, as well as Ford who would also compete in 
the market.  
 The flex fuel vehicle became available in 2003. The first car to be commercialized 
was the Gol Total Flex. GM came out with its first model in flex fuel, the Corsa 1.8. 
Consumers were informed and advised that the economic advantage of using ethanol was 
when the alternative fuel’s price was at 70% or below the price of gasoline. The positive 
perspectives of FFVs revived the interest for ethanol and sugar business (guidance of 
research, F4). The sector soon had a positive wave of investments, 1 billion Brazilian 
reais, to increase production in the short term (resource mobilization F6; entrepreneurship 
F1).  
 The building of capabilities in the downstream market was also supported by 
Petrobras, which soon recognized the importance of building pipelines going from the 
production site to ports. These pipelines would be exclusive for the transportation of 
ethanol (F8). Predicting higher exports, Petrobras started to invest in infrastructure to 
transport ethanol from the production location (most of it in the center-south region) to 
major ports. The company’s goal was to expand pipelines for the exclusive use of ethanol 
sold to the external market.  Improvements in flex fuel technologies were ongoing. 
Magneti Marelli (MM) was performing research on a technology that allowed a vehicle 
to use 4 different fuels: ethanol, natural gas, gasoline blended with ethanol, or pure 
                                                 
 
 
39 Brazil uses gasoline already blended with ethanol up to 26% and hydrated ethanol, while the US uses 
pure gasoline or blended with 10% ethanol, or E85 – 85% anhydrous ethanol and 15% gasoline. 
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gasoline. The new technology would allow Brazilian manufacturing centers to export 
vehicles to other countries in Latin America.  
 The stronger downstream market (F8) gave support to the growing ethanol and 
sugarcane sectors, which enjoyed a strong entrepreneurial moment (entrepreneurship F1; 
resource mobilization F6). In 2004, all automakers had models in FFVs. After VW and 
Fiat, Ford introduced its first model flex fuel, and the French Renault announced its first 
FFV car, the compact Clio. In the first year of sales, automakers predicted that FFVs 
would reach 15% of total vehicle sales in the Brazilian market. The positive estimate 
gave impulse to the sugarcane industry, predicting a 7% increase in the harvest for the 
following year. Contemplating imports from Brazil, China and Japan made investments 
in the Brazilian transport, research and production infrastructure. Japan invested US$ 15 
million in the Biofuels Technological Pole in the city of Piracicaba, an industrial and 
research center of biofuels in the state of Sao Paulo. The rapid development of the FFV 
market and sugarcane production came with strong criticism to the Brazilian government 
for its lack of planning and leadership. To avoid large fluctuation in the price of ethanol, 
the government created a regulatory framework to regulate supply and demand of ethanol 
during sugarcane harvest (8 months a year) and during ethanol production (during the 
whole year).  
 In January 2005, the sales of FFVs accounted for 30% of sales of new cars (light 
duty vehicles). Investments continued in the ethanol industrial sector. Industries from the 
state of Sao Paulo began expanding towards the border of the state of Sao Paulo and the 
state of Mato Grosso do Sul. Bosch announced its ongoing research to improve the 
performance of the FFV system. The new system would eliminate the small gasoline tank 
to help start the engine when temperatures were below 18 centigrade. With the new 
technology, ethanol would be heated before injection in the combustion chamber. The 
new system would be less expensive, because it would require less equipment in the car. 
In the production line, automakers gave more flexibility to the flex technology.  VW and 
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GM placed in the market the tri-fuel system, allowing engines to run on natural gas, 
gasoline, or ethanol. With record sales of FFVs (in July, FFVs made 60% of total sales) 
and increasing consumption of ethanol, production of ethanol reached the limit of its 
installed capacity (sugarcane and ethanol). From the installed capacity of 20 billion liters, 
production was 18 billion liters. Specialists confirmed that the expansion in ethanol 
demand was proof that most consumers fueled their FFVs with ethanol, and not with 
gasoline. Consumer feedback pointed to the economic and technological advantages of 
ethanol against gasoline.  
 In the research front, the production of knowledge and formation of networks 
between academia and the private sector assured the successful continuation of the 
innovation process in ethanol in Brazil (knowledge creation F2; knowledge diffusion F3). 
A collaboration between the Technological Sugarcane Research Center in Piracicaba, a 
Network of Brazilian Universities (Ridesa), the Sao Paulo Agronomic Institute, and the 
private research company Canavialys (owned by the Brazilian Group Votorantim) 
focused on the development of new sugarcane varieties that grew in the savannahs of the 
Northeast, a region poor in soil nutrients and with recurrent drought periods. Embrapa, 
the Brazilian Agro Company announced its Bioenergy Plan, which focused on 5 main 
groups of research: forests, biogas, biodiesel, ethanol, and residues.  
 More entrepreneurial activity (F1) supported by a stronger downstream market 
F8). Until the end of 2006, 19 new ethanol plants were operating, and 89 projects for new 
plants were being studied. Petrobras and the Government of the state of Goias, a state 
where great part of the expansion was taking place, signed an agreement to build a pipe 
line, allowing Petrobras to transport efficiently the ethanol produced in that state to the 
export terminals in the eastern coast of the country. The additional production was not yet 
enough to satisfy the increasing market demand, especially during the months considered 
off-season for the industry (outside the sugarcane harvest). The result came with higher 
ethanol price at the pump, leading consumers to switch back to gasoline. In the 
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meantime, Brazil and the US joined efforts to collaborate in the field. They created the 
Inter-american Commission on Ethanol to forge collaboration in research, 
commercialization and technological development of bioenergy within the Americas.  
 In 2007, an agreement between the government of São Paulo and the National 
Institute of Metrology and Apex Brazil, the Export Agency, marked the first long term 
effort to create standards to facilitate ethanol exports. The goal was to transform ethanol 
fuel in an international commodity. Following the creation of the Inter-american 
Commission on Ethanol, The United States and Brazil began work to promote 
collaboration. The two countries expressed their intention to sign an agreement to 
collaborate to increase their production of biofuels and decrease their dependency on 
foreign oil. For that matter, President Bush came to Brazil in March 2007 to sign an 
agreement and discuss bioenergy with President Lula of Brazil. The two countries would 
collaborate in technology transfer, R&D, and standardization of biofuels. Despite the 
positive perception of the Brazilian ethanol program around the world, R&D players in 
Brazil pointed out that Brazil was still a laggard in investments in R&D in the sugar and 
ethanol sector, investing only US$ 1.2 per hectare, while Argentina invested US$3, and 
Australia invested US$ 10. 
 The positive trend of entrepreneurial activity and investments in the sector 
remained stable in Brazil (entrepreneurship F1; resource mobilization F6). The Brazilian 
National Bank of Social Development (BNDES) announced investments of 10 billion 
Reais. The investment was part of a 20 billion Reais investment plan, the amount 
necessary to build 100 new plants to increase production of ethanol in Brazil. The 
remaining investment would come from the private sector until 2010. In the same year, 
the harvest of sugarcane reached the highest level of its history, raising questions about 
the sustainability of the Brazilian ethanol program. Specialists alerted about the growing 
migration of sugarcane harvest to pasture lands, and the dangers of monoculture. The 
debate around food vs fuel led President Lula to commission a study to the United 
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Nations FAO, which revealed that biofuels did not affect negatively the production of 
food in Brazil. 
 To avoid unsustainable practices of a one crop agricultural program, the Brazilian 
government developed a plan to certify the production of sugarcane and ethanol 
following the sustainability requirements established by the international market. The 
plan would require the rapid implementation of mechanized harvest, decreasing the 
burning of sugarcane fields before harvest, a practice that emits a significant amount of 
greenhouse gases. The sugarcane producers made an agreement with the government of 
Sao Paulo to end burning of sugarcane fields in 2014, as opposed to 2031 as established 
by law. For land with inclination higher than 12%, considered to be more difficult to 
implement mechanized harvest, end of burning would happen until 2017.  
 Europeans became interested in the Brazilian FFV technology. France announced 
the new Megane flex, showcasing an engine able to run on E85. The technology was 
developed in collaboration between French and Brazilian engineers. Peugeot Citroen 
Brazil would export FFV engines to their French headquarters. With the 
internationalization of the Brazilian ethanol, UNICA, the Brazilian association of sugar 
and ethanol announced the opening of its international offices in the United States and 
Europe.  
 In addition to investments in production capacity, there was a positive trend 
towards investments in research and development (entrepreneurship F1; resource 
mobilization  F6; knowledge creation  F2). Cosan, the largest ethanol producer in Brazil 
consolidated its dominance in the Brazilian ethanol industry announcing the acquisition 
of ten new ethanol plants. The Spanish group Abengoa bought three plants from the 
Brazilian Dedini group, increasing the international investment in ethanol and sugar 
production in Brazil. BNDES announced its financial support to the ethanol and sugar 
sector, pledging investments of 25 billion Reais until 2011. In the same year, Brazil saw a 
significant wave of investments in research. Dedini, the largest producer of equipment for 
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the production of sugar and ethanol in Brazil signed an agreement with FAPESP, the 
R&D financing agency for the state of Sao Paulo, to invest 100 million Reais in R&D of 
sugarcane and ethanol. The investment funded research on cellulosic ethanol from cane 
bagasse. Embrapa, the government led R&D agriculture company focused research 
efforts on sugarcane trangenics. The largest Auto Show in the world in Germany 
showcased the first motorcycle with flex fuel engine developed in Brazil, and also 
showcased vehicles with flex fuel technology imported from Brazil.   
 The Brazilian government had plans to upgrade the infrastructure of the Amazon 
region to promote development in the region. The English newspaper Guardian criticized 
the plans, arguing that they might place the tropical forest in danger in a period of 40 
years. The Brazilian Agriculture minister and the ministry for the environment discussed 
about the prospects of sugarcane crops in the degraded areas of the Amazon region. 
Coca-Cola had already a small production of sugar in the region. The United Nations 
criticized the development of sugarcane plantations in the Amazon region. The Brazilian 
government then created a commission to define a policy (ecologic zoning) on how and 
where to plant feedstock for biofuels in the Amazon region.  
 Years of investment in R&D brought significant results to the sugarcane and 
ethanol industry (guidance of research F4). In the beginning of 2008, years after having 
sequenced the DNA of sugarcane, Brazilian scientists were able to sequence the DNA of 
the yeast used in the fermentation of most of the processes of ethanol production in 
Brazil. And the Ministry of Agriculture formalized the long term strategic commitment of 
the Brazilian government in the ethanol and sugar sector. A study published by the 
Ministry declared that in 10 years Brazil would increase ethanol production by 120%, 
with exports growing by 223% during the period. Following the European Union interest 
in biofuels, Brazil and the European Union continued negotiations for the certification of 
ethanol produced in Brazil. Europeans wanted to make sure they would not import 
Brazilian ethanol that was produced without certain environmental requirements.  
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 But the fast growing trend of sugarcane and ethanol production did not come 
without resistance from the scientific community (guidance of research  -F4). A Science 
magazine article surprised many stakeholders in ethanol and sugar business in Brazil and 
in the rest of the world. The article provided support for the argument that the continuing 
production of biofuels would bring serious consequences for the environment. According 
to the article, taking into the account the damages to the Amazon forest for increased 
production of soybeans, it would take 320 years for biofuels to present a positive 
environmental benefit. In the case of the savannahs in Brazil, there would be a negative 
CO2 balance resulting from the destruction of native plants for additional production of 
biofuels.  
 Despite the negative media for biofuels, the production of ethanol from sugarcane 
was soaring in Brazil. According to specialists, the 2008/2009 harvest would dedicate 
more sugarcane for ethanol than for sugar. (guidance of research  F4). Following 
agreements with the state of Sao Paulo, almost 50% of the 2007/2008 sugarcane was 
mechanically harvested, eliminating burning of sugarcane fields, a practice known to be 
damaging for the environment.  
 The market of FFVs continued evolving. After 5 years it was introduced, flex fuel 
vehicles accounted for almost 90% of car sales in the domestic market (guidance of 
research F4). Consumers had used more ethanol than gasoline, because the biofuel 
provided economic advantages compared to gasoline. The advancement of flex 
technology and increasing sales of FFVs was already considered the main factor driving 
sales of ethanol in Brazil. In February of 2008, the sales of ethanol (1.43 billion liters) 
were higher than the sales of gasoline (1.41 billion liters) in the country. This trend was a 
positive result for the ethanol industry, and kept investors interested in participating in the 
innovation process of ethanol in Brazil (guidance of research F4; resource mobilization 
F6).  
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 The Brazilian government remained committed to research and to the 
development of advanced technologies for ethanol production. The federal government 
was investing 150 million Reais in five years in a research center (federally funded) to do 
research and development on advanced ethanol technologies (knowledge creation F2; 
resource mobilization F6). The CTBE, Technology Center of Bioethanol would 
undertake its own research, and would also serve as a users facility for universities and 
firms willing to test their lab experiments at the pilot scale.  
 Despite the international attacks on biofuels, ethanol continued to receive record 
investments from international and national entrepreneurs. Investments increased 16% 
from previous years, with plans for 32 new plants. Oil companies were also interested in 
the Brazilian ethanol business. BP had acquired half of the stakes of Tropicana Bioenergy 
and invested 1.6 billion Reais to finance investments in sugarcane and ethanol in Brazil. 
Cosan, the largest ethanol producer in Brazil invested in distribution and retail by 
acquiring all Esso (Exxon) stations in the country.  The prospects for ethanol in Brazil 
were positive. Petrobras announced plans to invest in biorefineries that would be 
integrated with biomass.  The oil giant Shell announced plans to invest in sugarcane 
ethanol and in cellulosic ethanol, acknowledging the company’s interest to enter the 
business of biofuels in Brazil. With new investments, ethanol production would increase 
15 to 19% compared to the previous year, and fuel approximately 5 million flex fuel 
vehicles available in the Brazilian market. Specialists claimed that approximately 80% of 
FFVs used ethanol instead of gasoline.  
 Brazilian engineers were working with automakers in the US and Europe to 
diffuse the knowledge developed in Brazil to other countries. Citroen Brazil was 
exporting flex engines to France and Sweden, while GM had nine Brazilian engineers 
from the Brazilian branch working in the American headquarters to help the US improve 
the flex fuel technology. Brazil had also a partnership with the European Union and 
Sweden to test the performance of ethanol in buses in the city of Sao Paulo.  
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 R&D investments between academia and the private sector were applied to 
advance technologies for the production of ethanol (knowledge production F2; 
knowledge diffusion; resource mobilization F6)). In the industrial side, The Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro continued its R&D efforts on the development of cellulosic 
ethanol. The goal was to find an affordable enzyme, which could effectively break the 
molecule of cellulose from the sugarcane bagasse at commercial scale. The Research 
funding agency of the state of Sao Paulo announced the bioenergy program, with initial 
investments of 73 million Reais in new technologies for the development of biofuels. The 
investment would be complemented by the private sector, the federal government, and 
the state of Minas Gerais. At the federal level, the government would fund 45 institutes 
(270 million Reais in the three first years) to pursue research on bioenergy through a 
collaborative network. 
 Brazil had also plans to invest abroad, and announced investments in the African 
continent. The plan was to build 18 ethanol plants in Sudan. A study estimated that 
Brazilian exports of ethanol should increase threefold until 2015, consolidating Brazil as 
the largest ethanol exporter in the world. Looking at the Japanese market, and the new 
law requiring blending of 3% ethanol into gasoline, Petrobras acquired a Japanese 
refinery and announced plans to distribute gasoline blended with 3% ethanol (E3) to the 
Japanese market. The operation would be done through the recently created Japan-Brazil 
Ethanol, a company formed by the Brazilian Petrobras and the Japanese estate owned 
Nippon Alcohol Hanbai KK.  
 Following the investment boost in ethanol plants, sugarcane reached the mark of 
70% of the harvested area in the state of Sao Paulo, leading the state government to block 
any further expansion of sugarcane crop in the state.   
 The international financial crisis which began in 2008 made the planned 
investments a more difficult reality, because of the lack of credit in the international 
market. Many companies delayed their investments, and the Brazilian market would see 
 148
some consolidation to survive the challenges of the financial market. With the economic 
downturn, gasoline prices went down, putting pressure in the competitiveness of ethanol. 
Translating the dynamics of innovation to the functions of innovations: 
 The development of the flex fuel technology in Brazil (knowledge creation-
F2, capabilities in the downstream market-F8), adapted from the technology 
developed in the U.S, allowed the innovation process of ethanol to rebound and 
regain credibility (guidance of research-F4). Having the distribution infrastructure 
in place (capabilities in the downstream market-F8), consumers did not have 
problems to find ethanol in service stations. Higher gasoline prices and enough 
ethanol supply helped ethanol to gain competitiveness in relation to gasoline. The 
positive prospects of ethanol (guidance of research-F4) attracted investments in 
production (mobilization of resources-F6), and in additional research (knowledge 
creation-F2) in collaboration with domestic and international partners (knowledge 
diffusion-F3). Despite the debates about the sustainability of ethanol (-F4, -F7), 
Brazil seemed to have entered a positive cycle of innovation. The graph below shows 
all the functions of innovation building up (F4 and F8 slightly moving down in the 
negative side). Oversupply of ethanol and high gasoline prices change expectations 
about the future of ethanol in the Brazilian market (F4). At the same time, the 
development of the flex fuel car as a capability in the downstream market (F8) 
reinforces positive expectations about ethanol (F4), providing conditions for long 
term policy guidance (F4), research and collaboration with partners (F2, F3), giving 
long term assurance to private investors (F6) and ethanol producers (F1) about the 
sustainability of the market demand (F4). The government and private sector 
played an important role educating and informing the consumer about the 
advantages of using ethanol over gasoline, guiding the consumer to make the correct 
decision at the pump (legitimation F7). Once a positive cycle of innovation was set 
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in, all the functions of innovation were fulfilled and interacting to further the 










 Since Brazil was under a dictatorship at the onset of Proalcool, the Brazilian state 
played the role of entrepreneur in the beginning of the period. During the 1980s, 
entrepreneurial activity was negative (plants shutting down, producing less) or 
nonexistent in Brazil. The financial and economic crisis of late 1980s and 1990s led the 
Brazilian government to decrease incentives to Proalcool. Moreover, lower oil prices and 
high international sugar prices decreased the private sector appetite for big projects in 
ethanol. Imbalance between supply and demand caused undersupply of ethanol during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Unable to find ethanol to fuel their cars, Brazilian consumers 
did not trust the ethanol program and switched to gasoline only cars. Ethanol volumes 
remained stable thanks to a Brazilian law that required blending ethanol to gasoline in 
percentages ranging from 24 to 25%. Entrepreneurship regained strength after the 
successful launch of FFVs in 2003.  
 
 
Figure 23: Entrepreneurship (F1) U.S. and Brazil - number of articles reporting events on ethanol 
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 In the U.S, entrepreneurship was positive during President Carter years. Ethanol 
innovation enjoyed policies supporting the development of gasohol. Like in Brazil, 
during the 1980s, entrepreneurial activity was negative or nonexistent. President Reagan 
ended or decreased resources for energy programs focusing on renewable energy. There 
was some entrepreneurial activity under President Clinton, following the Clean Air Act 
of 1990, and its amendments in 1992 establishing E85 (ethanol 85%, gasoline 15%) as an 
alternative fuel. Strong entrepreneurship emerged after the Energy Policy Act 2005, 
which established the Renewable Fuel Standards, or mandates to use ethanol at the 
national level under a long term growing incremental schedule. 
 
 
Figure24: Knowledge creation (F2) U.S. and Brazil- number of articles reporting events on ethanol 
 
 Brazil dominates knowledge creation (F2) most of the years. Since knowledge 
creation relates to the whole supply chain (agricultural, industrial, and automobile 
sectors), Brazil performed better than the U.S. because of all developments and tests 
performed with engines and automobiles running on 100 % ethanol in the first period, 
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and later with the developments with the flex fuel technology. The U.S. grows fast in 
knowledge creation after the Energy Policy Act of 2005, establishing the first Renewable 
Fuels Standards, and a strong government support to fund demonstration plants of 
cellulosic ethanol.   
 
 
Figure25: Guidance of Research (F4) U.S. and Brazil - number of events reporting on ethanol 
 
 There is not a trend pattern for guidance of research (F4) for either country until 
the early 2000s, the period when the Brazilian ethanol takes off. Most reports of events 
from the late period relate to the debate around the social and environmental implications 
of biofuels. The Brazilian ethanol was able to prevent long term damage, therefore 
continuing to generate positive expectations about the technology. It is still fighting some 
criticism about the implications of increased sugarcane production to deforestation and to 
the environmental degradation of the region of “cerrado”, or the Brazilian savannah. The 
same cannot be said about the U.S. Since the technology in the U.S uses corn as the 
 153
major feedstock, the U.S. process became vulnerable to strong criticism from academia 
and international organizations about the environmental impact of its use in substitution 
of gasoline. Corn ethanol has on average a worse environmental performance in measures 
of carbon emissions than sugarcane ethanol from Brazil. Moreover, sugarcane use as a 
fuel is not considered to be detrimental to the food market. Therefore, corn ethanol has 
been more vulnerable to the food versus fuel debate, which has affected negatively the 
long term innovation activity in the sector.  In the U.S., the policy target moves towards 
advanced and cellulosic ethanol (not yet available at commercial scale), while in Brazil 




Figure 26: Market Formation (F5) U.S. and Brazil - number of events reporting on ethanol 
 
 Reports of events related to market formation (F5) in the U.S. do not take place 
until 1985, when the Environmental Protection Agency completely bans leaded gasoline. 
This ruling opened the market for gasohol, a mix of 90% gasoline and 10% ethanol. In 
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the mixture, ethanol substitutes the lead as an anti-knocking additive.   Policies 
stimulating demand of ethanol take place earlier in Brazil. At the onset of the National 
Alcohol Plan (1975) the Brazilian government mandates the use of ethanol first as a 
blend with gasoline, then later as a 100% fuel in substitution of gasoline. The second 
period of strong activity in market formation for Brazil takes place during the late 1990s, 
the period of deregulation of prices of ethanol, when the Brazilian government stimulates 
market demand by creating the green fleet, and by mandating blending of ethanol to 
gasoline.  The U.S. boosts market formation activities after the year 2000 through energy 
legislation and programs mandating growing use of ethanol, and providing tax incentives 
to ethanol producers.  After 2000, the only market formation activity in Brazil is the 
continuing mandatory blending of ethanol with gasoline. 
 
 
Figure 27: Resource Mobilization (F6) U.S. and Brazil - number of events reporting on ethanol 
 
 Like entrepreneurship (F1), resource mobilization (F6) is strong earlier and late in 
the period of analysis. However, Brazil remains stronger than the U.S. in the beginning 
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and at the end of the period. Like with entrepreneurship, there is very little activity during 
the 1980s and the 1990s. The data, however, underestimate the large investment in R&D 
devoted to advanced and cellulosic ethanol in the U.S. since the year 2000.  
 
 
Figure 28: Legitimation (F7) U.S. and Brazil - number of events reporting on ethanol 
 
 
 Loud voices supported the ethanol TIS throughout the years in the U.S. Earlier, 
there was some action to strengthen and legitimize ethanol, especially to lobby for 
legislation to approve higher blends of ethanol as a substitute for gasoline during the late 
1980s. More recently, the Bush administration started an aggressive program in support 
of more advanced ethanol, and in support of mandates to consolidate the market of 
ethanol in the long term. The Obama administration reinforced the policies and the 
legitimation of biofuels, boosting investments through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. Brazil’s main strategy is to gain the world market, and the Brazilian 
ethanol lobby has been vocal to legitimize the Brazilian ethanol as a sustainable 
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technology and international commodity.  In the two countries, the ethanol lobbies as 
well as political forces act more forcefully after the year 2000, when prices of gasoline 
tend to be higher. See figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 29: Building of capabilities in the downstream market (F8) U.S. and Brazil - number of events 
reporting on ethanol 
 
 
 The contrast between the U.S. and Brazil in the function capability building in the 
downstream market is very telling. Brazil’s automobile sector becomes very active during 
the first Proalcool Plan, when automakers developed car engines capable of running on 
100% ethanol. Despite all the problems during the 1990s, a period considered by many as 
the lost decade of ethanol in Brazil, the knowledge and competence obtained during the 
first phase in the 1970s and 1980s helped the automakers adapt the flex fuel technology 
(developed in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s) to the Brazilian reality (using engines 
capable of using gasoline, 100% ethanol, or any mixture of the two). As the narrative 
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story described in more detail, the development of the flex fuel market rebuilt consumer’s 
and investors’ confidence in ethanol as a fuel, triggering the successful restart of the 
ethanol program in Brazil. 
 The U.S., on the other hand, has had some activity in the downstream market – 
some minor efforts to develop infrastructure – and some automakers making some steps 
to boost the E85 program. But despite the growing number of flex fuel vehicles, 99% of 
them run on gasoline, because of the small number of ethanol pumps in the country40.   
 
Summarizing 
• Brazil is more active earlier on in entrepreneurship (F1), and in knowledge 
creation (F2). The narrative shows that knowledge creation took place not only in the 
agriculture and industrial sectors, but also in the automobile sector. By the end of the 
1970s, beginning of the 1980s, Brazil was already exploring new engine options capable 
of running on 100% ethanol. Since the innovation process is cumulative, the earlier start 
will have important implications for the learning process, in special for “learning by 
doing”.  
• Still a military dictatorship, Brazil enjoyed strong government intervention to 
create a market for ethanol in the beginning of the program. During the deregulation 
process, the government kept some incentives, the most important being the ethanol 
blending mandate in the percentage of 20-25%. The successful launch of flex fuel 
vehicles provided the necessary ethanol demand to boost ethanol production. Brazil keeps 
mandatory the blending of ethanol into all gasoline in the country. Ethanol market 
                                                 
 
 
40 Only 2,200 of 160,000 gas stations in U.S. have ethanol pumps, and most E85 pumps are located in 10 
states that have 20% of vehicles running on ethanol. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61F1OQ20100216 (03/03/2010) 
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penetration in the U.S. remains dependent on long term mandates (RFS), and will soon 
face the 10% blend wall41.  
• Like entrepreneurship (F1), resource mobilization (F6) has some minor activity 
earlier in the period, but most of the activity takes place after the year 2000, with Brazil 
being more aggressive than the U.S.  
• The U.S. is more active than Brazil in lobbying for ethanol, more so after the year 
2000 when higher gasoline prices put the issue of alternative fuels high in the American 
policy agenda.  
• The function guidance of research (F4) shows that throughout the innovation 
trajectory, the Brazilian ethanol has shown ups and downs until the launching of FFVs, 
which provided the necessary market demand to boost the ethanol program and to 
reassure stakeholders in the innovation system about the long term prospects of the 
program. The U.S. is still facing questions over the sustainability of corn-based ethanol, 
and the corn ethanol industry faces the threat of the blend wall that limits the market. At 
the same time, the advanced ethanol industry is still working to make its process 
competitive with gasoline at commercial scale. The low expectation about the 
technology/industry hampers risky investments necessary to trigger a sustained process of 
innovation.   
• Brazil is significantly stronger than the U.S. in building capability in the 
downstream market (F8) throughout the whole period. This advantage affected the gap in 
the overall performance of the ethanol innovation system between the two countries in 
some ways:   
o In Brazil, FFVs use hydrated ethanol, while in the U.S. consumers fuel 
FFVs with anhydrous ethanol blended with 15% gasoline. Because hydrated 
                                                 
 
 
41 The blending limit with gasoline in the U.S. is 10%. The market of ethanol is reaching 10% of the 
gasoline market, and there are not enough ethanol pumps to boost sales of E85. 
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ethanol does not require a dehydration step, it tends to be less expensive than 
anhydrous ethanol. Moreover, Brazilians use ethanol at 100%, which does not 
require the blending operation with gasoline, as is the case of E85 in the U.S. 
These structural differences give Brazilians a cost advantage compared to the 
U.S.; 
o Because most FFVs in Brazil use ethanol, engines are tuned to run with 
ethanol. Therefore, they are designed with higher compression rates, taking 
advantage of high octane properties and higher energy density of ethanol 
compared to gasoline. In the U.S., most FFVs run on gasoline, and engines are 
tuned to run on gasoline; 
o In Brazil, sales of hydrated ethanol have substituted gasoline. In the U.S., 
ethanol has been a complement to gasoline, with a blending limit of 10% 
authorized by the EPA. As long as ethanol remains a complement, there is the risk 
of reaching the “blend wall”. This affects negatively how investors perceive the 
business (-F4). 
o Throughout the years, with the help of the Brazilian government, 
automakers in Brazil became participants in the ethanol innovation system. This 
has not been the case with automakers in the U.S, who through market forces, 
have developed their business participating more in the gasoline TIS than in the 
ethanol TIS.  
 
 The next two graphs, one for the U.S. and one for Brazil, map all the functions 
throughout the whole period of analysis. The graphs show the cumulative sum of events 
for each function in their respective positive and negative sides of the graph. The 
differentiation between positive and negative functions identifies whether the function 
contributes or is detrimental to the process of innovation of ethanol. According to the 
theory, we would like to see a growing trend towards the positive direction, ideally with 
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the largest number of lines going up. We see somewhat a growing trend in the positive 
side for the U.S., but much more timid than for Brazil. We see guidance of research (-F4) 
in blue falling down in the negative direction.  Brazil has a strong positive start, but has 
guidance of research (F4) and capabilities in the downstream market (F8) falling down in 














Figure 31: Brazil – Mapping the Functions of innovation 
 
 The next graphs show functions individually, by country, and by year. The lines 
represent the sum of positive and negative values of events for each function by country, 
for each individual year. This simplification helps compare the pattern of evolution of 
each function of innovation between the U.S. and Brazil42. The graphs in figure 32 
                                                 
 
 
42 Pearson correlation test, using a significance level alpha=0.05. r = coefficient of correlation 
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clearly reveal similar trends between the U.S. and Brazil for functions F1 
(entrepreneurship), F2 (knowledge creation), F5 (market formation), F6 (resource 
mobilization), and F7 (legitimation). The correlation between the U.S. and Brazil for 
guidance of research, F4, is weaker. The negative Pearson correlation confirms that the 
U.S. and Brazil have trends going into opposite directions, especially after the year 2005, 
when corn ethanol became more scrutinized for its long term sustainability and impacts 
in the food and feed markets.  
 The function capability in the downstream market (F8) shows the weakest 
correlation between the U.S. and Brazil (0.19), reflecting the contrast between the U.S. 
and Brazil in how the function building of capabilities in the downstream market 
influenced the innovation process of ethanol in the two countries. This quantitative result 
is consistent with the qualitative analysis presented in the narratives. Brazil starts 
building capability in the downstream market in the late 1970s, early 1980s, when it starts 
developing the distribution infrastructure and commercialization of cars running on 100% 
ethanol. Despite the downturn of the ethanol plan during the 1990s, the capability 
acquired earlier helped the ethanol comeback into consumers’ vehicles, this time into flex 
fuel vehicles with technology adapted to the Brazilian reality and technology. The United 
States did not start building capability in the downstream market for ethanol until the 
1990s, when automakers developed and implemented commercially the flex fuel engines. 
The new technology, however, has not had a significant impact into the innovation 
trajectory of ethanol, because most cars have not been able to use ethanol (E85). Most 
flex fuels (99%) use gasoline, because only few fuel stations offer E85 as an alternative 
for consumers. As a result, flex fuel engines have not been optimized to run on ethanol in 





 Figure32: Functions of innovation. Comparative analysis, correlation between the U.S. and Brazil 
(F1, F2, F4, F5, F6, F7). Source NYT, WP, OESP. Elaborated by own author. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 This dissertation explored the innovation dynamics of ethanol in the U.S. and in 
Brazil from 1975 to 2008. The quantitative and qualitative analyses just presented 
revealed that the two functions of innovation, Guidance of Research (F4) and Building of 
capabilities in the downstream market (F8) explain an important part of the differences in 
the innovation process between the U.S. and Brazil.  
Guidance of Research (F4): Guidance of Research is stronger for Brazil than for the 
U.S. In general, expectations about the Brazilian ethanol have been more positive when 
compared to the U.S. The graph in figure 32 shows that while Guidance of Research has 
had an overall positive effect on the innovation process of ethanol in Brazil, it has been 
detrimental to the innovation of ethanol in the U.S., especially after 2005. The negative 
correlation indicates trends for guidance of research going into opposite directions. Given 
the low penetration of ethanol in the gasoline market as a substitute of higher blends, this 
result suggests that clear policy goals and expectations about the technology play an 
important role in the innovation trajectory of emerging low carbon technologies such as 
biofuel ethanol. 
Building of capabilities in the downstream market (F8): the study shows significant 
differences in how the U.S. and Brazil built capabilities in the downstream market to 
advance their respective processes of innovation. The narratives and the low correlation 
between the U.S. and Brazil in this function support this conclusion. Taking into account 
events contributing and detrimental to the innovation process, Brazil has had a much 
higher positive impact than the U.S. during the last three decades. Brazil started building 
capabilities early in the period by developing the infrastructure for distribution of ethanol 
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and commercializing ethanol cars during the 1980s. This early experience reinforced the 
innovation in the upstream market, and helped Brazil regain a successful innovation path 
after the flex fuel vehicles came to the market in 2003. In the U.S., the development of 
capabilities in the downstream market was more limited to the development of flex fuel 
vehicles, without developing proper infrastructure for the distribution of ethanol fuel in 
the gas stations. The result has been most flex fuel vehicles in the U.S. running on 
gasoline and not on ethanol (E85). This result suggests that the function building of 
capabilities in the downstream market proposed in this dissertation is able to explain 
some of the differences in the trajectories of innovation of biofuel ethanol between the 
U.S. and Brazil during the last thirty years. 
 By using the functions of innovation and process analysis, this dissertation 
answered the following questions: 
1.Q   What are the differences between the functions of innovation of ethanol in the 
U.S. and Brazil? How have those differences evolved over time?  
The quantitative and qualitative analysis showed the following: 
F1 
Both countries had a similar number of positive events in entrepreneurial activity. In the 
U.S, entrepreneurship was more regional and centered in the Midwest in the beginning of 
the period. In Brazil, the military state was the main entrepreneur, controlling the whole 
innovation process of ethanol throughout the whole supply chain.  Entrepreneurial 
activity took off after the year 2000 for the two countries: in the U.S, thanks to the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and RFS, which mandated use of ethanol, and in Brazil, 
thanks to the successful launch of flex fuel vehicles.  
F2 
The data reveals that knowledge creation in Brazil was more intense than in the U.S. The 
results do not reflect the American leadership in R&D in cellulosic ethanol, a fact that is 
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supported by data available in international scientific databases. However, since events 
related to knowledge creation took into account gains in knowledge, skills, and 
competence in a broader sense, they included the positive experience Brazil had in the 
development of the engine running on 100% ethanol, and later the development and 
adaptation of the technology flex fuel. It also took into account improvements in the 
sugarcane and ethanol technology; and much of those happened through learning by 
doing. More recently, knowledge creation became more focused on R&D in second 
generation technology. In the U.S., the data also reflect more commitment towards 
research after the EPAct2005. At the end of the period, the gap is less dramatic between 
the two countries. 
F4 
U.S. and Brazil had a high number of negative events in Guidance of Research. The lack 
of long term goals and lack of definitions was recurrent throughout the period for the two 
countries. The data, however, shows Brazil gaining a positive pattern in the function after 
the beginning of sales of flex fuel vehicles. Brazil has had some bad criticism, in special 
coming from abroad about the long term sustainability of its program, but overall, it has 
had a positive balance. The positive Guidance of Research will have a positive influence 
in future investments and entrepreneurial activity of ethanol in the innovation of ethanol 
in Brazil. The U.S, on the other hand, has still a negative balance in the late period, and it 
relies on the future of cellulosic ethanol to regain long term trust for its sustainable future.  
F5 
Market Formation activities have the same intensity in the two countries. But they take 
place in different periods of time. Brazil begins earlier, reflecting the strong intervention 
of the military government in the beginning of the period. In the U.S, activities of Market 
Formation were first linked to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1992 and the New 
Oxygenated Fuels Program, which required oxygenated fuels to cut carbon monoxide 
pollution in certain areas of the country. The legislation opened the market for ethanol as 
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oxygenate. The Market Formation in Brazil in the late 1990s relate to new mandate 
programs established by the new democratic government to find new markets for ethanol. 
After the beginning of FFV sales in Brazil, when prices were deregulated, the 
government kept the mandatory gasoline blend with ethanol between 20 and 25%.  In the 
U.S., mandates established by EPAct2005 and strengthened by EISA2007 reflect most of 
the activities to stimulate the American market for ethanol in the late period. 
F6 
Brazil has twice the number of positive articles reporting events reflecting investments in 
ethanol than the U.S. However, the data does not take into account a large amount of 
investments made into cellulosic ethanol, especially after 2000 in the U.S. The data 
reveals that between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, the years of cheap oil, there was 
not much investment in ethanol in any country. However, the new millennium brought 
new priorities, and biofuels came back to the policy agenda as an alternative solution for 
climate change, energy security, and the volatility in oil prices. Investment activity 
became intense after 2000. In Brazil, it was stimulated by the positive expectations about 
the future of ethanol in the country. In the U.S, there was investment euphoria until 2007, 
but the market did not develop enough infrastructure for distribution and use of ethanol to 
take in the additional capacity at the speed expected by investors.  
F7 
The U.S. innovation system has built a strong lobby to advocate publicly for the interests 
of the industry. The function of legitimation for the U.S. is stronger than for Brazil. This 
makes sense, because under the dictatorship, the military government had total control to 
legislate over the innovation process of ethanol in Brazil. Also, a system of corporativism 
was prevalent in Brazil during the Proalcool program, and a close relationship between 
the state and the private sector remained strong after the democratic constitution of 1988 
(Goncalves Jr, Alves, Shikida, Staduto, & Freire Jr, 2008). With Brazilian ambitions 
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targeting the global market, and criticism affecting negatively the Brazilian industry, the 
country has now increased efforts to legitimate ethanol as a fuel at home and abroad. 
F8 
The data reveals the largest gap between the U.S. and Brazil in positive activities of 
Building of Capabilities in the Downstream Market. The multinational automakers in 
Brazil joined the Proalcool in the beginning of the period and took advantage of 
incentives offered by the government to expand the market for automobiles. However, 
the lack of ethanol led automakers to shift all production to gasoline cars during the 
1990s. By the late 1990s, the government promoted again the ethanol car, establishing the 
green fleet. Thus, function F8 had no activity during the 1990s. Automakers only joined 
the ethanol TIS again for the launching of the flex fuel vehicle, which happened after 
2000.  The flex fuel impact in the innovation trajectory of ethanol in the U.S. has had less 
impact than in Brazil, because no appropriate distribution infrastructure was in place. 
Moreover, automakers developed FFVs taking advantage of CAFE credits during a time 
when their main source of profit was to sell large and inefficient vehicles. Because most 
users of FFVs use gasoline, engines cannot be tuned to maximize the anti-knocking and 
energy density properties of ethanol, as it is the case in Brazil. Engines are tuned to run 
on gasoline, negating all benefits of the technology for potential users of E85  (Voegele, 
2010).  
    
2.Q   Which are the strongest and weakest functions in each country? How do they 
compare to each other? 
 
 According to table 4, the U.S. has made great efforts in legitimizing ethanol as 
fuel in the U.S. Since the beginning of the period, farmers, and corn producers had the 
support of legislators who helped advance important legislation for the industry. Some 
corporations such ADM still make efforts to influence the policy process relevant to the 
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business. It is interesting to note that while Legitimation is the “most positive function” 
for the U.S., Guidance of Research is the “most negative function” for the U.S., 
suggesting that the strong ethanol lobby has been acting to counteract the criticism, 
negative expectation, and lack of policy goals for the ethanol industry in the country (-
F4). Eventually, EPAct2005 and EISA2007 clarified policy goals, establishing mandates, 
and funding R&D. However, the debate over the sustainability of corn ethanol has not 
done well for the business, and expectations now turn to the timing of commercialization 
of cellulosic ethanol.  
 In Brazil, the “most positive function” has been F8 (Building of Capabilities in 
the Downstream Market). This function brought the innovation trajectory of ethanol into 
a nice path during the 1980s, but collapsed during the late 1980s and 1990s for a number 
of reasons. Some of the reasons include bad government planning and management, 
unforeseen decrease in oil prices, higher sugar prices in the international market, thus 
creating undersupply of ethanol in the Brazilian market. The function F8 rebounded with 
the development of the flex fuel technology. Brazilians used the concept developed in the 
U.S., but adapted to Brazilian conditions, using the knowledge generated during the 
Proalcool program. Like the U.S., the “most negative function” in Brazil is Guidance of 
Research. Data shows that the country achieved a sustained innovation path after the 
launch of flex fuel vehicles. Much of the history of the innovation of ethanol in Brazil has 
been marked by ups and downs, corruption, lack of policy goals, and very low 
expectations about the prospects of ethanol as a fuel.  
 
3.Q   What are the causal patterns that explain the outcomes of ethanol development 
for each country over time?  
 
 The narratives reveal that until the year 2000, there is not a sustained pattern of 
innovation in either country. The graphic representations of the evolution of the functions 
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of innovation show that it is only after the year 2000 that there is a building up of 
functions in the positive side. The narratives also reveal that neither of the countries 
developed a sustained market for ethanol until the year 2000. After 2000, the U.S entered 
a positive path with the passage of the Biomass R&D Act (guidance of research F4), 
creating funds for R&D of advanced biofuels (resource mobilization F6, knowledge 
creation F2). At the same time, the banning of MTBE as oxygenate raised expectations 
about market growth of ethanol as an additive (MTBE had 85% of the market at that 
time). The prospects of more R&D and market expansion of ethanol (guidance of 
research F4) had a positive impact in productive investments (resource mobilization F6) 
and entrepreneurial activity (F1). There was a surge of investments and plant 
constructions in the U.S. However, the investment euphoria did not take long because 
demand was not large enough to take in additional volumes in the long term. As has 
already been mentioned, main limitations were the blend wall and lack of pumps selling 
E85. The lack of capacity in the downstream market would bring financial pains to many 
investors in the sector (-F8).  
 Brazil entered a positive path of innovation after the successful launch of the flex 
fuel vehicles (capabilities in the downstream market F8), generating positive expectations 
about the ethanol market in the country (guidance of research F4). The flex fuel 
technology gave the needed flexibility to Brazilian consumers, who were able to choose 
the fuel at the pump. The timing coincided with larger crops of sugarcane, and low prices 
of ethanol. For the most part of the time, ethanol was less expensive than gasoline at the 
pump (prices were not controlled by the government anymore). High expectations drove 
investments to more production of sugarcane, and ethanol (resource mobilization F6, 
entrepreneurship F1), keeping the expectations about ethanol innovation high (guidance 
of research F4), closing the positive cycle of innovation. Given the success of the 
program, automakers invested to improve the flex fuel technology (resource mobilization 
F6, knowledge creation F2), taking greater advantage of ethanol properties. Flex fuel 
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sales reached 90% of new cars in Brazil (capabilities in the downstream market F8). The 
positive cycle remains, setting the ethanol TIS into a sustained innovation path.   
 The cases of U.S. and Brazil confirm what the literature has already reported 
previously that Guidance of Research (F4) is a trigger of the innovation process for low 
carbon technologies. As argued earlier, the expectation about the technology plays a 
critical role driving decisions of investments in R&D, and production. In the U.S and in 
Brazil, Guidance of Research (F4) after 2000 had a positive influence in investments in 
R&D (F2, F6), and in expanded capacity (F1). The same pattern was present in other 
cases of biomass digestion and biomass co-firing in Germany (Marko P. Hekkert & 
Negro, 2009; Negro & Hekkert, 2008); biomass gasification and biomass digestion in the 
Netherlands (Marko P. Hekkert & Negro, 2009); biofuels in Sweden and in the 
Netherlands (Hillman et al., 2008; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009); and biopower (CHP) in 
Sweden (Jacobsson, 2008). 
 The analysis of the new function of innovation proposed in this study, building of 
capabilities in the downstream market (F8), reveals differences in the innovation 
trajectory between the U.S. and Brazil. Moreover, as has been described in the narratives, 
a strong downstream market that works in coordination with the upstream market can 
play a positive role and accelerate the process of innovation. Brazil’s ethanol innovation 
system began recovering from a decade of no achievements by building capability in the 
downstream market (F8). The launching of flex fuels vehicles in 2003 was the critical 
factor for innovation to take off, because ethanol was the main fuel used by flex vehicles’ 
drivers. This indicates that the downstream market was taking part in the TIS trajectory in 
Brazil, thus driving policy and increasing expectations about the ethanol innovation in 
Brazil. The knowledge generated during the Proalcool (during the 1970s and 1980s) for 
the development of the ethanol car was useful to improve the competitiveness of ethanol 
in the new flex fuel technology. This was not the case in the U.S, where the 
commercialization of flex fuel vehicles has not influenced the innovation of ethanol. The 
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distribution of fuels in the U.S. is still “locked in” to gasoline, and a large investment is 
needed to build the necessary infrastructure for the appropriate distribution of E85 
through pipelines and in service stations. Government stimulus has not been sufficient to 
stimulate the private sector. This indicates that the downstream market in the U.S. has not 
been taking part in the innovation trajectory of ethanol. The figure below illustrates the 
contrast between the U.S. and Brazil in how their respective functions may act to bridge 
downstream and upstream market to accelerate the innovation process of ethanol. While 
in Brazil the downstream market (automobile industry – internal combustion engines) is 
more connected with the TIS ethanol than with the TIS gasoline, in the United States the 
downstream market remains more connected with the TIS gasoline. 
 
 





This study raises some relevant issues for innovation policy: 
1. The function of innovation guidance of research influenced innovation trends 
positively.  A strong and positive guidance of research induced innovation, 
while a weak or negative guidance of research was detrimental to the process 
of innovation in these cases. This finding has relevant policy implications:  
a. If guidance of research is an inducer of innovation, then it is critical that 
policy makers set clear policy goals about a technology. Clear policy goals 
increase expectations about the technology, and decrease the risk that is 
inherent to the innovation process. It is important that policy makers and 
advocates supporting the development of the technology maximize 
information exchange among the participants of the innovation system at 
all levels, so that goals, needs, and perceptions are homogeneous within 
the policy community.  
2. Still related to guidance of research, the results show that expectations about an 
emerging technology can induce or be detrimental to the innovation of such 
technology. The case of ethanol in the U.S. has shown that the negative 
expectation about corn ethanol (resulting from the food vs fuel debate, and the 
debate of the long term sustainability of corn ethanol) has been detrimental to 
the process of innovation of biofuel in general. A specialist in the industry in 
the U.S. has confirmed this assertion by interview. Advanced biofuels are still 
considered risky investments.  However, the negative perceptions about corn 
ethanol are not always supported by the facts. As Chapter 3 has claimed, corn 
ethanol can be produced using modern technologies that are more efficient 
and less carbon intensive.  
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a. The results suggest that the U.S. government at the present time should be 
more aggressive and provide more incentives for plants investing in 
technologies to produce advanced corn ethanol. It should also inform 
consumers and other stakeholders about the innovation happening in the 
1st generation technology. The creation of a positive expectation is critical 
until the 2nd generation technology is ready to be on the market. This is 
particularly true because many investors in cellulosic ethanol are large 
producers of corn ethanol, like POET, the largest producer of corn ethanol 
in the U.S.   
3. This dissertation also found that the function of innovation building of capabilities 
in the downstream market induced innovation in Brazil and was detrimental to 
the process of innovation in the United States. This finding also has important 
policy implications: 
 
a. In the case of ethanol in the U.S., it seems that automakers do not have the 
same motivation to innovate in E85 as they have in combustion engines 
running on gasoline. This is understandable, since they still operate under 
a system that functions under “carbon lock-in”. As long as there is not the 
critical infrastructure to sell E85 to consumers, automakers do not have 
enough incentives to invest in flex fuel technology. The results suggest 
that the American government should create incentives for automakers 
and distributors (oil companies) to join or share more space within the 




 This dissertation analyzed the innovation process of biofuel ethanol in the U.S. 
and in Brazil, the two largest producers of biofuels in the world. By using a functional 
approach to explain innovation, it identified two factors playing a significant role in the 
success of the innovation process of ethanol in these countries.  As society becomes 
increasingly pressed by the challenges of energy security and climate change, it becomes 
urgent to improve the field of innovation studies with the necessary tools to better 
measure and assess the innovation of low carbon technologies. The findings presented in 
this dissertation represent an effort in this direction: an additional contribution to the 





Appendix A - Functions of Innovation Systems – Codebook 
 
 Function Name Definition Code Description Values 
F1 Entrepreneurial 
Activities 
Events that reflect growing or 
diminishing industrial capacity, 
new projects and plants 
 
(Investments will focus on 
specific plants or projects)  
Announcement of new ethanol production plant, or acquisition of 
plant, expansion of ethanol production. 
+1 
 










Events related to Research, 
Development, and Demonstration 
of technologies 
Feasibility studies or new projects exploring ethanol  +1 
A new patent on ethanol +1 
 
Any research efforts on alternative fuels (alcohols-methanol, 
butanol) 
+1 
Any development (R&D, demonstration, pilot) on advanced 




Feasibility studies using alternative fuels vehicles (AFV), 
including flex fuel vehicles (FFV) 
+1 
 
Tests of automobiles, buses, or trucks running on biofuels  
(obs). Biodiesel goes under “context” 
+1 
 
 Function Name Definition Code Description Values 
F3 Knowledge 
Diffusion 
Events related to knowledge 
networks that promote interaction 
and exchange of information 




F4 Guidance of 
Research 
Events that help the selection of 
technological options, or those 
related to the enactment of policy 
targets. They also reflect the 
expectations about the 
technological options expressed 
by the various actors. 
Studies generating positive expectation about the technology +1 
Study reports positive results from debate food vs fuels. Biofuels 
do not compromise food supply in the long term. 
+1 
Positive results from studies about alcohol fuels +1 
Positive results from using alcohol fuels in racing cars or other 
automobilist event 
+1 
New legislation promoting the use of alternative fuels +1 
Positive results from car or engine testing ethanol or other alcohol 
fuels 
+1 
Environmental legislation regulating emissions from gasoline; 
government support to alternative fuels.  
 
+1 
Banning of MTBE as fuel additive (ethanol competitor) or finding 
MTBE toxic 
+1 
Ethanol more competitive than gasoline, E10 or gasohol more 
competitive than pure gasoline 
+1 
Positive market results, profitable ethanol industry +1 
Conflicting goals in public financing for the new technology or 
new policy program 
-1 
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Debate or conflicting interests around the technology, debate over 
future of ethanol industry 
-1 
Negative market results: lower demand or undersupply -1 
Negative expectations or negative outlook about the technology – 
based on studies or reports (food vs fuels, water consumption, 
deforestation, negative energy balance, negative results in tests in 
cars, engines, etc) 
-1 
Alcohol rejected as alternative to comply with legislation for clean 
fuels 
-1 
Sugar is preferred in detriment of alcohol 
 
-1 
Tax cut to oil companies -1 
Negative results about alternative fuels program (proalcool is 
criticized based on negative performance) 
-1 
 Function Name Definition Code Description Values 
F5 Market 
Formation 
Events that facilitate the market 
penetration of the emerging 
technology 
Tax breaks to ethanol producers and blenders or any legislation 
putting a price on carbon from fossil fuels or giving a price 





Mandates in general, for alternative fuels (E85 and E10), 
alternative fuels vehicles (FFV, AFV). This includes adoption of 










Events related to physical and 
human investments, be public or 
private.  





Funding for R&D activities or facilities for ethanol and/or green 








Loans, or financing for new plants or increased capacity for 

































 Function Name Definition Code Description Values 
F7 Legitimation Events related to lobbies, 
coalitions (interest groups, NGOs, 
industry associations) or political 
forces (congressional and 
executive leaders)  
Lobbying (advocating publicly) in favor of developing or 




Ethanol strong, high visibility in the policy agenda. Law makers 




Public presidential or political support for ethanol and alternative 













Car makers advocate for more distribution infrastructure (pumps) 


























 Function Name Definition Code Description Values 




Events that reflect the 
development of capabilities in the 
distribution and in the automobile 
segments 
Start or increase in ethanol (E85) or ethanol blend (E10) 





New cars in the market that can run on alternative fuels; increased 




Tax incentives for cars running on ethanol +1 
 













Legislation (loophole) increase production of FFV SUVs that end 




Sale problems with ethanol cars (because of technical issues) 






(S&T)2ConsultantsInc. (2009). An examination of the potential for improving 
carbon/energy balance of Bioethanol. (No. Task 39 Report T39-TR1): 
International Energy Agency Task 39. 
Alic, J. A., Mowery, D., & Rubin, E. S. (2003). U.S. Technologies and Innovation 
Policies. Lessons for climate change.: Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
 
Arraes, P. (2006). Renewable fuels: the Brazilian experience: Embrapa, Ministerio da 
Agricultura e do Abastecimento. 
Arrow, K. J. (1962). The Economic implications of learning by doing. Review of 
Economic Studies, 29(2). 
Azanha Ferraz Dias de Moraes, M., & Rodrigues, L. (2006). Brazil Alcohol National 
Program. 
Baffes, J., & Haniotis, T. (2010). Placing the 2006/08 Commodity Price Boom into 
Perspective (No. WPS5371). Washington DC: World Bank. 
Bake, J. D. V. (2006). Cane as a Key in Brazilian Ethanol Industry. Understanding cost 
reductions through an experience curve approach. (Thesis). Utrecht University. 
Bake, J. D. V., Junginger, M., Faaij, A., Poot, T., & Walter, A. (2009). Explaining the 
experience curve: Cost reductions of Brazilian ethanol from sugarcane. [Article]. 
Biomass & Bioenergy, 33(4), 644-658. 
Bergek, A., Jacobsson, S., Carlsson, B., Lindmark, S., & Rickne, A. (2008). Analyzing 
the functional dynamics of technological innovation systems: A scheme of 
analysis. Research Policy, 37(3), 407-429. 
Bergek, A., Jacobsson, S., & Sandén, B. A. (2008). Legitimation and development of 
positive externalities: two key processes in the formation phase of technological 
innovation systems. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 20(5), 575 - 
592. 
Berger, E. M., & Cozzens, S. E. (2009). International Research Collaboration in Small 
and Big Science: Comparing Global Research Output Between Biofuels and 
Neutron Scattering. Paper presented at the 2009 Atlanta Conference on Science 
and Innovation Policy. from http://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/32253 
Bernton, H., Kovarik, W., & Sklar, S. (2010). The Forbidden Fuel. A history of power 
alcohol. (reissue from original 1982 ed.). Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
Bettelheim, A. (2006). Biofuels boom. CQResearcher, 16(34), 793-816. 
 183
Bevill, K. (2008). Study: Biomass benefits ethanol. Ethanol Producer Magazine. 
BNDES, & CGEE. (2008). Sugarcane-based bioethanol: energy for sustainable 
development. 
Brown, M., Chandler, J., Lapsa, M., & Sovacool, B. (2007). Carbon Lock-In: Barriers to 
Deploying Climate Change Mitigation Technologies: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. 
Capehart, T., Schnepf, R., & Yacobucci, B. D. (2008). Biofuels Provisions in the 2007 
Energy Bill and the 2008 Farm Bill: A Side-by-Side Comparison (No. RL34239). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Carlsson, B. (1995). Technology Systems and Economic Performance: the case of factory 
automation. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Carlsson, B., & Braunerhjelm, P. (2002). The Biomedical Clusters in Ohio and Sweden: 
an overview. In B. Carlsson (Ed.), Technological Systems in the Bio Industries. 
An international study. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Carlsson, B., Elg, L., & Jacobson, S. (2006). Reflections on the Co-evolution of 
Innovation Theory, Policy and Practice: the emergence of the Swedish agency for 
innovation systems. Journal. Retrieved from 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/events/ocs/viewabstract.php?id=228 
Carlsson, B., Jacobsson, S., Holmen, M., & Rickne, A. (2002). Innovation systems: 
analytical and methodological issues. Research Policy, 31, 233-245. 
Carlsson, B., & Stankiewicz, R. (1991). On the nature, function and composition of 
technological systems. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1, 93-118. 
Carlsson, B., & Stankiewicz, R. (2002). The analytical approach and methodology. In B. 
Carlsson (Ed.), Technological systems in the bio industries: an international 
study. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Castro, N. J., Brandao, R., & Dantas, G. (2009). Importancia e Perspectivas da 
Bioeletricidade Sucroenergetica na Matriz Eletrica Brasileira.   Retrieved 
09/03/2010, from www.unica.com.br 
Cooke, P. (2001). Regional innovation systems, clusters and the knowledge economy. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4), 945-974. 
David, P. (2000). Path Dependence, its Critics, and quest for "Historical Economics". 
Journal. Retrieved from http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/0502/0502003.pdf 
Dosi, G. (1982). TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
TRAJECTORIES - A SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION OF THE 
 184
DETERMINANTS AND DIRECTIONS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE. [Article]. 
Research Policy, 11(3), 147-162. 
Earley, J., & Mc Keown, A. (2009). Red, White, and Green: transforming U.S. biofuels. 
Washington, DC: WorldWatch Institute. 
Edquist, C. (2005). Systems of innovation: perspectives and challenges. In J. Fagerberg, 
D. C. Mowery & R. R. Nelson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
EERE/Biomass. (2009). Multi-Year Program Plan. Washington, DC: DOE/EERE - 
Office of Biomass Program. 
EIA. (2002). Petroleum Chronology of Events. from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/chronology/
petroleumchronology2000.htm 
EPA. (2009). EPA Lifecycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Renewable 
Fuels. Retrieved. from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420f09024.pdf. 
Foxon, T., Kohler, J., & Neuhoff, K. (2008). Innovation in Energy Systems: learning 
from economic, institutional and management approaches. In T. K. Foxon, J.; 
Oughton C. (Ed.), Innovation for a Low Carbon Economy. Economic, 
Institutional and Management Approaches. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc. 
Foxon, T., & Pearson, P. (2008). Overcoming barriers to innovation and diffusion of 
cleaner technologies: some features of a sustainable innovation policy regime. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 16, S148-S161. 
Foxon, T. J., Gross, R., Chase, A., Howes, J., Arnall, A., & Anderson, D. (2005). UK 
innovation systems for new and renewable energy technologies: drivers, barriers 
and systems failures. Energy Policy, 33(16), 2123-2137. 
Freeman, C. (1987). Technology Policy and Economic Performance: lessons from Japan. 
London: Pinter. 
Galli, R., & Teubal, M. (1997). Paradigmatic shifts in national innovation systems. In C. 
Edquist (Ed.), Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and 
Organizations (pp. 342-370). London: Pinter Publishers. 
GAO. (2009). Biofuels. Potential Effects and Challenges of Required Increases in 
Production and Use. Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability 
Office. 
Geller, H. (2003). Energy Revolution. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Gerring, J. (2001). Causation. In Social Science Methodology. A criterial framework. 
 185
 . New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gerring, J. (2007). Case Study Research. Principles and practices. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Goldemberg, J. (2007). Ethanol for a sustainable energy future. Science, 315, 808-810. 
Goldemberg, J. (2009). The Brazilian Experience with Biofuels. Innovations, 4(4), 91-
123. 
Goldemberg, J., Coelho, S. T., & Guardabassi, P. (2008). The sustainability of ethanol 
production from sugarcane. Energy Policy, 36(6), 2086-2097. 
Goldemberg, J., Coelho, S. T., & Lucon, O. (2004). How adequate policies can push 
renewables. Energy Policy, 32, 1141-1146. 
Goldemberg, J., & Guardabassi, P. (2009). The Potential for First-Generation Ethanol 
Production From Sugarcane. Biofuels Bioproducts & Biorefining-Biofpr, 4(1), 17-
24. 
Goncalves Jr, C. A., Alves, Y. B., Shikida, P. F. A., Staduto, J. A. R., & Freire Jr, W. R. 
F. (2008). Um Estudo da Camara Setorial do Acucar e do Alcool Usando Analise 
de Correspondencia. Paper presented at the XLVI Congresso de Economia, 
Administracao, e Sociologia Rural.  
Hakes, J. (2008). A Declaration of Energy Independence: how freedom from foreign oil 
can improve national security, our economy, and the environment. Hobokem, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Hekkert, M. P., Harmsen, R., & de Jong, A. (2007). Explaining the rapid diffusion of 
Dutch cogeneration by innovation system functioning. Energy Policy, 35(9), 
4677-4687. 
Hekkert, M. P., & Negro, S. O. (2009). Functions of innovation systems as a framework 
to understand sustainable technological change: Empirical evidence for earlier 
claims. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 76(4), 584-594. 
Hekkert, M. P., Suurs, R. A. A., Negro, S. O., Kuhlmann, S., & Smits, R. (2007). 
Functions of innovation systems: A new approach for analysing technological 
change. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 74(4), 413-432. 
Hettinga, W. G. (2007). Technological Learning in US Ethanol production. Copernicus 
Institute. Utrecht University, The Netherlands. 
 
Hettinga, W. G., Junginger, H. M., Dekker, S. C., Hoogwijk, M., McAloon, A. J., & 
Hick, K. B. (2009). Understanding the reductions in US corn ethanol production 
costs: An experience curve approach. [Article]. Energy Policy, 37(1), 190-203. 
 186
Hillman, K. M., Suurs, R. A. A., Hekkert, M. P., & SandÃ©n, B. r. A. (2008). 
Cumulative causation in biofuels development: a critical comparison of the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 20(5), 
593 - 612. 
Holdren, J. P. (2006). The Energy Innovation Imperative. Addressing oil dependence, 
climate change, and other 21st century energy challenges. Innovations, Spring 
2006. 
Holt, M., & Glover, C. (2006). Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary and Analysis of 
Enacted Provisions. Retrieved. from. 
IAEA. (2006). Brazil: a country profile on sustainable energy development. Vienna: 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 
IEA. (2000). Experience Curves for Energy Technology Policy. Paris, France: OECD. 
IEA. (2006). The energy situation in Brazil: an overview.: OECD. 
IEA. (2009a). Transport, Energy, and CO2. Moving toward sustainability. Paris, France: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. International Energy 
Agency. 
IEA. (2009b). World Energy Outlook 2009. Paris, France: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. International Energy Agency. 
Jacobsson, S. (2008). The emergence and troubled growth of a 'biopower' innovation 
system in Sweden. [Review]. Energy Policy, 36(4), 1491-1508. 
Jacobsson, S., & Bergek, A. (2004). Transforming the energy sector: the evolution of 
technological systems in renewable energy technology. [Review]. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 13(5), 815-849. 
Jacobsson, S., & Johnson, A. (2000). The diffusion of renewable energy technology: an 
analytical framework and key issues for research. Energy Policy, 28(9), 625-640. 
Jensen, M. B., Johnson, B., Lorenz, E., & Lundvall, B. A. (2007). Forms of knowledge 
and modes of innovation. [Article]. Research Policy, 36(5), 680-693. 
Kamis, R., & Joshi, M. (2008). Biofuel Patents are Booming. Washington, DC: Baker & 
Daniels. 
Kline, S., & Rosemberg, N. (1986). An Overview of Innovation. In R. L. a. N. 
Rosemberg (Ed.), Positive Sum Strategy (pp. 275-305). Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press. 
Kohler, J., Grubb, M., Popp, D., & Edenhofer, O. E. J., 17-55. (2006). The Transition to 
Endogenous Technical Change in Climate-Economy Models: A Technical 
 187
Overview to the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project. Energy Journal, 17-
55. 
Koshel, P., & McAllister, K. (2010). Expanding Biofuels Production: sustainability and 
the transition to advanced biofuels. Summary of a workshop. Washington DC: 
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and National 
Research Council 
  
Kram, J. W. (2007). Shrinking Ethanol's Carbon Footprint. Ethanol Producer Magazine. 
Leite, R. C. (1990). PRO-ALCOOL. A unica alternativa para o futuro. Campinas, Brazil: 
Editora Unicamp. 
Leite, R. C. D., Leal, M., Cortez, L. A. B., Griffin, W. M., & Scandiffio, M. I. G. (2009). 
Can Brazil replace 5% of the 2025 gasoline world demand with ethanol? 
[Proceedings Paper]. Energy, 34(5), 655-661. 
Lundvall, B. A. (1992). National Systems of Innovation. Towards a theory of innovation 
and interactive learning. London: Pinter Publishers. 
Lundvall, B. A. (2007). Innovation System Research. Where it came from and where it 
might go. 
Lundvall, B. A. (2007). National Innovation Systems - Analytical Concept and 
Development Tool. Industry and Innovation, 14(1), 95-119. 
Lundvall, B. A., Johnson, B., Andersen, E. S., & Dalum, B. (2002). National systems of 
production, innovation and competence building. Research Policy, 31, 213-231. 
Malcolm, S. A., Aillery, M., & Weinberg, M. (2009). Ethanol and a Changing 
Agricultural Landscape (No. Report 86): U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Economic Research Service. 
Malerba, F. (2002). Sectoral systems of innovation. Research Policy, 31(2), 247-264. 
Martines-Filho, J., Burnquist, H. L., & Vian, C. E. F. (2006). Bioenergy and the rise of 
sugarcane-based ethanol in Brazil. Choices, 21(2). 
Mayer, S. L. (1995). Implementing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: where are we 
now? (No. 95-234 ENR). Washington, DC: Library of Congress. 
Moreira, J. R., & Goldemberg, J. (1999). The alcohol program. Energy Policy, 27, 229-
245. 
Morey, R. V., Tiffany, D. G., & Hatfield, D. L. (2006). Biomass for electricity and 
process heat at ethanol plants. [Article]. Applied Engineering in Agriculture, 
22(5), 723-728. 
 188
NAS. (2009). Liquid Transportation Fuels from Coal and Biomass. Technological status, 
costs, and environmental impacts. Washington, DC: National Academies of 
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and National Research Council. 
Negro, S. O. (2007). Dynamics of Technological Innovation Systems. The case of 
Biomass energy., Utrecht University. Netherlands, Utrecht. 
Negro, S. O., & Hekkert, M. P. (2008). Explaining the success of emerging technologies 
by innovation system functioning: the case of biomass digestion in Germany. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 20(4), 465-482. 
Negro, S. O., Hekkert, M. P., & Smits, R. E. (2007). Explaining the failure of the Dutch 
innovation system for biomass digestion - A functional analysis. Energy Policy, 
35(2), 925-938. 
Nelson, R. R. (1993). National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nelson, R. R. (2002). Technology, institutions, and innovation systems (vol 31, pg 265, 
2002). Research Policy, 31(8-9), 1509-1509. 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Technical Change: 
Belknap Press. 
OECD. (2008). Economic Assessment of Biofuel Support Policies. Paris, France: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
Pierson, P. (2003). Big, Slow-Moving, and ...Invisible. Macrosocial processes in the 
study of comparative politics. In J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.), 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Poole, M. S., Van de Ven, A. H., Dooley, K., & Holmes, M. E. (2000). Organizational 
Change and Innovation Processes. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Popp, D., Newell, R., & Jaffe, A. B. (2009). Energy, the Environment, and Technological 
Change. Journal. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org.www.library.gatech.edu:2048/papers/w14832.pdf 
RFA. (2009). Growing Innovation. Washington, DC: Renewable Fuels Association. 
RFA. (2010). Climate of Opportunity. Washington, DC: Renewable Fuels Association. 
Rickne, A. (2000). New Technology-Based Firms and Industrial Dynamcis: Evidence 
from the Technological System of Biomaterials in Sweden, Ohio and 
Massachusetts. PhD Thesis. Chalmers University. 
 189
Rosenberg, N. (1982). Learning by using. In Inside the Black Box (pp. 120-140): 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rosillo-Calle, F., & Cortez, L. A. B. (1998). Towards ProAlcool II - A review of the 
Brazilian bioethanol programme. [Article]. Biomass & Bioenergy, 14(2), 115-124. 
Royal Society. (2008). Sustainable biofuels: prospects and challenges. London: The 
Royal Society. 
Sandalow, D. (2006). Ethanol: lessons from Brazil, in A high growth strategy for ethanol: 
Aspen Institute Policy Dialogue. 
Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional advantage: culture and competition in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative Behavior: a study of decision making processes in 
administrative organizations. (4th ed.). New York: Free Press. 
Stephan, P. E. (1996). The Economics of Science. Journal of Economic Literature, 34(3), 
1199-1235. 
Stern, N. (2007). Stern review: The economics of climate change.: HM Treasury. 
Suurs, R. A. A., & Hekkert, M. P. (2009). Competition between first and second 
generation technologies: Lessons from the formation of a biofuels innovation 
system in the Netherlands. Energy, 34(5), 669-679. 
Unruh, G. C. (2000). Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 28(12), 817-830. 
Unruh, G. C. (2002). Escaping carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 30(4), 317-325. 
Unruh, G. C., & Carrillo-Hermosilla, J. (2006). Globalizing carbon lock-in. Energy 
Policy, 34(10), 1185-1197. 
US DOE. (2000). Outlook for biomass ethanol production and demand.: Energy 
Information Administration, Joseph DiPardo. 
US DOE. (2009). Annual Energy Outlook 2009. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration. 
USDA ERS. (2007). Feed grains backgrounder: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service. 
Van de Ven, A., & Poole, M. S. (2000). Methods for Studying Innovation Processes. In 
A. Van de Ven, H. L. Angle & M. S. Poole (Eds.), Research on the Management 
of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Voegele, E. (2010). Driving up Demand. Ethanol Producer Magazine, February 2010. 
 190
Walter, A., Rosillo-Calle, F., Dolzan, P., Piacente, E., & da Cunha, K. B. (2008). 
Perspectives on fuel ethanol consumption and trade. Biomass & Bioenergy, 32(8), 
730-748. 
Wang, M., Hong, M. W., & Huo, H. (2007). Life-cycle energy and greenhouse gas 
emission impacts of different corn ethanol plant types. Environmental Research 
Letters, 2(2). 
Wang, M., Wu, M., Huo, H., & Liu, J. H. (2008). Life-cycle energy use and greenhouse 
gas emission implications of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol simulated with the 
GREET model. International Sugar Journal, 110(1317), 527-+. 
WorldWatch_Institute. (2006). Biofuels for Transport: Global Potential and Implications 
for Sustainable Energy and Agriculture. London: Earthscan. 
Wyman, C. E. (2001). Twenty years of trials, tribulations, and research progress in 
bioethanol technology. Applied Biochemistry and Biotechnology, 91-93. 
Yacobucci, B. D., & Bracmort, K. S. (2009). Calculation of Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions for the Renewable Fuel Standard. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
Yacobucci, B. D., & Capehart, T. (2008). Selected Issues Related to an Expansion of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) (No. RL3465). Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
